Join Mailing List
Thank you! Your submission has been received!
Oops! Something went wrong while submitting the form.
02-15-2003
Continued European Union resistance to US plans for a quick blitz of Iraq is forcing the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia to choose sides. Caucasus nations have so far tended to side with the United States. Central Asian countries, meanwhile, appear divided with Uzbekistan generally backing Washington’s position, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan drifting toward the European viewpoint.
EU leaders, meeting at an emergency summit February 17, issued a statement demanding Iraq’s immediate and unconditional disarmament. At the same time, the EU insisted that an attack against Iraq should be the option of "last resort." Russia has come out in support of the European position, which contrasts sharply with Washington’s. The Bush administration seems intent on launching military operations possibly within weeks.
In staking out positions on the Iraq question, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus are influenced heavily by their own individual relationships with the United States, EU and Russia. The rise of radical Islam in both regions, Central Asia in particular, is also a major factor.
Georgia and Azerbaijan consider Washington as their main benefactor, especially following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The same holds for Uzbekistan. All three countries have prickly relationships with Russia and are wary that Moscow desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in the old Soviet space.
Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated after Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5 speech to the United Nations Security Council that there was sufficient evidence to justify Washington’s stance. "Powell’s address + reinforced the US call for more decisive and dramatic steps to exclude any possibility of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction or resources and technologies for their production," the Interfax news agency quoted Kamilov as saying.
In Georgia, internal politics have exerted influence on the government’s Iraq position. President Eduard Shevardnadze, whose domestic popularity is at or near its nadir, is reluctant to alienate the United States, which has emerged over the last 18 months as Tbilisi’s key strategic partner. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Another influence on Shevardnadze is the fact that during his tenure as Soviet foreign minister he worked closely with Washington during the first Iraq war. In explaining his Iraq position, the Georgian president openly admits that his administration considers itself obligated to support Washington.
"The totalitarian regime [in Iraq], which produced weapons of mass destruction, poses an enormous threat to the region and to the whole world. This is why it must be punished," Shevardnadze said recently. "Another reason for Georgia assuming this stand on the Iraqi problem is that the United States has rendered enormous assistance to Georgia since 1992. This is why our duty is to support the friendly country [the United States]."
Azerbaijan has also expressed support for the United States on the Iraq question, but in a somewhat more equivocal fashion. A recent foreign ministry statement, for example, lauded US efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, while calling for a settlement to be resolved in full compliance with the UN charter.
Armenia has traditionally excellent ties with the Arab countries and a thriving Diaspora in Lebanon and Syria. Armenian foreign policy is also viewed as pro-Russian. Nevertheless, some statements issued by the Armenian foreign ministry are cautiously supportive of the US position. Jyunik Agadjanian, a foreign ministry official, stated earlier in February that "Iraq’s disarmament is inevitable, otherwise the situation could lead to undesirable consequences," the Arminfo news agency reported. "Official Yerevan supports the complete and unconditional disarmament of Iraq."
"Colin Powell’s data submitted to the Security Council deepened Armenia’s concern over the Iraqi issue," Agadjanian continued.
Support for the United States is far from universal. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the Central Asian nations most leery of the Bush administration’s rush to war in Iraq. Their chief concern appears to be that the looming campaign to oust Saddam will subtract from Washington’s commitment to stabilization efforts in Central Asia, including countering the expansion of radical Islamic activity in the region. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Such concerns are pushing Astana and Bishkek to support the EU’s preferred course of action.
"The UN Security Council must issue authorization to handle such questions," the Itar-Tass news agency quoted Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev as saying in late January. "A one-sided war in Iraq would be a great mistake. In their hearts and souls the peoples of Islamic states are absolutely against this war that can only bring about integration of the world extremist forces."
Some of Nazarbayev’s domestic political opponents suggest the president’s Iraq stance in part is influenced by ongoing investigations in both the United States and Switzerland into bribe-taking by top Kazakhstani government officials. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. They add that Nazarbayev is keen to score points with both Russia and the EU, seeking to cultivate additional sources of political support as a hedge against the bribery scandal, known as Kazakhgate. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives].
Kyrgyzstan, bolstered by the recent deployment of Russian aircraft at the Kant military base, also echoed a Russian position. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Kyrgyz officials have expressed opposition to Washington’s use of Manas Air Base in potential military operations against Iraq.
12-17-2002
The Bush Administration is reacting calmly to the Russian Air Force’s deployment of planes at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan, which Russia announced in early December. The deployment is relatively small and temporary, but the muted American response to it indicates broader trends in American strategic policy toward Russia.
Scholars and observers say the placid American response to the December 5 announcement may indicate that China has emerged as a more important variable in Central Asia. Dmitri Gorenburg, Director of Russian and East European programs at a think tank called the Center for Naval Analyses, believes that Washington no longer views Russian military maneuvers through a competitive lens. (Gorenburg’s group advises the Pentagon.) A National Security Council official who covers Central Asia supported this assessment. "We are beyond seeing Russian troop deployment in Central Asia through the prism of US-Russian rivalry," said this person, on condition of anonymity. "This is no longer a zero-sum game. We hope the Russians know this."
Washington and Moscow, Gorenburg says, are emerging as a twinned alternative to Chinese hegemony. Russia and Central Asian states, however, do not want China to deploy troops in the region. Concerns about China are dovetailing with longstanding interest among Russia and its Collective Security Treaty allies in the development of a rapid reaction force in the region.
"President Putin is doing what Moscow experts were recommending throughout the 1990s," says Irina Kobrinskaya, director of the international cooperation program at Moscow’s National Project Institute-Social Contract. "It was obvious as early as 1995 that Russia has not economic capacity to deploy adequate forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus." Therefore, Russia had to ‘internationalize’ the peacekeeping there. The force did not come together after a series of car bombs in Tashkent, Uzbekistan nearly killed President Islam Karimov on February 16, 1999. Nor did it develop after the United States struck alliances with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan prior to the forays Americans led into Afghanistan in autumn 2001. According to some analysts, though, it was these alliances that spurred Russia’s deployment in Kyrgyzstan.
Moscow security sources believe that the military lobbied for Kant deployment to balance out US presence in Central Asia. President Putin agreed to these requests to placate generals and citizens who treat Western deployment in Central Asia as a long-term threat to Russia. If this analysis is correct, the deployment’s modesty is telling. American officials contend that Putin knows Russia’s limited budget reserves and military hardware cannot support adequate force structure along its periphery. That weakens Russian bases in Georgia, Armenia and Tajikistan and leaves soldiers at these bases poorly trained. If American troops pulled out of Central Asia, the thinking in the Pentagon goes, the Russians could not adequately protect the region on their own or within a CIS framework.
This traditional Russian military defensiveness, though, seems to coexist with a new emphasis on partnership with the United States. On the "old thinking," say sources from a Center for Naval Analyses seminar that convened in late November, Moscow tries to match Washington’s military reach and spending. On the new thinking, Moscow recalls its alliance with Washington in Balkan peacekeeping efforts – and welcomes the possibility of similar partnership in Central Asia.
Washington military analysts point out that the new Russian-led aircraft contingent in Kyrgyzstan seems weak in comparison with the American deployment at the Manas air base nearby. On December 16, according to Russian news agency Itar-Tass, US Ambassador John O’Keefe marked that base’s first anniversary by praising its "high standard." Russia’s group, which includes Russian, Kazakh and Kyrgyz aircraft, would provide cover for 5,000 CIS rapid deployment soldiers. By December 16, however, only two SU-25 ground attack jets and two SU-27 fighters were deployed, and the SU-27 will be returning soon to their permanent bases. These planes do not seem combat-ready. Russian presidential and defense staff and accompanying journalists from the base made an emergency landing in Kazakhstan; some sources knowledgeable about the episode blamed poor Kyrgyz jet fuel.
The American-led force in Kyrgyzstan includes 20 F-16 fighters and over 2,000 troops, deployed primarily to support the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. The Russian-CIS deployment can complement this force, and provide the basis for Russia-NATO cooperation envisaged in the NATO-Russian Treaty signed in May. As Russian and US military experts point out, conventional deployments do not necessarily harness the intelligence and special-forces capability that countries need to fight stateless foes such as al Qaeda. To truly battle terrorism, American and Russian leaders must support broad extra-military strategies designed to promote political participation, civil society and the rule of law. On this score, both the American-led deployment and the new Russian-CIS outpost in Kyrgyzstan seem unlikely to provide fresh answers any time soon.
04-24-2002
President Putin’s recent State of the Federation address clearly indicates that Russia puts increased emphasis on the CIS in its foreign policy. Moreover, it indicates an understanding that security and economic imperatives dictate that countries in the region pursue pluralistic and "multi-polar" policies. Moscow will emphasize its military ties, security cooperation, infrastructure projects, and cultural and educational cooperation to boost its influence in the region. Yet the military may not be satisfied with the official line, and the FSB is for the first time officially working outside Russia’s borders.
BACKGROUND: In his state-of-the-Federation address on April 18, Vladimir Putin made one thing perfectly clear: the Commonwealth of Independent States will remain the top priority of the Russian foreign policy. Putin’s speech contained altogether nine paragraphs dealing with foreign affairs, and seven of them were dedicated to the so-called "near abroad." Putin put Russian interests in the context of Russian security, claiming that the problem of whether or not to support the anti-terrorist coalition "did not even exist" for Russia. But taking into account the two tense weeks between the September 11 attack and the clear statement by Putin that Russia will cooperate with the U.S. in full, it stands to reason that there was a debate behind the Kremlin walls over what the right course of action should be. Furthermore, Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov first stated that the NATO troops will not have basing rights in Central Asia, only to be overruled by Putin later, when resistance would in any case have been largely futile.
In his speech, Putin took credit for the "liquidation of the most dangerous center of international terrorism in Afghanistan" by "common efforts." He stated that on September 11 "many in the world realized the Cold War is over" and that the new war is going on - against international terrorism. Putin claims that Russian foreign policy will be entirely pragmatic. He called CIS, the post-Soviet half-house, a "real factor of stability on the vast territory…an influential association of states."
The key paragraph in the speech proclaimed that "work with the CIS states is the main foreign policy priority of Russia, a priority linked to achieving competitive advantages in global markets." He stressed implementation of large infrastructure projects in transportation and energy to boost regional integration. He also mentioned integration through "humanitarian" and educational projects, calling to boost the number of students from the CIS countries in Russian colleges financed by the Russian government up to 1 percent of the total, recalling the USSR’s similar attempt to attract students from Third World countries to develop a cadre of sympathetic elites. Putin’s speech was, on the whole, peaceful. He stated that the only way Russia will challenge foreign countries was through economic competition. However, the Russian military put a different spin on recent developments in the region. Spokesmen for the Russian Defense Ministry have repeatedly warned against the long-term U.S. domination of Central Asia after September 11.
IMPLICATIONS: On April 15, The Russian military launched a large-scale anti-terrorism exercise called South Anti-terror, under the umbrella of the CIS Antiterrorist Center in Bishkek, and the Collective Rapid Reaction forces - a rather small structure built around a reinforced battalion from the 201st Infantry Division located in Tajikistan.
Participants in the exercise included forces from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Repellling a mock terrorist attack, the allied states would provide support to border guards and army units of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force, augmented by heavy military hardware, and the air force. Unlike previous maneuvers, this exercise was supervised by Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which until now had jurisdiction in the Russian Federation only. Part of the exercise was to share with the Central Asian allies what it ’learned’ in the Chechen campaign.
Other powers are also active in the region. The U.S. is trying to protect the Afghan interim administration of Hamid Karzai, and supports the upcoming Loya Jirga (a tribal conclave to decide the next Afghan government) in June. Li Peng, the former Prime Minister and the head of the National People’s Congress of China, and Artur Chilingarov, a deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, have recently discussed concerns in Central Asia at the third annual session of the Association of Asian Parliaments for Peace; and Mohammad Khatami, the President of Iran, has begun a nine day visit to Central Asia on April 22, while analysts and experts attach special importance to the Caspian summit in Ashghabat, where the Caspian Sea and its legal regime are to be discussed.
Challenges to Russian interests also come from inside the region. On the eve of the Caspian summit, Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurad Turkmenbashi Niyazov once again tried to revive the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline. Turkmenbashi suggested that the construction a 1,500 kilometer power line and a highway parallel to the pipeline will serve as guarantees of stability in Afghanistan.
In view of this complicated regional picture, Putin’s speech reflects Russia’s recognition of the limits to its power - something the Russian military has a hard time coming to grips with. While Russia may plan to boost its military presence and conduct exercises in the near term, a multi-polar security environment is gradually emerging in the region. Russia will try to protect what it perceives as its vital interests, especially in the energy sector. Opposition to alternative pipeline routes from the region that would decrease local states’ dependence on Russia is likely to be a major cornerstone of this policy. For example, Gazprom, the Russia natural gas monopoly, is anxious to maintain control over the export of gas, and is likely to fight Turkmenbashi tooth and nail on the trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline. Russia is also likely to carefully prepare for power transitions in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and eventually in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and work behind the scenes for pro-Russian candidates to come out on top in the succession struggles.
CONCLUSIONS: In the long term, Russia will not be able to dominate a Central Asia that already witnesses deployment of U.S. military power. China-Russia cooperation along the horizontal axis, and an India-Russia coordination along the vertical axis are in the cards. With American presence and a new security environment in the region, Russia will take the CIS in general and Central Asia in particular more seriously than before. The weakness of the Russian bureaucracy and decision-making process, as well as the lack of reform in the military and security services, represent, however, serious impediments to Russia’s power projection in the region. Putin is focused on defending Russian economic, especially energy, interests first and foremost, and on promoting integration in the military, security, business, and cultural spheres. However, pursuing their own national agendas, the countries of Central Asia are likely to pursue "multi-vector" foreign policies and will attempt to maximize their benefits by playing regional powers - and the U.S. - against each other.
03-27-2002
The Bush Administration has allowed the North Caucasus broadcasts of Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe to go ahead on April 3. These 15-minute broadcasts from Prague will include programming in Chechen, to which the Russian government strongly objects. The Bush Administration’s decision to take action may be interpreted as support for the Chechens, and may complicate its relationship with Putin at the time the U.S. troops are poised to take on terrorist elements in the Pankisi Gorge. However, the reasons for this action may be distant from the Caucasus and have roots in domestic policy and electoral politics.
BACKGROUND: Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty is planning to launch its North Caucasus service, including controversial broadcasting in the Chechen language, on April 3. The newest radio service was scheduled to go on the air in the Chechen, Avar, Circassian and Russian languages on February 28 of this year, but at the last moment Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, the second highest ranking U.S. Department of State official, had pulled the plug.
Armitage intervened with the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which ordered the Radios to postpone the broadcasts, and to cover the region through its Russian service. BBG is a body appointed by the President of the United States, which supervises the U.S. international radio broadcasters, such as Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America. Radio Liberty is funded by the U.S. Congress and is nominally independent from the executive branch of the U.S. Government.
The North Caucasus service was mandated by the U.S. Congress, the Radios’ funder, in 2000, and then-Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (Republican of North Carolina) led the charge for its creation.
Russian officials viewed the genesis of the service in conspiratorial terms. They suggested that Helms’s staff member for Russia Ian Brzezinski, spearheaded the effort together with Paul Goble, then-Director of Public Affairs at Radio Liberty. The two are supporters of the Chechen independence, the Russian officials alleged. Mr. Goble is currently a senior executive with The Voice of America.
The North Caucasus broadcasts will be conducted from the Radios HQ in Prague, and will last 15 minutes in each of the four languages. According to Andrey Sharyi, the Moscow bureau chief of Radio Liberty, the Chechen and other broadcasts for North Caucasus will be separate and independent from the Russian service, which uses AM and FM frequencies in Russia.
Mr. Sharyi refuted accusations that Radio Liberty supports the separatists: "The position of the Russian service on the Chechnya war has always been the same: calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, defense of human rights and [coverage of] humanitarian issues. There will be no changes in our position," Sharyi said.
IMPLICATIONS: Russia has long seen Radio Liberty broadcasts in Chechen as a direct affront. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reportedly spent half an hour complaining to Colin Powell about the pending broadcasts in January. The Kremlin Administration reportedly threatened to pull Radio Liberty AM/FM broadcasts off the air and shut down the Moscow bureau.
While Yastrezhembsky later denied media reports and limited himself to a promise to monitor the broadcasts "in accordance with the law," Minister of the Press Mikhail Lesin warned that the U.S. radios’ actions are "improper." Lesin said that his ministry will "address the situation from the position of information security" and added that Russian legislation on incitement to ethnic conflict "should be observed, and that measures will be taken if laws are broken."
Vremya Novostei, a Moscow weekly with ties to the Kremlin, compared the Chechen broadcasting to Radio Liberty’s Radio Free Iraq and the Farsi Service, which broadcasts to Iran. The weekly pointed out that the broadcasts are calling for regime change in these countries.
Radio Liberty Russian broadcasters, speaking on the condition of anonymity, expressed concern that the Government of Russia may actually shut down their large Moscow bureau and deny access to the coveted AM and FM frequencies. "No one listens to short wave any longer," they said, referring to the World War Two technology which was is still used to beam U.S. international
broadcasting around the world. "And it is not clear how the station management will monitor broadcasts in rare languages, such as the Chechen, which very few Americans know." The issue of editorial control will be crucial to keep the broadcasts from becoming a major friction point in the U.S.-Russian relations.
CONCLUSION: At the time of the delay, the U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated on the record that broadcasting would be counterproductive in the campaign against terrorism and because of the talks between the Russians and Chechens. What has changed?
A Radio Liberty memo and State Department sources agree that factors as diverse as the Republican Party strategy to win 2004 presidential elections, and the lobbying power of the U.S. poultry industry had played a role in changing the mind of Mr. Armitage.
To win the crucial, mostly blue-collar states of West Virginia and Pennsylvania in 2002 Congressional and 2004 presidential elections, Republicans needed to protect the shaky steel industry there. Thus the imposition of steel import tariffs earlier this month, that would hit Russian exports of steel to the U.S. In retaliation, on March 10, the Russians limited imports of American chicken legs, since the late 1980s colloquially referred to as "Bush’s legs," after the current president’s father, George H.W. Bush. And Tyson’s Chicken, the U.S. poultry giant, weighed in with its considerable Washington lobbying power, to send a message to the Russians on the necessity of chicken imports.
Last but not least, the Congress, protective of its prerogatives to fund foreign policy priorities, insisted that the Radios’ North Caucasus service must go ahead, thus rejecting the earlier State Department position postponing the broadcasts indefinitely. In February, the U.S. Senate launched a bipartisan initiative spearheaded by Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota), and Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Missouri), seeking the adoption of a resolution on Chechnya which would require President Bush to pressure Russia for a negotiated settlement. In the end, all these factors led to the U.S. reversal on Chechen broadcasting.
01-16-2002
The transformation of the Central Asian Economic Commonwealth into the Central Asian Cooperation (CAC) comes as regional cooperation is desperately needed in the broad array of issues, from national security to environmental protection. However, past performance, petty rivalries, and the lack of economic and trade expertise make the prognosis cautious for the newly created body at best. Lacking adequate budget and trained staff, the new organization may face a mountain of mandates and lack of resources - a well-known prescription for failure.
BACKGROUND: The last days of December 2001 witnessed the creation of yet another regional association in the territory of the former Soviet Union: the Central Asian Cooperation (CAC). It was born after a number of bilateral and multilateral meetings in Tashkent on December 27-28 between the host, President Islam Karimov, and Presidents Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, and Imomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan. The "permanently neutral" Turkmenbashi was absent. The new organization replaces the Central Asian Economic Commonwealth, and joins the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Cooperation Commonwealth (EEC); the GUUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova); and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as yet another attempt at searching jointly for regional political and economic cooperation solutions.
This time, the regional powers, such as Russia and China, the godfathers of SCO, were absent from the scene and none of the aspirants for regional influence, Pakistan, India, Iran or Turkey, were present either. Presumably, New Delhi and Islamabad had other fish to fry at the moment, or trying to avoid frying each other. Speaking at the press conference on December 28, President Karimov declared that CAC would have in its purview issues of military policy, economy, and humanitarian cooperation. This is understandable in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the four founding members declared that they will work together to create joint electricity, gas, transportation and irrigation networks.
The Tashkent Declaration, adopted by participants, proclaims an increase in political, economic and humanitarian cooperation; joint fight against international terrorism; drug smuggling; and religious and political extremism. The leaders patted themselves on the back for maintaining "stability" for 10 years after the Soviet collapse, and "maturity" in dealing with divisive and complex issues, such as water and road building. In the negotiations preceding the quadrilateral summit, Presidents Karimov and Imomali Rakhmonov covered issues of mutual trade ($80 million in the first three-quarters of 2001); border delineation; and security and law enforcement cooperation. To boost trade, Uzbekistan promised to loosen restrictions and open its borders to Tajik transit trade. Tajikistan will receive $12 million debt forgiveness (10 percent of the total debt), and Uzbekistan promised to restructure the rest of the debt ($108 million). Dushanbe is also hoping to receive more Uzbek oil and gas for hydroelectric power it generates. There were also promises of reduced tariffs on goods imported to Uzbekistan from Tajikistan and talk about cutting the price of the Uzbek natural gas flowing to Tajikistan.
IMPLICATIONS: Central Asia desperately needs joint efforts to solve a number of problems, from trans-border terrorism and border delineation, to environmental threats, to trade and foreign investment and refugees. In this sense, efforts to improve regional cooperation are needed. However, the prognosis must remain guarded - for four reasons.
First, Uzbek landmines have killed dozens of civilians since Tashkent buried thousands of mines along its borders, fearing radical Islamic incursions. This breeds resentment and suspicion between Uzbekistan and its neighbors. Uzbekistan behaved in a heavy-handed way, throwing its weight around in order to receive water from Kyrgyzstan for free. Persistent refusal of Tashkent and Astana to pay for water - the vital resource of the arid region, left a bitter taste in the mouths of many in Kyrgyzstan. According to sources in Bishkek, Tashkent also violated the gas-for-water agreement with Kyrgyzstan, starting in August 2001. However, the Uzbeks are fond of reminding that they are selling gas at about half price comparing to the prevailing global prices: In 2002, Tashkent would like to raise the price from $42 to $45for a thousand cubic feet.
Second, the true trading bloc is not likely to emerge, as there is almost melodramatic obsession with honor and prestige, little bureaucratic culture of compromise, and squabbles and suspicions between the top leaders. These suspicions, and fear of alien domination, have also hampered the development of closer economic ties with Moscow and Beijing within the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth. Despite the common and equal roots in the Soviet nomenklatura hierarchy, some leaders see themselves as more equal than others.
Third, the scarcity of trade and market economic expertise is a major impediment. After all, the Western Europeans managed to launch the European Economic Community (EEC), and later the European Union, only after prior experience with customs unions, such as the pre-unification Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Western European domestic economic models were more or less defined after World War Two, which is not the case in Central Asia.
Today, Uzbekistan is still struggling to make its currency convertible; there are serious problems with privatization and capitalization of state-owned enterprises in all countries of the region; and the rule of law facing serious challenges. In such conditions, developing a workable economic association is a truly Herculean task.
CONCLUSIONS: Despite the need for regional cooperation, the chances for success for the CAC remain tenuous. After all, nothing changed fundamentally since the launch of its predecessor, the Central Asian Commonwealth, and GUUAM has so far failed to create a trading organization. An equitable free trade association or a customs union is still far away, despite the positive historical experience with such formations. This is because the region consists of two larger and resource-rich countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) which are vying for local domination, and two small, poor and weak states: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Russia is not likely to let the former dependencies to go their own merry way. Moscow controls practically all oil and gas pipelines out of the region, and is likely to frown at the gas pipeline to be constructed via Afghanistan, to take Turkmen and Uzbek gas to the Pakistani and Indian markets. Moreover, Moscow is likely to attempt to revitalize the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth, which also includes Russia, and Belarus in addition to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. With the former KGB general Grigory Rapota at the helm of EEC, and the Kremlin controlling 40 percent of the EEC voting rights, Moscow is likely to keep the Central Asian falcons under its gimlet eye.
Telling the BBC that he is “disappointed but not done with Vladimir Putin,” President Donald Trump has threatened 100% tariffs against Russia, including secondary tariffs against countries that help dodge sanctions on the Kremlin’s energy exports., The U.S. Senate is considering a bill to give the president the ability to impose additional “sledgehammer” measures with up to 500 percent secondary sanctions. Under pressure, Moscow is expanding its hydrocarbon exports by boosting LNG shipments to the Asian markets from Siberia’s Yamal Peninsula. On June 26th, the Russian tanker Iris docked at Arctic LNG 2 terminal, a joint venture between Russia’s Novatek, Chinese CNPC and CNOOC, and Mitsui and JOGMEC, marking the first departure from the sanctioned facility since October 2024.
Read the full article here
A major Russian military buildup on the border with Ukraine has recently sparked fears of a potentially dramatic escalation in the simmering seven-year conflict between the two countries. Although tensions have eased somewhat following Moscow’s April 22 announcement of troop withdrawals, the threat of a new Russian offensive remains.
