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Sino-Russian Military Maneuvers: A Threat to U.S. Interests in Eurasia
09-30-2005
Peace Mission 2005, the unprecedented Sino-Russian joint military exercises held on August 18-25, should raise concerns in Washington. The war games are a logical outcome of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 2001, and the shared worldview and growing economic ties between the two giant powers.
Moscow and Beijing view U.S. predominance in the post-Cold War world as a threat to their power. The steadily improving Sino-Russian partnership is limiting and may significantly diminish the U.S. strategic presence in the Eurasian landmass from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea.
Notwithstanding China-s and Russia-s best efforts to undermine U.S. influence in Eurasia, Washington can take some steps in the short to medium term to manage this challenge effectively. Specifically, the U.S. should:
Strengthen military, security, and economic cooperation with India and Japan, including cooperation on joint business projects in the Russian Far East and Central Asia;
Secure observer status for the U.S. in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and
Use U.S. public diplomacy to focus attention on the problems inherent in closer Sino-Russian relations.
The War Games
China and Russia kicked off Peace Mission 2005 at a joint ceremony in Vladivostok, just 30 miles from the North Korean border. The war games involved nearly 10,000 troops (including 1,800 Russian military personnel); scores of advanced aircraft (including Russian TU-95 and TU-22 heavy bombers, which can carry cruise missiles); and army, navy, air force, marine, airborne, and logistics units from both countries.
For the first time, Russia demonstrated for the Chinese the supersonic -carrier-buster- cruise missile Moskit, one of the most advanced weapons in the Russian arsenal and a weapon clearly designed to get the attention of the U.S. Navy.[1] The combined operations were conventional and looked like a preparation for a large-scale maritime landing.
The war games included large-scale troop maneuvers on China-s Shandong peninsula, located on the Yellow Sea near North Korea. However, despite the proximity to North Korea, observers should not infer that the war games are a signal to Pyongyang to make progress in the six-party talks. For their part, Moscow and Beijing have disingenuously declared that the maneuvers are aimed at combating terrorism, extremism, and -separatism- (a veiled reference to Taiwan).[2] None of these is a credible explanation.
The Russian daily Nezavismaya Gazeta was more blunt about the purpose of the war games: -This is above all an assault on the uni-polar world that has so suited Washington since the end of the Cold War.-[3] Chinese commentators were similarly frank. Jin Canrong, professor of international relations at the People-s University of China, stated that -[t]he main target is the United States. Both sides want to improve their bargaining position in terms of security, politics, and economics.[4] As Pravda.ru announced, -the reconciliation between China and Russia has been driven in part by mutual unease at U.S. power and a fear of Islamic extremism in Central Asia.-[5]
The Second Honeymoon
Relations between Russia and China have steadily improved since 1986, when Mikhail Gorbachev was General Secretary of the Soviet Union. After the February 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and especially during the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, Russia emerged as China-s primary supplier of advanced weapons systems.[6] The two countries have since completed the demarcation of their borders and launched wide-scale cross-border trade.
The Moscow-Beijing axis is not unprecedented. In February 1950, China and the former Soviet Union signed a formal alliance aimed at the U.S. and its allies in Asia. The alliance reached its peak during the Korean War. Ideological strains split the alliance in 1956 after Premier and Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin-s crimes and rebuffed Chairman Mao Zedong-s demand to be recognized as a co-leader of the global communist movement. By 1969, Moscow had signaled to Washington that it intended to launch a preemptive strike on China-s nuclear facilities and perhaps even initiate -regime change- in Beijing.[7] The prospect of Soviet hegemony in Eurasia led President Richard Nixon to go to China and prompted an urgent U.S. campaign to enlist China in America-s containment strategy against the Soviet superpower.
Today, however, Moscow and Beijing share a belief in a multipolar world, which means diluting American global supremacy and opposing the U.S. rhetoric of freedom and democracy. China traded support for the heavy-handed Russian tactics in Chechnya for Russian support for Chinese demands to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.[8]
Kicking Out the U.S. Military. During the July 6 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[9] in Astana, Kazakhstan, Beijing and Moscow demanded that the U.S. provide a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Central Asia.[10] On July 31, Uzbek President Islam Karimov notified Washington that the U.S. should withdraw its forces from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase.
In other words, the anti-American axis has already begun to work. However, in the long term, by keeping Central Asian dictators in power, Sino-Russian efforts will likely have the perverse effect of strengthening the cause of radical Islamists and lead to more extremism and violence in the post-Soviet Muslim areas and in China-s Xinjiang province.[11]
Iran. Both China and Russia have close relationships with Iran. Energy-starved China has signed a 25-year $50 billion deal to develop and import oil and liquid natural gas from the giant South Pars field in Iran. Other projects under discussion are potentially worth $200 billion. The Russian military-industrial and nuclear complex benefits from large-scale contracts with Iran, including construction of the $800 million Bushehr nuclear reactor.[12] Given these economic ties, it is likely that Russia and China will veto any proposed U.N. Security Council economic sanctions on Iran for violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Geo-economics. The growing geostrategic cooperation between Russia and China against the U.S. in Central Asia also has a geo-economic dimension. While U.S. and other multinational major oil companies successfully developed large energy projects in the Caspian basin in the 1990s, China eyed oil and gas in Russia and the Caspian region to satisfy its own rapacious appetite.
China has signed deals with Kazakhstan for the construction of oil and gas pipelines, multibillion-dollar deals with Russia on long-term oil and gas supply, and an agreement with Islam Karimov to supply Uzbek gas. China is also interested in building an oil pipeline from Siberia to the city of Daikin in northeast China and has bid $4.2 billion for the Canada-based PetroKazakhstan oil company.[13] To achieve its strategic goals, China is interested in keeping U.S. companies out of Eurasia and delimiting U.S. power projection in the region.
Responding to the Challenge
The willingness of both Moscow and Beijing to participate in these joint maneuvers lies in the fact that each country now views the other as its -strategic rear.- Some believe that Russia-s aims are the more benign, while China-s are worrisome to the U.S., Japan, and especially Taiwan.
Several press reports indicate that Moscow wanted to limit the recent military exercise to the Central Asian region, where the danger that pro-extremist forces might take over a national regime is highest, while China insisted that the drills be held in China opposite Taiwan.[14] The Shandong site was evidently a compromise and should not be seen as a hopeful sign that China and Russia are pressuring North Korea.[15] Finally, a Taiwanese newspaper claimed that China is apparently paying for the entire cost of the war games.[16] China is the primary instigator of Peace Mission 2005 and is paying handsomely to send a message to the United States that China is the rising power in East Asia.
Given this reality, the United States can take prudent steps to curtail the temptation on either side to enter into a closer alliance. The Bush Administration should expand its diplomatic dialogue in Central Asia to emphasize security and economic issues. In the context of U.S. commitments to the global war on terrorism, Central Asia must continue to be a top-tier strategic concern in Washington.
Washington needs to formulate a clear strategy to preserve U.S. influence in the region, develop energy resources, cultivate democratic reforms, and oppose authoritarianism. Specifically, the Bush Administration should:
Strengthen military, security, and economic cooperation with India and Japan, including cooperation on joint business projects in the Russian Far East and Central Asia. The Bush Administration should strengthen U.S. military cooperation with India in conventional forces, missile defense sensor and signal processing technologies, and information warfare. These are areas in which India and the U.S. could collaborate usefully with value added to both sides. The U.S. should seek greater diplomatic and intelligence cooperation with India on security issues in Central Asia. Washington and Tokyo could expand military exercises and intelligence-gathering programs focusing on Russia and China.
Most important, however, Washington should continue to court both New Delhi and Tokyo aggressively in the economic arena-launching joint projects in oil, gas, natural resources, manufacturing, and other sectors in Russia-s Pacific Far East and in Central Asia in order to gain influence throughout the region.
Expand cooperation against radical Islamist groups and drug trafficking in Central Asia. Radical Islamist subversion in Central Asia is a threat to regional and global security. Opposing Islamist terrorism and militancy is a joint interest for all powers involved in the area. The U.S. Department of State and the intelligence community should launch joint working groups and task forces to collect intelligence on, intercept the communications of, and neutralize radical Islamist organizations and drug trafficking operations. This can be accomplished under the umbrella of the U.S.-Russia Anti-Terrorism Working Group, co-chaired by R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Sergei Kislyak, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia.
Secure observer status for the U.S. in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. One of the current SCO members, such as Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, should suggest U.S. observership in the organization. To avoid a veto of such a suggestion by Moscow or Beijing, Washington should persuade friendlier hosts of future SCO summits to invite U.S. observers as a formal prerogative of the host, as well as persuade Moscow and Beijing to agree to U.S. participation. Some SCO members, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have already indicated that they are amenable to this.
Use U.S. public diplomacy to focus attention on the problems inherent in closer Sino- Russian relations. Russians have had many apprehensions regarding China, especially its intentions in the Russian Far East and Siberia.[17] U.S. diplomats in Moscow should explain American concerns about Russian-Chinese military cooperation.[18] The State Department-s public diplomacy strategy should be to encourage debate on Sino-Russian relations in Russia and involve the U.S. academic community, non-governmental organizations, U.S. international broadcasting, and the Russian media.
Conclusions
The balance of power in Eurasia may be changing-and not in favor of the United States. However, as the Sino-Russian relationship develops, the Russian bear might not be so comfortable with the Chinese dragon, at which point a renewed Russian interest in a genuine partnership with the United States may emerge. Developing a policy to address this challenge will require monitoring Sino-Russian -friendly- developments and pursuing proactive policies aimed at preventing the bear and the dragon from getting closer.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. William Schirano, Research Assistant in the Davis Institute, assisted in preparing this report.
[1]See Agence France-Presse, -Chinese, Russian Defense Chiefs Assess Joint Exercises,- August 24, 2005, at www.defensenews. com/story.php-F=1054075&C=asiapac
(August 25, 2005). China-s Sovremenny-class destroyers are armed with Moskit cruise missiles.
[2]Al Pessin -Rumsfeld Not Concerned About Russia-China Exercises, Experts Divided,- Voice of America News, August 23, 2005, at www.voanews.com/english/2005-08-23-voa60.cfm
(August 24, 2005).
[3]Reuters, -Sino-Russian War Games Move on to China,- Yahoo! News, August 20, 2005, at news.yahoo.com/s/nm/china_russia_dc (August 24, 2005).
[4]Ibid.
[5]-Chinese, Russian First Joint Military Maneuvers Scheduled on Aug. 18-25,- Pravda.ru, August 2, 2005, at newsfromrussia. com/world/2005/08/02/60899.html
(August 24, 2005).
[6]Tung Yi, -Russian Experts Said Helping PRC Make High Tech Weaponry,- Sing Tao Jih Pao, September 6, 2000, p. A39. Areas of cooperation extend to submarine construction (including advanced models 93 and 94) and the Jian J-10 fighter jet, nuclear weapons development, cruise missiles, and jet propulsion.
[7]Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 183.
[8]BBC Monitoring, -Sino-Russian Joint Statement Excerpts,- BBC News, December 10, 1999, at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ monitoring/558306.stm(August 24, 2005).
[9]The SCO member states are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and China.
[10]Robert Burns, -Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Troops Can Stay for Now,- Union Leader (New Hampshire), August 2, 2005, at www.theunionleader.com/articles_showa.html?article=58557
(August 24, 2005).
[11]Ariel Cohen, -Uzbekistan-s Eviction Notice: What Next-- Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 978, August 18, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/em978.cfm.
[12]U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, -Iran,- March 2005, at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html(August24, 2005).
[13]Ibid.
[14]Mark Magnier and Kim Murphy, -An Exercise Fit for Sending U.S. a Message; Joint Troop Maneuvers by China and Russia This Week Point to Wariness About America-s Strong Presence in Their Backyards, Analysts Say,- The Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2005, p. A5.
[15]Wu Min-chieh, -Choice of Venue for Military Exercises -Kills Two Birds With One Stone,-- Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), August 19, 2005, p. 1.
[16]-China Paid for Wargames: Newspaper,- The Taipei Times, August 20, 2005, p. 4, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/ 2005/08/20/2003268462 (September 29, 2005).
[17]See Burt Herman, -Chinese Presence Grows in Russian Far East,- Associated Press, August 24, 2005.
[18]See editorial, -U.S. Ambassador Complains to Russia RE Arms Sales to China,- International Broadcasting Board, July 29, 2002, at www.ibb.gov/editorials/10034.htm
(August 25, 2005).
08-18-2005
On July 31, Uzbek President Islam Karimov served notice on the Pentagon that the U.S. should vacate the Karshi–Khanabad military base (K-2 in military parlance) within six months. In the post- 9/11 era, this is the first time that a U.S. ally has not only abandoned the battlefield—as Spain did in Iraq—but also shown American servicemen the door. After years of complaining that the United States has not done enough to counter terrorist threats, Karimov did what his Islamist foes have demanded all along: He demanded an end to the American “infidel” presence in Uzbekistan.
Clinging to Power. Karimov took this drastic step because he believed that the U.S. policy of support for democracy might lead to a “multicolor” revolution in Uzbekistan, which is predominantly Muslim but has a secular government. Indeed, Mr. Karimov’s authoritarian practices, which have left the population impoverished and intimidated, have built up internal political pressure that could lead to a social explosion and destabilization.
When Uzbek troops killed hundreds of civilian protestors while trying to put down an Islamist uprising in the city of Andijan on May 13, Washington joined other Western governments in demanding an international investigation. In response, Uzbekistan limited night flights at K-2, which is located 90 miles north of the Afghanistan border. When the United States supported the evacuation of Uzbek refugees from camps in neighboring Kyrgyzstan to Romania, including some suspected militants—that Karimov demanded be repatriated—the curtain went down on K-2.
Geopolitical Context. In July, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) demanded that the United States provide a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces from Central Asia. The SCO is a regional bloc dominated by Russia and China that includes all five Central Asian states, with India, Iran, and Pakistan as observers. Beijing and Moscow are clearly using the SCO to establish their dominance between the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic Sea, as evidenced by the joint Sino–Russian military maneuvers involving 10,000 personnel scheduled for August 18–25. The SCO is also becoming a vehicle to keep dangerous democratic ideas out of the region. Moscow and Beijing appear to have exerted pressure on Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to send the U.S. military packing, but so far only Karimov has obliged.
Although the Uzbek move ostensibly demonstrates the SCO’s power, in reality, it probably has as much to do with Karimov’s need for international protection for his regime. Russia and China are willing to disregard the human rights violations of authoritarian regimes in order to draw them into their orbit. Thus, after the Andijan massacre, Beijing greeted the visiting Karimov with a golden handshake—a $600 million natural gas contract. Moscow stated that the repression was an “internal affair” of Uzbekistan and did not join demands for an international investigation. However, Karimov will likely wake up one day and find himself being squeezed between the two giants.
What Should Be Done. The United States can continue operations in Afghanistan without K-2. In fact, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has already visited Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and has made arrangements for alternative bases. Manas, Kyrgyzstan, near the capital Bishkek, is likely to take the brunt of the displaced U.S. cargo air traffic and support missions. Other U.S. assets will be relocated to the Bagram and Kandahar airfields in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the United States is still interested in maintaining a presence in Uzbekistan—civilian and military. First, overflight rights are important. Second, the Ferghana Valley is a hotbed of Islamist unrest and needs monitoring. Third, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration wants to maintain a foothold.
To secure its geopolitical presence in Central Asia, the U.S. should:
Conclusion. U.S. interests in Central Asia are long-term and will not disappear with the evacuation of the Karshi–Khanabad military base. The U.S. needs to follow a long-term strategy that includes fighting the war against terrorism, securing U.S. vital interests, and promoting freedom in Eurasia’s heartland.
Time to Relaunch Ukraine’s Economic Policy
06-14-2005
Ukraine is an important American geostrategic priority in Eastern Europe. Many U.S. policymakers and experts believe that Ukraine’s integration into the global economy, and Europe in particular, will change the geopolitical balance in Eastern Europe and could trigger positive changes in other post-Soviet states. Above all, it will benefit the people of Ukraine. Therefore, the outcome of Ukrainian reforms is important for U.S. foreign policy.
Since the events leading to the Orange Revolution in Kiev, the U.S. government has supported Viktor Yushchenko, who became president of Ukraine in January 2005, and his political allies. The Bush Administration has spent over $60 million on Ukrainian democratic transition, and the fiscal year 2005 supplemental budget includes a similar amount. However, Ukraine’s economic policy has been derailed since Yushchenko took power, for the following reasons:
The lack of a free-market vision at the highest level of the Ukrainian government;
The breakdown of governmental economic decision-making mechanisms;
An inadequate judiciary and a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy;
Continuous violation of property rights and excessively complicated taxation, which is implemented in an arbitrary fashion;
Anti-market and protectionist policies pursued by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko; and
Insufficient integration into the global economy due to the parliament’s reluctance to pass the necessary laws.
The conflict between President Yushchenko’s pro-market declarations and his cabinet’s centralizing instincts and confused performance has resulted in an economic policy that appears to be statist and populist in nature. This year’s track record lags behind 2004 economic achievements, which included gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 12 percent and an over 200 percent increase in the Ukrainian stock market.
Lackluster Performance
Key indicators of the Ukrainian economy have deteriorated since the beginning of 2005, endangering the future of the Yushchenko Administration.
Macroeconomic Indicators. The results of the populist policies have been immediate. In the first four months of 2005, GDP growth plunged to an annual rate of 5 percent while inflation surged to 15 percent.[1] Construction contracted significantly, by 5.9 percent per year in the first quarter of 2005 compared to the first quarter of 2004. Metallurgy also declined by 3.6 percent in the first quarter due to increased input costs, especially energy costs.[2]
Privatization. The new government has promised a new privatization deal that has prompted lengthy discussions about what should be reprivatized and how it should be done. The government has drafted a broad law that could undo much of Ukraine’s privatization. This has endangered the property rights of thousands of enterprises.
The new government has not executed its controversial plans for renationalization and subsequent reprivatization of Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine’s biggest steel mill. In an apparent exercise in corruption and nepotism, the giant plant was originally bought for 10 percent of its fair market value by a consortium that included then-President Leonid Kuchma’s son-in-law and close supporters of then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich.
President Yushchenko has also appointed Valentina Semenyuk as the new privatization “czarina.” Semenyuk hails from the Socialist Party and is on record as opposing privatization.[3]
Budget and Taxation. In the first quarter of 2005, the consolidated budget had a surplus of 3.85 percent of GDP. Budget revenues increased by 31 percent, and expenditures rose by 23 percent. However, concerns remain about the government’s ability to collect enough revenue to finance its debt payments and social expenditures, including those promised by Yushchenko during his presidential campaign. These include increased benefits for the newborn and the disabled, as well as raising pensions and minimum wages by 42 percent in the first quarter of 2005.[4]
In March, the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) adopted amendments to the 2005 budget envisioning a budget deficit equal to 1.86 percent of GDP. The budget accounts for the ambitious increases in pensions and the minimum wage but uses overly optimistic estimates of revenue growth.[5] In reality, the government is scrambling to find more revenue. Discretionary tax exemptions have been abolished in a hurried and incompetent fashion. This has forced tens of thousands of small entrepreneurs to close their businesses or to shift operations into the black market economy.[6]
Policy Discord. The government does not speak with one voice. First Vice Premier Anatoly Kinakh is one of the vocal critics of the prime minister’s policies. He has publicly criticized the introduction of price controls and the imbalance between social and economic policy in the 2005 national budget.[7]
Inflation and Prices. Ukraine has the highest inflation rate in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The inflation increased from 13.3 percent annually in February to 14.7 percent in April.[8] According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, the annual inflation rate for January–May 2005 was 14 percent, compared to 7.2 percent for the same period in 2004.
Relaxed fiscal policies and falling savings rates have encouraged greater consumption, which has led to higher food prices, including prices for meat. The government responded by imposing price controls on food items. Prime Minister Tymoshenko also issued a decree requiring every region to develop, present, and implement a meat production self-sufficiency program—an approach reminiscent of Soviet-style central planning.
Ukraine is also suffering from an oil shortage, which some blame on the Russian government for blocking delivery of crude oil. However, high oil prices worldwide influenced Russian shipments.
Ukraine’s oil price controls, which order state oil companies to deliver gasoline at prices below market levels, have had disastrous effects, leaving Ukrainians queuing fruitlessly for fuel. While the price controls were in effect, only Russian-owned stations had gasoline. On May 18, President Yushchenko signed into law a bill intended to ease a fuel supply crisis by canceling customs duties and taxes on fuel and to allow Ukraine to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Canceling duties on imported fuel allows Ukraine to purchase oil from other exporters, such as Kazakhstan, Iran, and Iraq, at higher prices without increasing the cost to consumers. After his trip to Azerbaijan, Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk announced that Ukraine would be willing to buy fuel from Azerbaijan. This is in line with the president’s statement about diversifying Ukraine’s crude oil market and seeking three to four sources of crude oil for Ukraine—specifically, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Libya.[9]
Trade. First quarter exports increased by 16.8 percent over the previous year, while imports grew by 18.5 percent. Metals were the major contributor to export growth. However, the trade balance is likely to become negative due to the appreciating hryvnia (the Ukrainian monetary unit) and cheap imports.[10]
Monetary Policy. Strong exports and foreign exchange inflows led to nominal appreciation of the hryvnia in April. In a step toward liberalizing the foreign currency market, the National Bank of Ukraine rescinded the regulation requiring the mandatory sale of 50 percent of export proceeds.[11] This is a welcome step, but more needs to be done in other areas of economic policy.
Business Reforms. The government does not seem to have a clear legislative, regulatory, or administrative strategy for the development, approval, passage, and implementation of major business reforms. Every week, there is a new plan for a new vertically integrated business company to be owned and run by the Ukraine government, and this includes the energy sector.[12] The Tymoshenko cabinet does not discuss the reform of state monopolies, but instead talks about their reinforcement.
Lack of reform discourages American investment, as does widespread violation of intellectual property rights. Ukraine’s software piracy rate (90 percent) is one of the highest in the world, comparable to the software piracy rates of Vietnam, China, and Zimbabwe.
On May 31, the Rada voted down a package of amendments to Ukraine’s intellectual property rights laws. As a result, U.S. economic sanctions, imposed in 2002, will remain in place, affecting $75 million of Ukrainian imports. In 2004, the U.S. reaffirmed the sanctions, citing Ukraine’s poor efforts to fight optical media (CDs and DVDs) piracy and trademark counterfeiting as the main reasons for sanctions. Failure to pass this legislation will also delay Ukraine’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), block the U.S. Department of Commerce from granting the coveted market economy status to Ukraine, and send more negative signals to foreign investors.[13]
On July 6, overcoming the rowdy opposition of the Communist and Socialist Parties, the Rada passed a law making it a crime to distribute compact disks, equipment, raw materials for their production, and moulds illegally. This law brings Ukraine closer to WTO membership. However, the Rada has adopted only five of 15 WTO-related reform bills. Three more passed the first reading, but five have failed, and two have been postponed.[14]
What Is at Stake?
The United States has much at stake in Ukraine, but it will be difficult to implement a policy of economic reform in the context of the constitutional changes that take effect in September—which shift power from president to prime minister in September—and parliamentary elections in March 2006. If the economic policy fails, Russia will try to relaunch its own candidates for the March 2006 parliamentary elections and will attempt to bring to power its own Ukrainian prime minister, who will have more power than President Yuschenko under the new constitutional arrangement.
Economic deterioration will also discredit U.S.-supported democratization in Ukraine, and this will have repercussions beyond Ukraine. If Ukraine fails, so also may Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, current economic policies discourage Western investment while allowing corrupt Ukrainian and Russian interests, accustomed to the murky waters of government-regulated transitional economies, to thrive.
What Should Be Done
The Bush and Yushchenko Administrations need to take action to relaunch Ukrainian economic reforms.[15] The main effort to turn the tide, however, must come from the Ukrainian side. The U.S. can supply technical assistance and moral support, but the leadership and management of the economic reform process can come only from the Yushchenko Administration.
Specifically, the Yushchenko Administration should:
Create a uniform public vision of the president’s economic reforms. The government should execute and implement President Yushchenko’s vision for economic reform and creation of a positive investment environment. The plan of action should include a timetable with specific and achievable benchmarks. It should designate specific officials who will be responsible for implementing the plan. The Yushchenko Administration should formulate a single business and legal strategy, improve the institutional capacity to absorb and manage international assistance, and centralize the process for requesting and coordinating technical assistance.
Engage an outside management consulting firm to review the current government decision-making and policymaking process. This could be funded as part of existing U.S. technical assistance. The government, working together with such a consultancy, should use this assessment to implement a comprehensive government reform to improve the decision-making process in the economic, financial, fiscal, and investment policy fields. Improving the government’s institutional capacity to implement stable and lasting reforms will foster an environment and infrastructure that attracts foreign and internal investment.
Reduce the tax burden and enhance property rights protection and the rule of law. The Rada should begin by repealing Ukraine’s Soviet-style commercial code (also known as the economic code), adopting the Joint Stock Company Law, and abolishing all price controls. Significantly deregulating the economy, including removal of hidden charges and obstacles to start-up and small and medium businesses, is also necessary.
Ukraine should reform the judicial and legal system so that it can enforce court decisions in a transparent and timely manner. It should also undertake comprehensive legal reform to facilitate economic competition and reform the administrative legislation and procedural code as recommended by the United Nations Development Programme’s Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine.[16] Such a reform would include facilitating enforcement of foreign judgments, including arbitration awards and improving bailiff service. On June 23, the Rada voted to remove the state bailiff service from the Ministry of Justice to ensure its independent function, which is a step in the right direction.[17] Finally, it should consolidate and significantly reduce social insurance taxes, as one of the ways to entice business out of the shadow economy.
Integrate Ukraine into the global economy. The Yushchenko Administration should reconstitute an interdepartmental working group on market economy status to guide Ukrainian efforts to secure market economy status from the United States. The Ukraine government should also appoint a high-level official responsible for completing this task within a certain time frame. The government should complete, by the end of 2005, negotiations for entry into the WTO.
On the U.S. side, the Bush Administration should:
Promote Ukraine’s integration into the global economy. The Bush Administration should ask Congress to exempt Ukraine from the Jackson–Vanik Amendment.[18] The amendment was proposed and enforced against the Soviet Union for a different purpose, and U.S.– Ukraine relations have changed radically since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Bush Administration should also support Ukraine’s bid to join the WTO and achieve market economy status, provided all U.S. concerns are resolved. The recent arrival of the U.S. government interagency delegation to Ukraine—which has been holding a series of meetings with top Ukrainian officials on Ukraine’s European and WTO integration, its market economy status, safety of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, and HIV/AIDS—is an encouraging step forward.[19]
Conclusion
Despite time lost since the beginning of this year, it is not too late to relaunch the effort to put Ukraine on the road to economic reform, increased domestic and foreign investment, and prosperity. This effort will require bold leadership, commitment to economic freedom, and qualitative improvement in the rule of law and protection of property rights. If done right, U.S.–Ukrainian cooperation on economic policy will greatly benefit the peoples of both countries.
The Yushchenko Administration needs to start speaking with one voice and taking the necessary steps to make Ukraine as competitive and attractive as its Central European and Baltic neighbors. Anything less will be a huge disservice to the people of Ukraine who won and celebrated their freedom in Independence Square at the end of 2004. They deserve not just political liberty, but also economic freedom. The U.S. should continue to help and support Ukraine in this quest.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Heritage Foundation intern Tatyana Klimova assisted in preparing this paper. Special thanks also go to Dr. Irina Paliashvili of the Russian–Ukrainian Legal Group for her valuable comments.
[1]Anders Aslund, “Betraying a Revolution,” The Washington Post, May 18, 2005, p. A17, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2005/05/17/AR2005051701326.html (July 5, 2005).
[2]Iryna Piontkivska and Edilberto L. Segura, “Ukraine Macroeconomic Situation,” SigmaBleyzer, May 2005, at sigmableyzer.com/files/Ukraine_Ec_Situation_05_05_2.pdf (June 22, 2005).
[3]“Semenyuk Prefers State Property to Private Ownership,” BBC Monitoring Service, May 18, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 487, May 19, 2005.
[4]Iryna Piontkivska and Edilberto L. Segura, “Ukraine Macroeconomic Situation,” SigmaBleyzer, April 2005, at sigmableyzer.com/files/Ukraine_Ec_Situation_04_05.pdf (June 22, 2005).
[5]Ibid.
[6]Aslund, “Betraying a Revolution,” p. A17, and “Polish Investors in Ukraine Preparing Indictments for Breaches in Contracts Regarding Special Economic Zones,” Polish News Bulletin, June 14, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 503, June 16, 2005.
[7]Ukrainian News Agency, “PM Tymoshenko Asking Kinakh to Be More Measured in His Comments About Cabinet of Ministers Actions,” May 18, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 487, May 19, 2005, and Interfax-Ukraine, “Kinakh Calls for Restoring Lures for Investment to Maintain Industrial Growth,” June 10, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 501, June 13, 2005.
[8]Piontkivska and Segura, “Ukraine Macroeconomic Situation,” April 2005 and May 2005.
[9]A. Vasovic, “Ukraine Seeks to Reduce Energy Dependence on Russia,” AP Worldstream, May 18, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 487, May 19, 2005.
[10]Piontkivska and Segura, “Ukraine Macroeconomic Situation,” May 2005.
[11]Piontkivska and Segura, “Ukraine Macroeconomic Situation,” April 2005.
[12]Ukrainian News Agency, “Pres Yushchenko States Need to Create Vertically Integrated Ukrainian National Oil Company,” May 18, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 487, May 19, 2005.
[13]E. Morgan Williams, “Ukraine Parliament’s No Vote a Major Setback Regarding Possible New Major International Trade Agreements,” The Action Ukraine Report, June 13, 2005; “Verkhovna Rada Shoots Down the Law Against CD Piracy,” New Europe, June 6, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 501, June 13, 2005.
[14]“Ukrainian Government Stalled over WTO Legislation,” One Plus One TV (Kiev), July 5, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 516, July 6, 2005; Associated Press, “Ukraine: Rada Fails to Vote on Bills Needed to Join WTO,” July 5, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 516, July 6, 2005; Ukrainian News Agency, “DPM Rybachuk: Changes of Laser Disks Legislation Compulsory Precondition for Ukraine’s Accession to WTO,” July 6, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 518, July 7, 2005; Tom Warner, “Unruly Ukraine Deputies Impede Passage of WTO Legislation,” Financial Times, July 7, 2005, p. 6; Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukraine President Yushchenko Laments Parliament’s Failure to Pass WTO Bills,” July 6, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 518, July 7, 2005; Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukrainian Parliament Adopts Law on CD Piracy for WTO Entry,” July 6, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 518, July 7, 2005; and “WTO Obstructionists,” Kyiv Post, July 7, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 518, July 7, 2005
[15]Recommendations have been formulated by the U.S.–Ukraine Policy Dialogue Economic Task Force. Co-Chairs: Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, and Ihor Shevliakov, International Centre for Policy Studies (Kyiv). Members: E. Morgan Williams, Director, Government Affairs, Washington Office, SigmaBleyzer Private Equity Investment Group; Sergiy Kruglyk, Director of Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Valeriy Pyatnitskiy, Senior Adviser, Office of the Vice Prime Minister/European Integration; and John Kun, U.S.–Ukraine Foundation.
[16]United Nations Development Programme, Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine, Proposals for the President: A New Wave of Reform, 2005, at www.un.kiev.ua/brc/report_e/brcreport040305eng.pdf (July 7, 2005).
[17]Interfax-Ukraine,“Ukraine Parliament Votes to Make Bailiffs Independent of Justice Ministry,” June 23, 2005, quoted in The Action Ukraine Report No. 515, July 5, 2005.
[18]The Jackson–Vanik Amendment denies normal trade relations to certain countries with non-market economies that restrict emigration rights. It was originally targeted at the Soviet Union. See Wikipedia, s.v. “Jackson–Vanik Amendment,” at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackson-Vanik_amendment (July 7, 2005).
[19]E. Morgan Williams, “Top US Government Interagency Delegation Arrives in Ukraine for a Series of Important Meetings,” The Action Ukraine Report No. 516, July 6, 2005.
06-10-2005
As the U.S. and Israel withdrew their non-essential personnel and diplomatic families from their embassies in Uzbekistan due to "specific" terror threats, the U.S. policy in Central Asia seems to be facing a fundamental challenge: How the Bush Administration can promote democratization without giving up strategic priorities of the war on Islamist terror.
In Uzbekistan and in Egypt dictators are unwilling and unable to either reform or get out. They are clinging to power -- and finding powerful allies abroad. This does not mean that the White House will beat a retreat in either Tashkent or Cairo -- vital countries both. It means, however, that the reality is more complicated than the theory of rapid democratization, and adjustment in both strategy and tactics are necessary.
The recent tragic events in Central Asia and in the Middle East teach us hard lessons. Democratization is not easy, nor is it cost-free. People die. Regimes and dictators get brutal. In the Ferghana Valley hundreds died in a heavy-handed government suppression of a popular uprising triggered by what seems to be an Islamist organization in Andijan and elsewhere.
In the Middle East, President Hosni Mubarak manipulated a referendum to prevent viable candidates to run for presidency, and security forces beat up peaceful protesters. Elsewhere, Islamists swept into municipal offices in Saudi Arabia and Gaza, while the Saudi monarchy, a friend and ally of the United States, still prevents women to vote and violates the norms of democracy across the board.
The geopolitical threat of radical Islamists coming to power through the ballot box looms large. Due to the short-sighted view of many an autocrat, secular and moderate Muslims parties and movements are banned or emasculated, pushing the opposition into the mosque or Islamic underground.
Islam Karimov’s crackdown on Erk and Birlik parties in Uzbekistan, grinding poverty, and lack of support for moderate Islam, encouraged thousands to join Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation, which is banned in many Middle Eastern countries, Central Asia, Russia and Germany). By destroying both the political and economic landscape, Karimov might have dug his own political grave.
However, his crackdown won kudos in both China and Russia. On a recent trip to Beijing, Karimov signed a $600 million natural gas pipeline deal -- a golden handshake. In Russia, "political technologists" such as Gleb Pavlovsky, Maxim Meyer and Modest Kolerov -- the latter in charge of the Commonwealth of Independent States Directorate in the Presidential Administration -- called for governments in Central Asia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union to use force against the potentially rebellious population. "Governments should deny opposition the ability to escalate", pontificated Pavlovsky at the Eurasia Media Forum in Almaty in April 2005. And the mild-mannered Meyer said at the same venue that a "real power" should be able to use force to defend itself -- exactly what Mr. Karimov believes he did.
The Bush Administration is facing a dilemma: Support dictators who profess pro-American policy, or push through democratization regardless of strategic, military, energy and other geopolitical costs and concerns. The policy is congealing, but there is no consensus yet. Moreover, such consensus may be impossible. At times, acute and chronic strategic challenges may trump the best of democratic intentions. And departmental concerns may once again find the State Department and the Pentagon bickering -- or worse -- in the interagency process.
For example, at a recent conference in Washington, a senior military officer mused about deploying U.S. forces in Turkmenistan to be able to project power against Iran in case disarmament talks, currently led by France, Germany and Great Britain, fail. Civilian participants cringed, but the general remained staunchly "open-minded" to open a "dialogue" with Turkmenbashi on U.S. basing there.
On the other hand, Dr. Phillip Zelikow, Counselor to the Secretary of State, stated at a Center for Strategic and International Studies conference on U.S.-Saudi relations, that the President has looked at a possibility that Islamist forces which are not pro-American may come to power, "and he is willing to take that risk."
A senior Pentagon official, who is about to retire, said recently, that in Syria and Iran, the Administration’s policy is to encourage evolutionary, not revolutionary, change. However, what will be the course of action if the Administration comes to the conclusion that the authoritarian regimes are so resilient, that an evolutionary change is impossible -- which many in Washington believe is the case of the Karimov regime.
Beyond the Horizon
However, policy makers also need to look beyond the horizon and prepare for the future. The Moslem Brotherhood is the best-organized force in Egypt and predominantly Sunni Syria. There, the Alawite regime of the Assad dynasty, supported by roughly 10 percent of the population, has been in power since 1970. A Sunni Islamist Syria will double the power of the Iraqi Sunni insurgents, making U.S. support of the Shi’a-dominated Iraq problematic. Will the Israeli-Palestinian peace process be better off with Hamas in the driver’s seat? Will Egypt and Syria benefit under the Moslem Brotherhood rule? Will U.S. energy security be safer if Salafis come to power in Saudi Arabia?
The dilemma of the Bush Administration is, therefore, how far to push democratic change while taking into account such geopolitical concerns. And the answer one hears is: promote democracy, but go easy on friends, and push enemies hard. The question then becomes: Is Karimov a friend?
Different policy makers have different views on the subject, but most importantly, the United States has strategic interests in Uzbekistan. And these interests are jeopardized by Mr. Karimov and will be even more threatened if an anti-American Islamist force comes to power.
Uzbekistan was a key ally in the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom, which liberated Afghanistan. A US air force base in Karshi Khanabad supports U.S. forces there. Islamists, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and IMU, use the US presence to agitate against America and the West. They also attack Karimov for maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel.
So, what are Washington’s choices? Western powers and international organizations will no longer aid Karimov to quell future revolts. Russia, China and Kazakhstan (with its oil riches) may be supportive, fearing further destabilization. On the other hand, the fall of Uzbekistan into the hands of the Islamists will cause a geopolitical shift in Central Asia and will endanger both U.S., Chinese, and Russian presence and interests there. Russia alone may be a destination for millions of migrants from Central Asia if systemic instability escalates.
In the long run, radical Islamist strategists believe that Central Asia, with its Soviet-educated technical personnel and ample natural resources, such as gold, oil and gas, uranium, and globally competitive cotton production, may be turned into a califate (a militarized Muslim state). It may become a territorial base of jihad against the West.
To avoid a catastrophic outcome, both bilateral and multilateral solutions need to be pursued. Uzbekistan’s neighbors, the United States, European Union, OSCE and the United Nations, need to clarify to Karimov that he must find a political -- not repressive -- way out from the current crisis. Such solutions may include legalizing political parties, allowing opposition access to the media, and scheduling of popular parliamentary and presidential elections. They also may include technical assistance from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to reform the economy, and pressure from the U.S. military to stop security cooperation if Karimov does not comply. He also should eventually be encouraged to relinquish power in the end of such political transition.
To avoid a further bloodbath and forestall expansion of radical Islam, it is important to give people hope and open the country to both political and economic modernization. Mr. Karimov has overstayed his welcome.
06-02-2005
A harsh, nine-year sentence meted out by a Russian court on May 31 against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former owner of the YUKOS oil company, and his partner Platon Lebedev sends a chilling signal to Western and Russian investors and could disrupt U.S.-Russian relations. President George W. Bush, in an unusually blunt language, said that it seemed that Khodorkovsky “had been adjudged guilty prior to having a fair trial.” Unfortunately, that is a fair assessment.
An Expensive Affair
It did not have to be this way. The Khodorkovsky trial, which followed the destruction of YUKOS, was aimed to address the real problem of Russia’s powerful oligarchs, who were no strangers to tax evasion, political dabbling, and underhanded dealings during the 1990s. But the crackdown, in keeping with Russian history, threw the baby out with the bath water.
The lessons of the Khodorkovsky trial are just beginning to sink in. U.S. and international policy makers and business leaders now understand that the rule of law in Russia is deeply flawed. Justice there is selective. Many oligarchs likely committed the kind of crimes of which Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were accused, but no others were prosecuted.
Few in Russia deny that Khodorkovsky may have nurtured political aspirations; after all, his company did support Duma members from the two liberal opposition parties—Yabloko and Union of Right Forces—and even some Communists. However, the Kremlin’s abuse of tax authority and the criminal justice system is a massive display of force against a political foe that raises questions about separation of powers in Russia.
President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff, Dmitry Medvedev, has admitted that the prosecution was intended to “make an example” for Russian business, which will now be chastened to pay its taxes dutifully and stay away from politics. During the trial, Putin initiated a retroactive amnesty for privatization violations of the kind Khodorkovsky was found guilty. Further, in his annual State of the Federation address, Putin criticized tax authorities’ “terrorization” of business—seemingly the same terror that brought down YUKOS with a $30 billion tax liability.
The legal proceedings against Khodorkovsky were deeply flawed, with retroactive application of the tax code, harassment of Khodorkovsky’s lawyers, and violations of criminal procedure.
In short, the prosecution of Khodorkovsky was legally arbitrary and politically capricious, and the economic response has been predictable. Russian and Western investors have voted with their feet. Capital flight quadrupled in 2004, reaching somewhere between $9 and $12 billion, according to the Russian Finance Ministry. According to Putin’s own economic advisor, Andrey Illarionov, a critic of the crackdown on YUKOS , it may be as high as $24 billion.
The government’s heavy-handed behavior also has consequences for Russian civil society. The authorities’ assault on Khodorkovsky and YUKOS led to a crackdown on Khodorkovsky’s charity, Open Russia, which supported a slew of non-government organizations promoting democracy, human rights, Internet-based education, and study abroad. The rhetoric of the Russian secret services against Western and foreign-funded NGOs has been harsh. Some were publicly accused of ties to Western intelligence services, and others have been harassed.
Squandered Opportunity
The crackdown on YUKOS and the government’s subsequent steps have destroyed the notion that Russia may develop a privately owned and financed oil sector. Such a model, if it had been allowed to flourish, would have helped Russia integrate into the global economy and brought Western investment and know-how into the Russian energy industries on a scale which is inconceivable today, with the government being the dominant player in oil and gas.
YUKOS was among the champions of privately developed oil pipelines to Murmansk and Daikin, in Northeast China. Now the Murmansk pipeline seems to be dead in the water, and Daikin has morphed into a branch off a primary pipeline projected to be built across Siberia to the Pacific port of Nakhodka. Controlling the project is the government owned pipeline monopolist Transneft.
The government has quickly consolidated power in the energy sector. Yugansk, the main production asset of YUKOS, was auctioned off in an opaque procedure in December 2004 to a fly-by-night corporate shell and then quickly transferred to Rosneft, a government-controlled oil company. This spring, tax authorities initiated a $1 billion tax claim against TNK, the Russian partner in a $6 billion joint venture with British Petroleum called TNK-BP, so far (and perhaps for some time) the largest Western investment in Russia. Exxon has announced that it will freeze investments in the Sakhalin island oil projects after Russian Ministry of Energy requested the company to pay an additional $1 billion. Natural Resources Minister Yurii Trutnev announced in February that a number of attractive mineral projects will be closed to Western investors. He was seconded by Putin, who called for a “strategic sectors” law to bar foreign investment from selected industries. Finally, the Russian government now plans to acquire over 10 percent of the gas monopoly GAZPROM, which will give it formal control of the gas sector, as well. In this context, the YUKOS affair and the Khodorkovsky verdict are only part of of the Russian state’s re-consolidation of the “commanding heights” of the economy—a troubling trend.
Currently, foreign investment in the Russian energy sector is falling, efficiency in the sector is declining, and production, which until 2003 grew by leaps and bounds, has plateaued.
Conclusion
The U.S. and the West need to recognize that Russia has changed. The U.S. and Russia still have important joint interests, such as preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear armed power, joint efforts to secure Russian nuclear materials and other weapons of mass destruction , the war on terrorism, and economic cooperation. But the lack of transparency, deficiencies in the rule of law, and threats to property rights and political diversity are making the U.S.-Russian relations increasingly strained—and economic cooperation ever more difficult.
05-31-2005
The Andijan events in Uzbekistan have sharpened the debate among policy makers in Washington over whether American support for Uzbek President Islam Karimov helps or hurts US national security interests. Many in Washington have grown disenchanted with Karimov’s authoritarian methods. However, some continue to view the Uzbek leader as a bulwark against Islamic radicals in Central Asia.
On May 29, three US senators visited the Uzbek capital Tashkent and condemned the Karimov administration’s handling of the Andijan events, which began May 13. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbek authorities insist that Islamic militants started the Andijan confrontation, in which, according to the official death toll, 173 people died, including 36 Uzbek soldiers. Human rights groups say at least 750 people were killed during the Andijan events, and allege that Tashkent has engaged in a cover-up concerning the extent of the violence used against largely unarmed civilians. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
One of the visiting American senators, John McCain, an Arizona Republican, repeated calls for an independent investigation into what he termed the Andijan “massacre.” In addition, McCain pointedly refused to concur with the Uzbek government view that the Andijan protests were started by Islamic terrorists. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Karimov has rejected the demand for an independent investigation.
The Andijan events have helped turn Uzbekistan into a proving ground for competing US foreign policy priorities. One the one hand, Karimov remains an ally of the United States, having helped Washington in its prosecution of the anti-terrorism campaign by making an Uzbek air base available to the American armed forces. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On the other, Karimov has shown himself to be inimical to the global democratization trend advocated by US President George W. Bush. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Washington insiders are now struggling with the question: which policy should be prioritized? Should the United States support a dictator who has pursued a generally pro-American policy? Or, should Washington promote democratization regardless of the strategic, military, energy and other geopolitical costs? No consensus has yet emerged in Washington on this issue, and none may ever develop. Even so, the Bush administration may have to make a choice, and many Washington analysts believe that strategic necessity will probably trump the best of democratic intentions.
The Uzbek dilemma could reignite a turf battle among the State Department, the Pentagon and other US governmental agencies. The Defense Department clearly has no qualms about allying with dictators in the pursuit of enhanced US security. For example, at a recent conference in Washington, a senior military officer raised the possibility of deploying US forces to Turkmenistan. Such a deployment, the officer theorized, could exert pressure on Iran to agree to and comply with international demands concerning Tehran’s nuclear program. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Civilian conference participants cringed at the Turkmen base suggestion, but the US officer remained staunchly “open-minded” about opening a “dialogue” with Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov on base possibilities.
The officer seemed to ignore the fact that Turkmenistan has adhered to a policy of neutrality during the post-Soviet era, as well as the fact that Niyazov has acted in recent years to shut the country off from outside influences, and thus it would be highly unlikely for Ashgabat to agree to any kind of basing arrangement. Niyazov sits atop what is generally recognized as one of the most despotic regimes in the world. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives].
The State Department appears to retain hope that Bush will press ahead with his democratization goals. Phillip Zelikow, an adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stated at a Center for Strategic and International Studies conference on US-Saudi relations that Bush was aware of the possibility that Islamist forces which are not pro-American may come to power amid the democratization trend, “and he is willing to take that risk.”
Many US policy-makers believe that pressure, both bilateral and multilateral, must be exerted on Karimov in order to compel the Uzbek government to implement long-promised political and economic reforms. Such reforms could include giving opposition political parties, including Erk, Birlik and the Sunshine Coalition, greater room for maneuver, and the loosening of state control over mass media. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On a bilateral level, the Bush administration could possibly make continued strategic cooperation with Uzbekistan conditional on Tashkent’s implementation of a reform blueprint.
While the best available option may be to press Karimov to reform, a significant number of Washington analysts believe that the Uzbek president is incapable of changing. This inability to open up Uzbekistan’s political and economic systems is detrimental to US security interests, as Karimov’s continued reliance on force pushes Uzbeks, out of desperation, to resort to violence, and possibly embrace Islamic radicalism. As a result, distaste for Karimov seems to be growing in Washington, and many wouldn’t mind seeing a new leader in Tashkent, provided that stability could be maintained.
At present, though, US officials probably can’t abandon Karimov because of the credibility of the Islamic radical threat. Indeed, if Karimov’s administration collapses there is no force outside of Islamic radicals that could stand a chance of filling the power vacuum.
Helping to restrict US options is the fact that both Russia and China are providing staunch support for Karimov. On his recent visit to Beijing, Karimov was rewarded with a $600 million natural gas pipeline deal. Such assistance certainly serves as a disincentive for Karimov to make domestic changes, and lessens whatever leverage that the United States has with Tashkent.
05-18-2005
With more than 500 dead in Andijan, a city in the impoverished and overpopulated Fergana Valley, a hotbed of Islamic extremism in Uzbekistan, the face of Central Asia has changed forever. Brittle relations between the government of President Islam Karimov and his people are bloodstained.
The city is quiet -- a graveyard quiet. President Islam Karimov’s government, its heavy-handed tactics, and a deliberate provocation by Akramia, a local Islamic organization, appear to be at fault for the massacre.
According to the sketchy media reports, hundreds of people were killed and many other wounded. Hundreds, if not thousands became refugees in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
Western observers should be careful not to mistake this for one of these peaceful "multi-color" revolutions which occurred from Belgrade to Bishkek in the last three years. The violence, even if quelled for now, may re-ignite -- with unpredictable consequences in this tinderbox of a region.
Uzbekistan, its neighbors, along with other world powers, need to find a way out of this crisis -- and fast. The main challenge for the Uzbeks and the U.S. is how to move along the road to political reform without allowing Islamists to take over.
Akramia is named after its founder, Akram Yuldashev, who has been in and out of jail on charges of Islamic extremism. Public evidence of his group’s terrorist activities is sparse. However, the recent operation in Andijan, which included seizing a military base and disarming a contingent of government troops seems well-planned, and executed without regard to civilian casualties. Moreover, the threat of radical Islam in Central Asia -- and especially in impoverished and radicalized Fergana Valley, which straddles Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan -- is significant and growing.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has links to al Qaeda and directed terror attacks in the 1990s. It suffered setbacks fighting alongside Usama bin Laden in Afghan-istan and its leader, Juma Namangani, was killed. Another leader, Tahir Yuldashev (no relation to Akram), survived and is now hiding in Pakistan.
Another key player may be the global, clandestine radical Islamist party, Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation), which is recruiting supporters by a thousand. Hizb’s goal: creation of a worldwide Califate, a military dictatorship based on Shari’a law, and Holy War (jihad) against Land of the Sword -- that is, the West.
Central Asia, according to Hizb, is ripe for an Islamist revolution because of its corrupt "infidel" regimes and U.S. presence due to the war in Afghanistan. The region, with its natural resources such as uranium mines, is as good of a bridgehead in global jihad as any. Hizb has declared democracy is un-Islamic but is likely to take part in any popular uprising.
If President Islam Karimov -- a Soviet-era secular authoritarian leader -- does not negotiate with the secular and moderate opposition, the uprising could spread.
Uzbekistan is a quintessence of everything wrong with post-communist Central Asian regimes. Since the Soviet collapse, the country has never had legitimate elected leaders, or postcommunist democratic institutions. Instead, it stagnated.
Mr. Karimov took over when Moscow stopped taking phone calls. The elites remained the worst of Soviet Central Asia -- riven by a combination of clan allegiances, corruption and an inability or unwillingness to reform and modernize.
The people of Uzbekistan are sick and tired of Mr. Karimov. Today he is opposed by a combination of Islamist organizations and secular opposition parties and movements. These include the Erk and Birlik parties, which are largely secular, urban and middle class. However, the Uzbek opposition has not one recognized leader, such as Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine or Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia.
Uzbekistan is now on the brink. It is strategically located in an area that has known much bloodshed and little democracy. In 1992, ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were at each other’s throats in Osh, with deaths reaching 2,000. A civil war that resulted from a split between northern and southern clans in Tajikistan took more than 100,000 lives after the Soviet collapse.
The United States has strategic interests in Uzbekistan and should follow the situation closely. The country was a key ally in the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom that liberated Afghanistan. A U.S. air force base in Khanabad is just one of the American sites in the country. Islamists use U.S. presence to agitate against America and the West. They also attack Karimov for maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel.
Russia and Western powers and international organizations will think twice before aiding Karimov to quell the revolt. Meanwhile, China and Kazakhstan, with its oil riches, are nervously watching developments in Andijan.
A fall of Uzbekistan into the hands of the Islamists would cause a geopolitical shift in Central Asia and endanger both U.S. and Russian interests there. In the long run, radical Islamist strategists believe Central Asia, with its Soviet-educated technical personnel and ample natural resources -- gold, oil and gas, uranium, and globally competitive cotton production -- will emerge as a militarized Muslim state: a califate. They see it becoming an anti-Western jihad territorial base.
To avoid that catastrophe, Uzbekistan’s neighbors and the United States, Russia, China, European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations should prod Mr. Karimov to find a way out of the current crisis. This may include legalizing political parties, giving opposition access to the media, and scheduling elections. Parliamentary elections could take place before presidential ones, and Mr. Karimov should be encouraged to transfer power thereafter.
To avoid the political expansion of radical Islam, it is important Uzbekistan’s people have hope and that the country open to modernization. But the time left for Uzbekistan to change course may be running out. Decisive action is needed now.
05-13-2005
With over 500 dead in Andijian, a hotbed of Islamic extremism in the impoverished and overpopulated Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, the face of Central Asia is changed. Akramia, an allegedly radical Islamic group, appears to be behind the uprising against President Islam Karimov’s government. The government’s heavy-handed tactics and deliberate provocation by Akramia appear to be at fault for the massacre.
According to the sketchy media reports, hundreds have been killed and many others wounded. Thousands have fled to neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Western observers should be careful not to mistake this for one of these peaceful “multi-color” revolutions that have occurred from Belgrade to Bishkek over the last three years. The violence, even if now quelled, could reignite at any time. The main challenge now for the Uzbeks and the U.S. is to find a way out of this crisis—and fast.
Akramia is named after its founder, Akram Yuldashev, who has been in and out of jail on various charges (fabricated, the group claims). It is not clear exactly how extremist the organization really is—reports vary. Public evidence of its terrorist activities is sparse. However, the recent operation in Andijan, which included seizing a military base and disarming a contingent of government troops, seems to have been well-planned and executed without regard to civilian casualties. The threat of radical Islam in Central Asia—and especially in impoverished and radicalized Fergana Valley, which straddles Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—is significant and growing.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has links to Al Qaeda and directed terror attacks in the 1990s. It suffered setbacks fighting alongside Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan and its leader, Juma Namangani, was killed. Another leader, Tahir Yuldashev, survived and is now hiding in Pakistan.
Another key player may be the global, clandestine radical Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation), which is recruiting supporters by the thousand. Hizb’s goal: creation of a worldwide Califate, a military dictatorship based on Shari’a law, and Holy War (jihad) against Land of the Sword—that is, the West.
Central Asia, according to Hizb, is ripe for an Islamist revolution because of its corrupt “infidel” regimes and U.S. presence due to the war in Afghanistan. The region, with its natural resources such as uranium mines, is as good of a bridgehead in global jihad as any. Hizb has declared that democracy is un-Islamic but is likely to take part in any popular uprising.
If President Islam Karimov, a Soviet-era secular authoritarian leader, does not negotiate with the secular and moderate opposition, the uprising could spread.
Uzbekistan today is a quintessence of everything that is wrong with post-communist Central Asian regimes. Since the Soviet Union collapsed, the country has never had a “velvet revolution,” legitimate elected leaders, or post-communist democratic institutions. Instead, it has stagnated.
Karimov took over when Moscow stopped taking phone calls. The elites remained the worst of Soviet Central Asian—driven by a combination of clan allegiances, corruption, and an inability or unwillingness to reform and modernize.
The people of Uzbekistan are sick and tired of Karimov. Today he is opposed by a combination of Islamist organizations and secular opposition parties and movements. These include the Erk and Birlik parties, which are largely secular, urban, and middle class. However, the Uzbek opposition does not have one recognized leader, such as Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine or Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, and so even a pro-Karimov could have a chance to succeed him.
Uzbekistan is now on the brink. It is strategically located in an area that has known much bloodshed and little, if any, democracy. In 1992, ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were at each other’s throats in Osh, with the death toll reaching 2,000. And a civil war that resulted from a split between northern and southern clans in Tajikistan took over 100,000 lives after the Soviet collapse.
The United States has strategic interests in Uzbekistan and should follow the situation closely. The country was a key ally in the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom that liberated Afghanistan. A U.S. air force base in Khanabad is just one of the American sites in the country. Islamists use the U.S. presence to agitate against America and the West. They also attack Karimov for maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel.
Russia and possibly Western powers and international organizations will think twice before aiding Karimov to quell the revolt. Meanwhile, China and Kazakhstan, with its oil riches, are nervously watching developments in Andijan. All should keep a close watch, at the least. Uzbekistan’s falling into the hands of the Islamists will cause a geopolitical shift in Central Asia and endanger both U.S. and Russian interests there. In the long run, radical Islamist strategists believe that Central Asia, with its Soviet-educated technical personnel and ample natural resources—including gold, oil and gas, uranium, and globally competitive cotton production—will emerge as a militarized Muslim state. They foresee it as a territorial base of jihad against the West.
To avoid that catastrophic outcome, Uzbekistan’s neighbors and the United States, Russia, China, European Union, OSCE, and the United Nations should prod Karimov to find a way out of the current crisis. This may include legalizing political parties, giving opposition access to the media, and scheduling elections. Parliamentary elections could take place before presidential ones, and Mr. Karimov should be encouraged to transfer power thereafter.
To avoid the political expansion of radical Islam, it is important that the people of Uzbekistan have hope and that the country open itself to modernization. But the time left for Uzbekistan to change course may be running out. Decisive action is needed now.
05-08-2005
President George W. Bush’s visit to Latvia, Russia and the Republic of Georgia underscores how much the geopolitical landscape changed 13 years after the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
In Riga, Mr. Bush will address leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These are America’s new allies -- members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are also members of the European Union. Russia is an ex-rival and a strategic partner, a vague term indeed. Georgia (and neighboring Azerbaijan) are emerging allies.
In Riga, Mr. Bush should avoid new dividing lines in Europe, but call for recognition of Latvian and Estonian borders by Russia and the signing of a peace treaty. The president should also tell people of the Baltic States that their well-earned and much-deserved freedom should not be dishonored by occasional expressions of sympathy to Nazis or by discriminatory measures against the Russian population.
Mr. Bush should also acknowledge our new allies’ great achievements in making the transition to democracy and market economy and integration into NATO. He should remember a new generation has come of age, which did not suffer from Soviet occupation and is not as pro-American as its parents. The president should remind these young people the U.S. supported Baltic independence and never recognized Soviet annexation. The task now is to keep these young people friends of America.
Presidential challenges in Russia are different. He should address Russia’s people through press conferences and in the meeting with democracy activists.
He should acknowledge the great sacrifices of the peoples of Russia and the former Soviet Union in World War Two -- a topic most dear to every Russian’s heart. Josef Stalin no doubt enabled Adolf Hitler to start the war, and the Soviet regime then was as bloodthirsty as the Nazis. Stalin also destroyed the top Soviet generals and was criminally negligent and oblivious to the coming Nazi attack -- Operation Barbarossa, which started in June 1941. In it, millions of Soviet soldiers were surrounded and whole field armies destroyed.
It was, however, the blood and heroism of Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Jews, Georgians and others who stopped the Nazi war machine. Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk broke the backbone of the Wehrmacht. The strategic gifts of Marshal Georgi Zhukov helped a lot. Still, Soviets lost 25 million sons and daughters.
Mr. Bush can also remind his audience that the victories of the Red Army were due to a large degree to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s "lend-lease" program: Studebaker trucks, Cobra fighter planes, SPAM and GI boots.
Today, the president should say, the United States and Russia face a new enemy: implacable Islamist terrorism coveting weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In talks with Mr. Putin, Mr. Bush should advance joint anti-proliferation efforts, such as the Nunn-Lugar program worth up to $1 billion a year aimed at securing and destroying the creaky Russian WMD arsenal and related materials.
The United States and Russia should work on ways to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. While Tehran can hit Russian soil, it still lacks the missile capability to strike the U.S. The two leaders should also discuss the future challenges U.S. and Russia may face from assertive and resource-hungry China.
The president should extend a helping hand to the Russian people. America can help address Russia’s catastrophic social trends: an HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis epidemics and a male life expectancy of 58-59 years -- behind that of Egypt.
Russia suffers from a wave of alcoholism, drugs and related illnesses, and the abortion rate remains among the highest in the world. This is not about geopolitics, it is about helping Russians lead healthier, happier lives.
In meeting with Russia’s democracy activists, President Bush should explain why America promotes democracy around the world. Without stentorian lectures, Mr. Bush should explain why smooth and bloodless transition from one power elite to another benefits Russia, why free media helps fight corruption, why transparency and the rule of law attract foreign investment. If Russia wants to modernize, it needs to liberalize. It is in the Russian national interest to be free. The United States can help -- if the Russians want it to.
Finally, a speech at the Independence Square in Tbilisi is a great opportunity to look into the future. Mr. Bush should acknowledge Georgia’s accomplishments in its Rose Revolution, a bloodless pro-democracy power change. He should express America’s -- and the world’s -- firm hope that Georgia will remain on the democratic path and its territorial integrity and sovereignty be restored. U.S. should support return of secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia’s fold, and withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgian soil.
Further, President Bush should demand the end to "frozen conflicts" between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Transnistria in Moldova. These conflicts lasted too long, and make everyone miserable and unable to economically develop.
Finally, the president should express our hope the right will be respected of the region’s peoples -- from Belarus to Turkmenistan to Uzbekistan -- to elect their leaders. Tbilisi will be a terrific place to launch a new campaign for a better future in the former Soviet area, a future where dignity, the rule of law, civil society, economic development and freedom prevail.
05-04-2005
President George W. Bush’s visit to Latvia, Russia, and Georgia underscores how much the geopolitical landscape in that part of the world has changed in the 13 years since the collapse of the Soviet Empire. In Riga, Bush will speak to the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, now members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union and strong allies of America. Bush’s second stop, Russia, once a rival, is now a strategic partner—an appropriately vague term, to be sure. Georgia, the President’s final stop, and neighboring Azerbaijan are emerging allies. The President must convey different messages to the people and leaders of each country, while promoting American foreign policy and security interests.
In Riga, Bush should acknowledge our new allies’ great achievements in transitioning to democracy, adopting market economies, and becoming a part of NATO. But he must remember that each of these countries has raised a younger generation that doesn’t remember Soviet occupation and is not as pro-American as its parents. This generation needs to know that the U.S. was firm in its support of Baltic independence and never recognized Soviet annexation. The task now is to keep these young people friends of America.
While Bush should avoid creating new dividing lines in Europe, he should still call for Russian recognition of Latvian and Estonian borders and for Russia to finally sign a peace treaty with them. The President could also tell the people of the Baltic states that their well-earned and much-deserved freedom should not be dishonored by expressions of sympathy to Nazis or by discrimination against their Russian populations.
Russia presents different challenges. The President should address the people of Russia through the usual press conferences and also by meeting with democracy activists. He will likely address the great sacrifices of the peoples of Russia and the former Soviet Union in World War Two—a topic dear to every Russian’s heart.
Joseph Stalin was no doubt Adolph Hitler’s enabler in starting the war, and the Soviet regime then was as bloodthirsty as the Nazis. Stalin removed the top Soviet generals and was criminally negligent and oblivious to the coming Nazi attack—Operation Barbarossa, which started in June 1941. Soon millions of Soviet soldiers were surrounded, and whole field armies were destroyed.
It was, however, the blood and heroism of millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Jews, Georgians, and others who stopped the Nazi war machine. The battles for Stalingrad and Kursk broke the backbone of the Wehrmacht. Marshal Georgii Zhukov’s gift for strategy helped a lot. Still, the Soviets lost 25 million of their sons and daughters.
Bush can remind his audience that the Red Army’s World War II victories were due in part to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “lend-lease” program: Studebaker trucks, Cobra fighter planes, SPAM, and GI boots all played crucial roles.
Today the U.S. and Russia face a new enemy: implacable Islamist terrorists coveting weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In talks with Putin, Bush should advance joint efforts against proliferation, such as the Nunn-Lugar program that spends up to $1 billion per year to secure and destroy the creaky Russian WMD arsenal and related materials. The U.S. and Russia should work together to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. While Teheran still lacks the missile capability to strike the U.S., it could hit Russian soil today. The two leaders should also discuss challenges the U.S. and Russia may face in the future from an assertive and resource-hungry China.
America can also help the Russian people address several catastrophic social trends: HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis epidemics and male life expectancy that has fallen to just 58 to 59 years—lower than even in Egypt. Russia suffers from waves of alcoholism, drug addiction, and related illnesses, and its abortion rate is among the highest in the world. This is not about geopolitics but helping Russians to lead healthier, happier lives.
When meeting with Russia’s democracy activists, President Bush should explain why America is promoting democracy around the world. Without stentorian lectures, Bush can explain how democracy benefits Russia, why free media helps fight corruption, and how transparency and the rule of law attract foreign investment. If Russia wants to modernize, it needs to liberalize. It is in the Russian national interest to be free. The U.S. can help—if Russians want it to.
Finally, his speech at the Independence Square in Tbilisi will be a great opportunity for the President to address the future. Bush should acknowledge Georgia’s Rose Revolution, a bloodless victory for democracy. He should express America’s and the world’s hopes that Georgia will remain on the democratic path and that its territorial integrity and sovereignty will be restored. The U.S. should support the return of secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia’s fold and the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgian soil.
Further, President Bush should demand an end to the “frozen conflicts” between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Transnistria in Moldova. These conflicts have gone on for too long and leave all sides miserable and impoverished.
Finally, the President should express hope that peoples of the region—from Belarus to Turkmenistan to Uzbekistan—will have their right to elect their leaders respected. Tbilisi would be a terrific location to launch a new campaign for a better future in the former Soviet area, a future where dignity, the rule of law, civil society, economic development, and freedom prevail.
04-10-2005
Since the March 8 death of Aslan Maskhadov, former president of Chechnya and supreme commander of Chechen militant forces, Russia has escalated its anti-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region.
Last Tuesday, Russian security forces apprehended Adam Jabrailov, a Chechen terrorist responsible for capturing, killing and beheading four Red Cross workers in 1996.
Details of Maskhadov’s death remain murky. While he had limited control of the Chechen Islamist faction led by warlord Shamil Basaev, during the unilateral January 2005 cease-fire, most Chechen factions observed the truce in support of a call for peace talks with the Kremlin. However, sources close to the Russian leadership indicated in Moscow last week the Kremlin is opting for a military crackdown and leadership elimination.
Maskhadov’s legacy is complex. He was a former Soviet Army colonel cut from the same cloth as many Russian leaders and could have been a peace settlement partner. But he commanded military operations and achieved Chechnya’s near-sovereignty under the Khasav-Yurt accords (1997).
During his presidency, he allowed Chechnya’s frightful transformation into Sharia-dominated anarchy. In 1997-1999, the years of Chechnya’s quasi-independence, the region became an Islamist terrorist training ground and saw 2,000 kidnappings for ransom, slave trade and massive trafficking in weapons, drugs and stolen goods. Maskhadov couldn’t -- or wouldn’t -- stop any of it.
Maskhadov publicly distanced himself from mass hostage-taking operations by the jihadi warlord Shamil Basaev, such as the Dubrovka Theater and the Beslan school attack in September 2004. Nevertheless, Maskhadov took no steps to prevent such atrocities. On the contrary, in his latest interviews he advocated expansion of the "jihad" beyond Chechnya, to the rest of Northern Caucasus, and targeting Russian civilians.
The formal Maskhadov’s successor is a little-known Islamic law figure ("Sheik") Abdul Halim Sadullaev. Not known for religious learning or military prowess, he apparently was Maskhadov’s appointed successor to keep Basaev from formally taking power and to threaten Moscow with chaos if it decided to eliminate Maskhadov. Russian sources report Sheik Abdul-Halim issued fatwas allowing murder and terror attacks.
Mr. Putin needed a great victory as his popularity began to deteriorate after Beslan and mass protests of unpopular cash payments introduced in January to replace social in-kind benefits. The secret service, the FSB, produced such a coup.
One year after Vladimir Putin handily won a second presidential term, his domestic and foreign challenges are snowballing, and his aura of almost superhuman invincibility is quickly dissipating.
Analysts in Moscow speculate he is repeating the mistakes of the czars who brutally suppressed the Chechens. In 1850, Nicholas I ordered his Caucasus viceroy, Prince Michael Vorontsov, to "firmly follow my system of destruction of dwellings and food supply, and bothering them with incursions."
Leo Tolstoy, the great Russian writer who served in the Caucasus in the mid-19th as a military officer, had this to say about the reactions in Chechnya in his classic "Haji Murat":
"Nobody even discussed hatred toward the Russians. The feeling that all Chechens experienced, from a child to a grown up, was stronger than hatred. It was not hate, but the lack of recognition of these Russian dogs as human beings. It was such a revulsion, disgust and noncomprehension, facing the irrational cruelty of these creatures, that the desire to exterminate them was a natural feeling, as natural as the instinct of self-preservation. [This] was like the desire to exterminate vermin, poisonous spiders and wolves."
With Maskhadov’s killing, Moscow lost an opportunity to split the Chechens between the more secular supporters of national independence or broad autonomy, and radical Islamist "jihadi" terrorists. But it seems the Kremlin did not believe such an option was available and equated Maskhadov with Basaev.
Ironically, the radical Islamists do not want an independent Chechnya, as Maskhadov did. They want nothing less than a Califate, which would subsume Chechen national aspirations in favor of a pan-Islamic agenda of a Muslim superstate.
Now, according to London’s Sunday Times, the radical Islamist wing, led by Basaev and a Saudi warlord Abu Havs, which rejects diplomacy and hails jihad, and the Russian security forces and the military, will dictate the scope and pace of the North Caucasus war. Unfortunately, the likelihood also will increase of terror mega-attacks, like the September 2004 horror in a Beslan school. Quickly killing or capturing Basaev is an imperative for the Russian forces.
Islamist terrorists, with their global networks of financial support and training, would want nothing more than to have Basaev as de-facto supreme military commander of North Caucasus -- without Maskhadov’s meddling. Basaev already trains and equips jihadi units, which grew out of North Caucasus Wahhabi madrassas networks. Fighting there is on the rise.
The North Caucasus Islamist movement and its allies believe their geopolitical goal -- creating the North Caucasus Califate, a militaristic Sharia-based dictatorship between the Black Sea and the Caspian -- just got a bit closer.
If they succeed, a disastrous scenario unfolds. Such an entity on Europe’s doorstep, controlled by ideological soulmates of Osama bin Laden, will radiate terrorism and religious extremism for decades to come. It may become one of the greatest threats to Eurasian security of this century.
Russiawide terrorism will escalate, as will "jihad" in the Russian-controlled republics of North Caucasus, where security forces increasingly impose political controls and the Kremlin moves toward setting up its loyalists as presidents and governors. A secular Shi’ite regime of Azerbaijan and its oil fields, and pipelines from the Caspian basin, will also be more prone to terrorist attacks.
It is time the United States paid attention to the threats escalating in the Northern Caucasus.
03-24-2005
The people of Kyrgyzstan have spoken—and acted. On Thursday, they stormed presidential headquarters and government buildings in the capital Bishkek in response to rigged parliamentary elections, and the government appears to be losing its grip on power. The Supreme Court has since annulled the elections, and the country is likely to return to the polls shortly. Still, Kyrgyzstan may face the prospects of civil war and possible disintegration if President Askar Akaev does not resign. In turn, turmoil in Kyrgyzstan could bring inter-ethnic and political violence to its larger neighbors, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and lead to their destabilization. To prevent this outcome and win another victory for democracy, the U.S. and its allies convince President Akaev to step down—and soon.
A Model of Authoritarian Ills
The present unrest was not inevitable. In the early 1990s, mountainous and poor Kyrgyzstan was hailed as an oasis of democracy in Central Asia where freedom of speech flowered. The United States bestowed WTO membership and World Bank credits, but the country remained poor and corrupt.
In the mid-1990s, Kyrgyzstan began its long descent into authoritarianism. Askar Akaev, a respected physicist, was elected president in 1990 and has managed to hold that post thanks to changes to Kyrgyzstan’s constitution. Since the mid-1990s, his government has become increasingly hostile to political opposition, harassing supporters and holding questionable elections. International observers challenged elections in 1995 and 2000 as not up to standards, and Akaev’s government began to crack down on independent media and opposition parties. A recent referendum, also contested, gave Akaev greater powers and eliminated party-list voting—weakening the opposition further.
In early 2001, President Akaev jailed Felix Kulov, his former vice president who had challenged him for presidency. Protesters now have released him. Akaev’s Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev resigned in 2002 after troops shot six peaceful protesters and now is emerging as the top opposition leader. Roza Otunbaeva, the former Foreign Minister whom he banned from running for parliament in favor of his daughter, is among his toughest critics.
Having never gone through a “velvet revolution,” Kyrgyzstan’s political elite remains essentially Soviet, with addition of some small traders and criminals, as well. Its opposition leaders are very much of the national nomenklatura—and not dissidents like Lech Walensa in Poland or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia. But they are still the standard-bearers of popular discontent with the ruling family’s corruption and are pushing for more democracy than Akaev cares to grant. If successful, the opposition is likely to inject new blood into the country’s corrupt body politic.
They have some reason to be optimistic. A wave of democracy is sweeping the former Soviet Union. The Kyrgyz call it the Tulip Revolution or the Lemon Revolution, echoing similar movements in Georgia and Ukraine. Given reports that President Akaev fled the country, the opposition has the chance to make lemonade out of a lemon of an election. In two rounds of Kyrgyzstani elections held over the past month, President Akaev has packed the parliament with cronies and relatives, including his son and daughter. Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and U.S. say the elections were flawed.
Following the second round, the opposition took over the south of the country, including the second and third largest cities, Osh and Jalal-Abad, and protests have since spread elsewhere. The opposition demands a rerun, like in Ukraine, and Akaev’s immediate resignation, like in Georgia.
But this was not Akaev’s plan. According to reports, Akaev is no longer interested in the presidency. His once-sterling reputation as a democrat, philosopher, and writer has understandably withered. But Akaev’s influential wife and family, who have enriched themselves during his rule, are egging him to stay on. He may still try to change the constitution and run for a fourth term in October, something most Kyrgyz oppose. Akaev calls opposition leaders “criminals” and “externally inspired,” echoing closely the words of Ukraine’s former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich before he gave into opposition demands for a fair election. All signs are that Akaev is unlikely to stand down now without significant prodding.
Danger Lurks
The leaders of neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are nervously watching these developments. As in Kyrgyzstan, both countries’ ruling regimes are prone to cut down opposition, mostly secular, as quickly as it appears. But a greater menace may be lurking in the wings: Islamic radicals who are amassing power and, for now, have been holding back from the political square. By cutting the secular opposition out of the picture, the region’s leaders may be pursuing a counterproductive—and ultimately destructive—strategy.
In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, a clandestine radical Islamist party known as Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation) is recruiting supporters by the thousand. Two prominent Kyrgyz politicians, including the country’s ombudsman, are Hizb supporters. Hizb’s goal is creation of a worldwide Califate—a military dictatorship based on Shari’a law—and it is dedicated to waging the Holy War (jihad) against the West. Central Asia, according to Hizb, is nearly ripe for Islamist revolution because of its corrupt “infidel” regimes and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Central Asia, with its natural resources like uranium mines, is as good a bridgehead as any for global jihad. Hizb has boycotted elections and calls democracy un-Islamic. It is likely, however, to join in any popular uprising—which may happen if Kyrgyzstan’s Akaev does not change tactics and negotiate with the opposition.
Such widespread unrest may destabilize Uzbekistan to the south, with its large Islamist opposition, and the oil-rich Kazakhstan to the north. Both are afraid that the unrest will spill over to Muslim Turks in their countries, many of whom are poor.
Ethnic unrest is also a possibility. In 1992, ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz clashed in Osh, with the death toll reaching 2,000. Moreover, the split between Kyrgyzstan’s North and South is significant— just like the chasm between East and West in Ukraine or the split between northern and southern clans in Tajikistan. There, a 1992-1997 civil war took over 100,000 lives.
Quick Solution Needed
Three things must happen—and soon—to avoid a catastrophic outcome in the region:
Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors, the United States, European Union, OSCE, United Nations, and possibly Russia, must convince Akaev to resign and help the opposition find a quick and bloodless way out of the current crisis.
New parliamentary elections must be held—with a strong presence of international election observers.
Free, fair, and transparent presidential elections should take place, with international support and supervision.
The people of Kyrgyzstan have shown that they are unwilling to accept the status quo. They deserve better and should have the chance to build a more democratic, equitable, and accountable republic. With international support, they have the chance to accomplish these goals.
03-24-2005
The people of Kyrgyzstan have spoken -- and acted.
As they storm presidential palace and government buildings in the capital Bishkek, the government is paralyzed and impotent. The resignation of President Askar Akaev is the best way out of the crisis. Otherwise, the country will be facing a civil war, a bloody uprising, a possible disintegration, or all of the above. What’s more, turmoil in Kyrgyzstan may destabilize its large neighbors, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with catastrophic consequences of inter-ethnic and political violence.
To prevent bloodshed, the US and its allies must act quickly to convince President Akaev to step down or be shunned by the international community.
Akaev’s secular opposition has already taken over the south of the country, including the two largest cities Osh and Jalalabad, and is poised to march on the capital Bishkek which is bracing for a large protest this weekend. In response, Akaev calls his opponents "criminals" and foreign agents. He has refused to cancel deeply flawed parliamentary elections or resign. Messrs. Leonid Kuchma, the former President of Ukraine, and Victor Yanukovich, his Prime Minister defeated by Victor Yushchenko in the Orange Revolution, used to do the same in Kyiv.
It didn’t have to be like that. In the early 1990s, mountainous and poor Kyrgyzstan was hailed as an oasis of democracy. The US bestowed WTO membership and World Bank credits, but the country remained poor and corrupt. In early 2001 Akaev jailed Felix Kulov, his former vice-president, for challenging him for the presidency.
His former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev resigned in 2002 after government troops shot up six peaceful protesters, and now is an opposition leader. Roza Otunbaeva, the former Foreign Minister whom he banned from running for parliament in favor of his daughter, is among his toughest critics.
Kyrgyzstan today is a quintessence of everything that is wrong with post-communist Central Asian regimes, although it is hardly the worst offender. It did not have its "velvet revolution". The elites are essentially Soviet, with a sprinkle of small traders and criminals. Today’s opposition leaders are very much the national nomenklatura -- not dissidents like Lech Walensa and Vaclav Havel. But they are leaders of popular discontent with the ruling family’s corruption and want more democracy than Akaev is willing to grant. They are also likely to inject new blood into the corrupt body politic.
The situation in neighboring Uzbekistan and totalitarian Turkmenistan is even worse: there, the regimes are knocking down any opposition that appears on the horizon. However, they may be digging their own graves, a senior Bush administration National Security Council official says. The current opposition movements in Central Asia are likely to depose the authoritarian ruler and bring new secular elites to power, with at least a chance for democratic development. The Islamists, who are lurking in the background, have a whole different plan: a Shari’a (Islamic Law)-based state which will be a base of Jihad against other infidel regimes in the region.
In Kyrgyzstan and especially in Uzbekistan a global, clandestine radical Islamist party, Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation), is recruiting supporters by the thousand. Two prominent Kyrgyz politicians are Hizb supporters. Hizb’s goal: creation of a worldwide Califate, a military dictatorship based on Shari’a law, and dedicated to waging the Holy War (jihad) against the West.
Central Asia, according to Hizb, is getting ripe for an Islamist revolution because of its corrupt "infidel" regimes and US presence due to the war in Afghanistan. Central Asia, with its natural resources, including uranium mines, is as good of a bridgehead in global jihad as any. Hizb has declared that democracy is un-Islamic, but is likely to take part in any popular uprising, which is likely to happen if Akaev does not negotiate with the opposition.
A wave of democratic uprisings is sweeping the former Soviet Union. The Kyrgyz call it the Tulip, or Lemon, Revolution -- similar to Georgia’s Rose one and Ukraine’s Orange. But there are no guarantees the Kyrgyz will make lemonade out of this lemon. The two rounds of Kyrgyzstani elections took place February 27 and March 13. In these polls, Akaev packed the parliament with cronies and relatives, including his son and daughter. OSCE and US observers called the elections flawed. The opposition demanded another election (like in Ukraine) and Akaev’s immediate resignation (like in Georgia).
According to his entourage, Akaev was considering changing the Constitution for the second time and running for a third term in October, something most Kyrgyz oppose.
Akaev, who is in power since 1991, is tired and not really interested in the presidency, but is egged on to stay by his influential wife and the family, who enriched themselves during his rule. His once-sterling reputation as a democrat, philosopher and writer has shrunk like Dorian Gray’s picture.
Last Monday, a senior Kyrgyz official visiting Washington could not answer this writer’s question: why is Akaev afraid of the opposition’s demand to rerun the elections in a clean way, with numerous foreign observers present? After all, if he enjoys popular support as he claims, there is nothing to worry about. He should also clearly commit not to run in October. The Kyrgyz opposition does not have one recognized leader, such as Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine, or Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, so a pro-Akaev candidate may have a chance.
Central Asia has been on the brink of violence before. In 1992, ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were at each other’s throats in Osh, with the death toll reaching 2,000. Moreover, the split between the North and South in Kyrgyzstan is significant, like the chasm between East and West in Ukraine, or the split between the northern and southern clans in Tajikistan. There, the 1992-1997 civil war took over 100,000 lives.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are nervously watching developments in the small neighboring republic. They are afraid that the unrest will spill over to their poor Muslim Turkic population.
To avoid a catastrophic outcome, Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors, the United States, the European Union, OSCE, the United Nations and Russia, need to pressure Akaev to leave in order to let the opposition find a bloodless way out from the current crisis. It is time to let the Kyrgyz people enjoy their freedom.
01-21-2005
President Victor Yuschenko’s inauguration on Sunday January 23 is not the end of the road: it is the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between the US and the West, and Ukraine. Washington needs to throw a lifeline to Kyiv to complete the historic transformation and to build the democratic and free Ukraine of the 21st century.
The exhilarating Orange Revolution has demonstrated the deep desire of its people for honest, responsive and democratic government. This was a drama worthy of the 1989 scenes in Wenceslas Square in Prague and Solidarity’s surge to freedom in Poland. Victor Yushchenko’s heroic victory in the third round of presidential elections on December 26, 2004, now raises the question of what’s the most effective Western support to make the Ukrainian post-election transition a success. The Bush Administration should facilitate Ukraine’s membership in WTO, lift Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, encourage Ukraine’s EU membership, expand NATO’s cooperation with Kyiv, offer a bridging loan for economic restructuring; and state unequivocally that US will not tolerate threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Post-election challenges. With 52% of the vote, Yushchenko will face multiple challenges. His primary concerns include the polarized electorate; calls for regional autonomy; decrepit, value subtracting, rust-belt coal and steel industries in the East; and the opposition of protectionist oligarchs, apparatchiks and thugs. What’s more, 44 percent of voters favored Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich, an ex-con who promised to tighten Ukraine’s ties with Russia, make Russian the second official language, and introduce dual citizenship. Ukrainian oligarchs -- Yanukovich’s supporters and main beneficiaries of the economic links with Russia -- may launch a political opposition that will be difficult to overcome. If Russia retaliates by banning its large Ukrainian guest work force, Yushchenko’s popularity may suffer. Finally, Ukraine finds itself in the epicenter of the East-West strategic competition. The Orange Revolution opened the door to Ukraine’s European reintegration. Russia’s influence in the country declined, though Ukraine’s relations with its gigantic neighbor remain a long-term constant and a national priority.
Implications for the West. The US and the EU demonstrated policy coordination over Ukraine, which is rare in the post-Iraq world. However, after the revolution the EU has proceeded with caution. The EU now has to face its future relations with Ukraine in addition to the difficult accession of Turkey. The EU may pursue a good-neighbor policy, sign an associate member status agreement, or explore an outright membership which may take 10-15 years to achieve. Ukraine-NATO relations are another promising direction for cooperation. NATO is a leading Western organization to ensure Ukraine’s Western integration, as well as to restore a greater cohesion in transatlantic foreign policy. However, Ukrainian membership may cause friction in the US-Russian, EU-Russian, and Ukraine-Russian relations.
The US has supported the triumph of democracy in Ukraine and is interested in having Ukraine stable, prosperous and integrating in Euro-Atlantic structures. US also extensively cooperated with the European Union, achieving a unified position in support of Ukraine’s transformation -- an important post-Iraq achievement. At the same time, the US relationship with Russia is also important, as the Bush Administration seeks President Vladimir Putin’s support on future diplomatic action on Iran; reconstruction of Iraq; non-proliferation; counter-terrorism and energy cooperation. Support of Ukraine should not damage this relationship.
Supporting Ukraine. The US has to provide support for Ukraine’s integration with the West; encourage the EU to take Ukraine in, and preserve a working relationship with Russia. Therefore, integration into European institutions and bolstering of an assistance package to Ukraine are the proper approaches for the US Ukraine policy.
The Bush Administration should convince the 109th Congress to repeal the Jackson Vanik Amendment’s as it applies to Ukraine. The Amendment, which curbs normal trade status, is an irrelevant legacy of the Cold War as far as Ukraine is concerned.
The State Department should encourage the EU to sign an associate membership agreement with Ukraine and begin preliminary consultations on accession, including the exact date of the start of negotiation.
The Pentagon should expand NATO’s Partnership for Peace program to further modernize Ukraine’s military; promote civilian control over the military; explore a "trusted ally" non-member relationship; and eventually consider Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance.
The Treasury and the State Departments should work with and through the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to diversify Ukraine’s Soviet-era heavy industries and provide, if necessary, a bridging loan to shut down unprofitable mines.
The US should help the Yushchenko Administration develop a comprehensive package of reforms in the rule of law and legal reform. It should include privatization; expansion of free trade; and reducing and simplifying taxation. Civil service overhaul, including law enforcement, is key to restore Ukrainians’ trust in the state.
Washington should help Kyiv promote regionally focused export-oriented projects in Ukraine; and should foster technical assistance and cooperation with the private sector to make Ukraine a foreign investment magnet.
Prior to the Bush-Putin summit in Slovakia scheduled for February 24, the State Department should find an opportunity to mention that that the US fully endorses territorial integrity of Ukraine. The US should clarify to the Kremlin that the US support of Ukraine is not aimed at hurting Russian political and economic interests there (such as the Russian naval base in Sevastopol), investment, energy transit to Europe, overflight, etc.
Finally, The White House should work with the Yushchenko Administration to reverse pre-election promises to withdraw the Ukrainian contingent from Iraq, which is the fourth-largest one in the US-led coalition.
Ukraine has presented a renewed opportunity for the US engagement in the region. Washington should demonstrate unwavering political support for Ukraine’s pursuit of its democratic aspirations. An ongoing, cohesive transatlantic US foreign policy towards Ukraine should be at the core of the Bush Administration support for Ukraine.
11-12-2004
The outcome of the Ukrainian presidential elections could dramatically increase Moscow’s influence in Eurasia. If former Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich (the Kremlin’s preferred candidate) is elected, the Kremlin would virtually control the Ukrainian presidency. That would allow Russia to exercise greater geopolitical influence in Ukraine and would increase Moscow’s political momentum in the rest of Eurasia.
The biggest challenges for the U.S. are to keep Russia in the anti-terrorism coalition and to ensure continued access to Russian energy resources, while supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet states. To these ends, the U.S. should boost cooperation with these countries and expand the dialogue with Moscow about contentious issues, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the U.S. presence in Central Asia. In Ukraine, the Bush Administration should assist Ukrainian groups that are committed to democracy, free markets, and Euro-Atlantic integration by providing diplomatic, financial, and media support.
The First Round
According to the government-controlled Central Electoral Commission, Yanukovich received 40.12 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election. Opposition leader Victor Yushchenko received 39.15 percent. However, European observers and independent pollsters gave the victory to Yushchenko by 4 percent to 6 percent. Widespread election fraud and Yushchenko’s lack of access to the government-controlled media could also give Yanukovich a "win" in the run-off election on November 21.
The U.S. has a strategic interest in preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and keeping the democratic process on track, while preventing Russian influence from growing further. The U.S. has warned that it may impose selective visa bans on Ukrainian officials involved in election fraud, but this may not prevent fraud in the run-off.
Russia’s Ascendancy
The Soviet-educated Russian elite, which generally views the U.S. as a strategic adversary, may challenge the sovereignty of or pursue increased control over the post-Soviet states by overtly supporting pro-Moscow candidates. In the process, undermine long-term U.S. interests in developing democratic, globally integrated states in Eurasia.
There are two reasons for the Kremlin’s ascendancy in Ukraine. First, according to published accounts in Moscow and Kiev, the Kremlin has poured unprecedented resources into the election campaign--at least $200 million from sympathetic Russian and Ukrainian businessmen. Second, Russia has access to the Soviet-era criminal files of Yanukovich, who was jailed twice for aggravated assault and robbery. According to Moscow experts, Yanukovich’s criminal past creates a relationship of a case officer and an "asset" between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Yanukovich.
Ukraine’s Significance
Ukraine should be viewed in the larger context of the recent negative regional dynamics. Before the elections, at Moscow’s request, President Leonid Kuchma and Yanukovich engineered changes in Ukraine’s military doctrine and turned away from NATO and EU integration. On October 17, Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenka pulled off an unconstitutional power grab in Belarus. The stalemate in Moldova about the secessionist Transdniestr region continues. In the Caucasus, Moscow is undermining Georgian independence by creeping annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Ukraine is crucial to the Kremlin because it is a large-scale demonstration that Russia can reestablish influence in the former empire and expand its access to the Black Sea and Southeastern Europe, including the Balkans. Russia has deliberately focused on detaching Ukraine from its Western ties and making it dependent on Moscow.
Implications for Eurasia
If Russia successfully consolidates control over Belarus and Ukraine while derailing a peaceful resolution in Moldova, Moscow may also be encouraged to pursue greater control over Caspian oil. It could do so by increasing pressure on Kazakhstan, possibly through its Russian-speaking minority, and it could eventually move to secure Azerbaijan’s compliance with the Kremlin regional policy.
Moscow has also utilized secessionist enclaves to advance its "near abroad" policy. Beyond that, it may further undermine pro-American Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and pressure Uzbekistan to return to the Russia-led bloc. However, as the Beslan tragedy demonstrated, Russian military power is still limited in its ability to counter real security threats. Such ambitious policy may stoke imperial hubris in Russia--with unpredictable consequences.
What the Bush Administration Should Do
The biggest U.S. challenges are to keep Russia in the anti-terrorism coalition and to ensure access to Russian energy resources, while keeping the former Soviet republics sovereign and independent. Furthermore, the tools in the U.S. diplomatic toolbox are limited. Russia is flush with oil revenue and no longer needs Western economic assistance, and it can easily obtain the financing and needed advanced technology for oil exploration on the open market. In this context, the Bush Administration should:
Support Ukrainian groups that are committed to democracy, free markets, and Euro-Atlantic integration by providing diplomatic, financial, and media support.
Support sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet states by expanding cooperation via NATO’s Partnership for Peace, bilateral military-to-military ties, exchanges, train-and-equip programs, and even limited troop deployment where necessary.
Expand high-level diplomatic dialogue with Moscow about contentious issues, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the U.S. presence in Central Asia.
Conclusions
Recent developments in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East will require the President’s attention and will likely limit American freedom of maneuver in Eurasia. The muted U.S. responses to recent power shifts in Ukraine and Belarus demonstrate that the U.S. is unwilling to challenge Moscow’s growing influence. However, the long-term geopolitical outcome in Eurasia will depend on Washington’s engagement in the region, on Russia and the U.S agreeing on the "traffic rules" in Eurasia, and on Moscow abandoning its anti-American policy in and beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union.
11-10-2004
The outcome of Ukraine’s contentious presidential vote could have far-reaching ramifications for the US-Russian geopolitical competition in Central Asia and the Caucasus. An election victory by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, who is widely viewed as Russia’s preferred candidate, could embolden Kremlin efforts to enhance its position in the energy-rich Caspian Basin.
Yanukovich is set to face opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, a Western-oriented reformer, in a run-off vote on November 21. Since the first round of voting October 31, campaigning has been marked by acrimony, with both sides hurling allegations of voter fraud at the other.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s administration has made no secret of its desire to prevent Ukraine, long viewed in Moscow as Russia’s "little brother," from drifting Westward. In pursuit of their goals, Russian leaders have played on the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian political leaders. In 2000, for example, President Leonid Kuchma became embroiled in a scandal after the release of a secretly recorded tape on which the president appeared to sanction the assassination of a Ukrainian journalist. Since then, Russia has provided strong political support for Kuchma, helping ensure the president’s political survival. Not surprisingly, Kuchma has steered Ukraine away from NATO and EU integration in recent years.
Yanukovich has also been a central figure in Ukraine’s tilt towards Russia, and the Kremlin reportedly has used its influence to help bankroll his presidential campaign. Some experts believe that, like Kuchma, Russia is exploiting Yanukovich’s troubled past – specifically the fact that Yanukovich served time in jail as a young man for robbery and assault. There is speculation in both Moscow and Kyiv that Russian officials may possess more "compromat," or embarrassing information, on Yanukovich that they could use in the future to coerce him. In Moscow, observers already characterize the potential relationship between Putin and Yanukovich as that of a security services case officer handling an "asset." A Kremlin source indicated that Putin, a former KGB officer, is personally disdainful of Yanukovich’s unsavory past. Nevertheless, the Putin administration badly wants Yanukovich to be elected, as it would likely cement Ukraine in a position of dependency regarding Russia.
Given the high strategic stakes involved, observers in Washington believe Russia is willing to go to great lengths to secure Yanukovich’s election. His victory would free Russia to devote more attention and resources to bolstering its geopolitical interests elsewhere, in particular Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Moscow is especially keen to improve its position in the competition over Caspian Basin energy. Moscow’s primary opponent in this sphere is the United States, which since the September 11 terrorist tragedy has increased its strategic profile throughout the Caspian Basin. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Washington is also the main sponsor of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, an energy conduit that will break a Russia’s virtual monopoly on Western-oriented energy export routes. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Of late, however, China has also entered the energy fray, working with Kazakhstan to establish a pipeline network that would transport energy to the East. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
At present, there are several points in Central Asia and the Caucasus where Russia could apply pressure in an attempt to reorder the geopolitical calculus. Some observers expect Russia to increase pressure on Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has aggressively pursued a "multi-vector" policy in recent years that is designed to play Russia, the United States and China off against each other in the energy contest. One way Moscow can attempt to influence Kazakhstani policy is to play the nationality card, stirring up discontent among the large ethnic Russians community in northern Kazakhstan.
Other analysts suggest the Kremlin’s attention may turn to Azerbaijan, a country whose relationship with the United States has appeared to ebb over the past year. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Reports of infighting within the ruling party in Baku have prompted speculation that President Ilham Aliyev’s authority is shaky. Russia could thus try to repeat the "Kuchma scenario" in Azerbaijan, providing strong political support that helps Aliyev to preserve and consolidate his authority. In return, Moscow would no doubt demand closer Azerbaijani cooperation on energy-related issues, as well as on the ongoing conflict in Chechnya.
Uzbekistan is another country that has experienced recent trouble in its relations with the United States, underscored by the US State Department’s decision last July to sanction Tashkent because of the Uzbek government’s poor human rights record. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. President Islam Karimov of late has signaled a desire to improve relations with Russia, and Moscow seems eager to reciprocate. At an October ceremony marking the admittance of Russia into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, Karimov championed Russia’s "legitimate" right to play a large role in regional developments. "We here in the region acknowledge, have acknowledged and will continue to acknowledge Russia’s interests - its strategic interests and the historical aims and tasks Russia pursues in this region," Karimov said.
Georgia is another logical focus for Russian officials. However, any designs that Moscow may have on Georgia may be complicated by the continuing political turmoil in the separatist region of Abkhazia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russian officials, without doubt, view Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, specifically his desire to reunify the country and push it into the embrace of NATO and the EU, as a threat to Russian interests. However, Russia has traditionally depended on its ability to manipulate Georgia’s separatist regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – in order to exert pressure on Tbilisi. The Abkhaz turmoil would appear to deprive Moscow of this lever of influence, at least on a temporary basis.
Given the US preoccupation with the insurgency in Iraq, Washington’s ability to counter Russian moves in Central Asia and the Caucasus would seem limited. In addition to the fact that Iraq is consuming most of the United States’ strategic resources, American officials say their chief aims vis a vis Russia are maintaining its participation in the anti-terror coalition, and keeping access open to Russian energy reserves. These policy priorities, US officials quietly admit, act as a restraint on Washington’s desire to check Russian expansionist impulses in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation After Beslan
10-25-2004
On September 1, 2004, the first day of school, a multiethnic group of over 30 radical Islamist terrorists, including two female suicide bombers and some Chechens, took more than 1,000 children, teachers, and parents hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia. The terrorists deployed explosives around the school, hanging them from basketball hoops in the gym, where most of the children were held. This was the fifth massive hostage-taking event in Russia since 1995, and it ended in tragedy. Shamil Basaev, leader of the radical Islamist wing of the Chechen separatist movement, has taken responsibility for the massacre.1
In the aftermath of Beslan, the U.S. should emphasize to the Russian people, President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian government that the two countries are facing the same enemy. The U.S. should increase outreach in the battle for Russia’s hearts and minds, paying particular attention to the younger generations of Russian citizens.
In addition to these public diplomacy efforts, Presidents Putin and George W. Bush should hold an anti-terrorism summit in the near future to hammer out a joint anti-terrorism action plan. The two countries should expand security cooperation in anti-terrorist force structure; command, control, and communications; and on techniques for dealing with hostage situations. The U.S. and Russia should expand the range of joint programs designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist organizations, going beyond the current Nunn–Lugar funding.
However, even though the two countries face a common threat, the U.S. does not have to agree to Russia’s policies toward its neighbors. The U.S. should support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet states, and it should not remain silent if democracy in Russia is rolled back. Instead, Washington should develop programs that support growth of the nonprofit/nongovernment sector, promote the rule of law, and help to advance transparent, participatory, and democratic governance in Russia. The U.S. should also expand support of the independent media in all forms, including print, broadcasting, and Internet.[1]
Beslan: Russia’s 9/11
The Beslan tragedy shook Russia on a scale comparable to how September 11 affected the United States. Terrorists subjected the children and other hostages to unspeakable abuses, denying them water and food, killing some at random, and forcing many children to drink urine.[2] Europe has not seen such cruelty since the Nazi atrocities during World War II and Stalin’s genocidal exile of nations to Siberia and Central Asia.
After two days, the terrorists triggered an explosion in the gym, and many children ran from the building. The terrorists opened fire, shooting and killing hostages. Russian special forces and the armed local population attempted a rescue, but the death and destruction of that day speaks clearly of a monumental security failure.
Heart-wrenching scenes of small bodies in tiny coffins and parents breaking down in grief at their children’s graves shocked the world. Many Russians watched the crisis on television, tears pouring down their cheeks.
Security Failures
The systemic failures of the policy and security apparatus that failed to stop the atrocities in Beslan were immediately obvious to Russian and Western observers. The Russian intelligence networks—run by the military, internal security forces, and the Ministry of Interior police in the North Caucasus— failed to identify preparations for the attack or provide timely intelligence that would have allowed the terrorists to be intercepted en route to the school.
Nor was Beslan an isolated incident: A few days prior to Beslan, two female suicide bombers destroyed two Russian airliners in flight, and a Moscow metro station and a bus stop were bombed.
The failure of the rescue operation was also obvious. The top military commander indicated that “there was no planning to rescue hostages” and disclosed that 48 hours after the school was seized, the main special forces were training 30 kilometers away.[3] Even if negotiations were underway, a rescue force should have been on location and ready to respond at any moment. Furthermore, the rescuers had only two or three armored personnel carriers to use as shields in approaching the building. As a result, the special forces were pinned down by the terrorists’ heavy fire.
The terrorists were permitted to dictate the operational tempo. They imposed the rescue timing by setting off the explosives and put up a stiff resistance that lasted for 10 hours, from 1 p.m. to 11 p.m., when most of them were finally killed. Sporadic fire continued until 4 a.m. of the next day.[4]
Because the building was rigged with explosives, the only chance to save the children if negotiations failed would have been to overwhelm the terrorists in a massive, precise surprise attack, which would take out most of the perpetrators in the first few minutes. Such an operation could have used advanced technology, such as night vision goggles, stun grenades, body armor, and incapacitating gas. Nothing of the kind happened.
Roaming Locals. Appallingly, the security forces failed to remove hundreds of armed locals from the scene. This failure to establish and enforce a police perimeter allowed civilians to interfere with the rescue attempt. It placed both the hostages and rescuers in their crossfire and exposed civilians to terrorists’ weapons fire, leading to entirely avoidable civilian casualties. Furthermore, some terrorists were allowed to break out of the building, and they engaged in firefights until the next morning.
The Russian anti-terrorist forces were woefully unprepared. Beslan was Russia’s fifth massive hostage situation, with over 1,000 hostages; yet Russian security forces demonstrated that they had learned little from the debacles of Budennovsk, Pervomaysk, and Kizlyar in the 1990s and from Dubrovka in 2002. They did not wear modern Kevlar helmets or even bulletproof vests in some cases, and the elite Alfa and Vityaz units lost 10 men—their largest losses in post-Soviet history.
Failures of Policy and Leadership
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations have failed to reform the Soviet-era security services and the Ministry of Interior police forces, which in turn failed to prevent or adequately respond to the Beslan hostage situation. These are still quasi-totalitarian political control and crime fighting organizations, rife with corruption, as has been acknowledged by President Putin as well as other senior Russian officials.[5] They are simply inadequate to the task of confronting modern local and global terrorism.
Despite the recent terrorist attacks on Russia, President Putin is ambiguous about Russian cooperation with the West in fighting terrorism. After the tragedy, Putin repeatedly bemoaned the passing of the Soviet “great power,” but he also recognized that Soviet ideology suppressed numerous real ethnic conflicts.
Putin accuses Western intelligence services of maintaining contact with the Chechen rebels. Clearly, he believes that the U.S. and other Western powers support anti-Russian Chechen forces in an effort to keep Russia pinned down and “involved in its own problems.”[6] After all, Great Britain and the U.S. have granted political asylum to some Chechen leaders.
Putin could have also mentioned the fundraising activities conducted in the West by radical Muslim groups to aid the “jihad” in “Chechnistan.”[7] Such activities have been going on in Great Britain and the U.S. for years but now seem to be coming to an end (although fundraising for Chechnya is continuing in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world without interference). In this regard, Putin’s criticism may be legitimate in view of the Beslan atrocities and Basaev’s own admission that he received money from abroad and, if offered, would have taken money from Osama bin Laden.[8]
As an intelligence professional, Putin should appreciate the difference between information gathering and operational support. Instead, he is apparently convinced that the West is preoccupied with creating an irritant for Russia. In an earlier speech to the nation, Putin went even further, saying that foreign powers are interested in dismembering Russia and neutralizing it as a nuclear power;[9] he ignored, however, the much greater issue of the global Islamist networks supporting the Chechen extremists.
Still, Putin left enough common ground to infer that continuing cooperation with the West in the war on terrorism is possible. He sent a clear message that entrenched bureaucracies on both sides of the Atlantic hamper U.S.–Russian security cooperation. He also said that President Bush is a “good, decent man,” “a reliable and predictable partner,” and someone he can “feel as a human being.”[10] He also stated that terrorist attacks in Iraq are aimed at achieving President Bush’s electoral defeat.[11]
Thus, despite his vocal reservations concerning the West, Putin sent a message to the Western leadership. Putin presented himself as open to anti-terrorism cooperation, indicating that security “professionals” on both sides are in contact and recognizing that Cold War sentiments still excessively influence the bureaucracies on both sides of the Atlantic.[12] Putin is no doubt aware of shared risks of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.[13]
New Challenges
While President Putin appears to understand the threat of global terrorism, Russia’s security apparatus does not seem to grasp sufficiently the challenge of the jihadi menace. This is an enemy different from the Cold War threats of “Western imperialism” and internal political opposition. Externally, Soviet foreign intelligence fought the Cold War against the U.S. and its European allies while, domestically, the secret police were positioned to ruthlessly suppress any political dissent among the unarmed population through intimidation and incarceration.
Ethnic and religious unrest, however, is endemic to the territory of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, as prolonged guerrilla warfare during the 18th–20th centuries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Western Ukraine, and Baltic states demonstrates. In particular, ethnic-based warfare and insurgency have hardly been new to the Caucasus—north and south—for the past two centuries.
A Missed Chance. President Putin has admitted that the first Chechen war, unleashed by the Yeltsin administration in the fall of 1994, in which 80,000–100,000 people were killed and over 100,000 became internally displaced, was an error.[14] After the Russian army’s defeat in Chechnya, Moscow granted the rebel region quasi-independence in 1996.
Sadly, however, “independent” Chechnya turned into a disaster for its own people. Armed gangs and clans ran wild. Radical Sunni (called Wahhabi or Salafi) clerics imported from Saudi Arabia have established Islamic religious courts in the society, which had previously practiced a rather lax version of Sufi Islam.[15] Public hangings have become commonplace. Thousands have been kidnapped for ransom. Slave markets have appeared. Oil has been stolen from pipelines, pipelines sabotaged, transit trains from Russia shot at, and passengers robbed. Trafficking in drugs, arms, and other contraband is rampant.
The Wahhabi presence, including ties with al-Qaeda terrorists, has increased, strengthening the leadership of radical Islamists such as Shamil Basaev. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s second in command, spent six months in Chechnya setting up training camps and preparing for jihad. The Russian security services even arrested al-Zawahiri, but unaware of his identity eventually let him go.
The Second Chechen War. The second Chechen war began in 1999 when a radical Chechen faction commanded by Shamil Basaev invaded the neighboring republic of Daghestan. Bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk, in which over 300 people died, greatly escalated matters. Basaev and the radical faction he leads do not hide their geopolitical ambitions of establishing a caliphate from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Russia responded with a World War II– style invasion of Chechnya, which resulted in massive destruction and heavy civilian casualties.
The second Chechen war bolstered Putin’s popularity and facilitated his election to his first term in office in March 2000, but it also left lingering problems. Tens of thousands of Chechen civilians were displaced, killed, or wounded. After Beslan, however, Putin refused to discuss the problems. Further, he asserted that the Chechen war had nothing to do with the hostage taking in Beslan. The Russian president offered no criticism of command, control, and leadership failures or of doctrinal and organizational lapses in fighting the terrorist war in the Caucasus and Russia.
Today, political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and “hearts-and-minds” issues desperately need attention throughout the Northern Caucasus. President Putin understands this, at least to some degree. However, it remains to be seen whether the newly installed nationalities minister Vladimir Yakovlev, former mayor of St. Petersburg and a political enemy of Putin,[16] and the newly appointed Governor-General of the Northern Caucasus Dmitry Kozak, a Putin can-do confidante and former Cabinet secretary, are up to the demanding tasks involved.[17]
To address today’s threats, Russia needs to rethink and revamp its anti-terrorism approach, learn lessons from other countries and conflicts, and establish new security structures that are capable of dealing with 21st century terrorism. In such a predicament, one would think that Russia would not look for adventures in the “near abroad” (the other former Soviet republics) and would leave recent democratic achievements intact.
Prisoner of the Caucasus
However, in the days before and after Beslan, Putin and his inner circle overtly questioned the sovereignty of Georgia and her post-Soviet borders. Putin said, “When the Soviet Union collapsed, no one asked the Ossetians and the Abkhaz whether they want to stay in Georgia.”[18] Russia is also staunchly opposing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s plan for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Transdniester, a secessionist region in Moldova.
The message is loud and clear: Post-Soviet borders are no longer sacrosanct. Furthermore, in 2001, the Duma quietly adopted a constitutional mechanism for incorporating foreign lands and countries into the Russian Federation.
In Georgia, Russian arms, Transdniester and Cossack volunteers, and Russian peacekeepers under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States have been deployed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian gunboats have entered Georgian territorial waters without authorization. One even had ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky on board. Zhirinovsky was delivering the gunboat as a gift to the Abkhaz separatist leadership.[19] Such events do not happen without the permission of Putin’s administration.
Russian citizenship and passports, freely distributed to the secessionist populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, undermine the national identity of the Abkhaz and Ossetians as citizens of Georgia, while these separatist elites benefit from contraband trafficking and are supported with secret Moscow-based funds.[20] Plans have even been laid to reopen a railroad line from Sochi to Abkhazia without Tbilisi’s agreement.[21]
The Russian leadership seems to have a blind spot. By trying to pull South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Moscow’s orbit, the Kremlin may be inadvertently strengthening the case of Chechen separatism.
Border Revisions? Since 1992, Moscow has supported sundry separatists—from Transdniester to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Nagorno–Karabakh—for a reason. These moves open the door to revising other borders, especially in areas heavily populated with Russian speakers, such as northern Kazakhstan, Transdniester, and eastern Ukraine.
Russia may also support border revisions in such areas as Nagorno–Karabakh, which could have unpredictable consequences for the 10-year– old Armenian–Azerbaijani cease-fire. Border revisions can be held over the heads of uncooperative neighbors like the sword of Damocles. Internationally, this can become a powder keg. Undermining the territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors is unacceptable to the U.S. and the European Union, and it is dangerous to Russia itself.
The Kremlin Response After Beslan
Crying over the phantom pains of empire will not protect Russia from terrorism. Instead of revamping, retraining, and reorganizing Russia’s anti-terrorist and security services, Putin has opted for a massive re-centralization of power—despite an outcry from the Russian liberal elites.[22] In doing so, he is taking the country on a path reminiscent of the Soviet and czarist eras.
Specifically, on September 13, 2004, Putin announced the following measures ostensibly to ensure that Russia is effectively governed:
Regional leaders will no longer be elected by a popular vote. Instead, regional legislatures will approve nominees submitted by the president.
All Duma deputies will be elected through party lists in single-seat constituencies.
A “public chamber” will be established to provide public oversight of the government, particularly of law enforcement and security agencies.
Voluntary people’s patrols, ubiquitous in the Soviet era, will be established and will work in tandem with police to ensure that public order is re-established.
A special federal commission will be set up to oversee the North Caucasus issues.
The government will re-establish a new Ministry for Regional Policy and Nationalities.
The government will elaborate a system of responses to thwart terrorist threats.[23]
Putin is essentially rebuilding the Soviet state security apparatus and applying the 19th century Russian imperial model to a 21st century state that is riddled with terrorism and corruption. For example, there are also plans to the reintroduce police-issued residence permits, similar to the Soviet-era propiska, to control internal movement of the population.[24]
These measures are unlikely to provide an effective antidote to expanding terrorism in the North Caucasus and Russia, and they reverse democratic achievements of the 1990s. Nostalgia for the Soviet past may beget new authoritarianism, as former Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev warned in interviews on September 16, 2004.[25]
Reverting to the Past? Putin’s decision to nominate governors, doing away with their election, will not only dilute Russia’s developing democracy. It will effectively end administrative ethnic autonomy, which was adopted by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 coup.
The number of regions—”federation subjects” as they are called in Russia—is likely to be reduced through constitutional changes from 89 to about 30. However, in the 21st century, it is extremely difficult to govern a country that spans 11 time zones from one political center. The information overload and corruption may become severe enough to slow the pace of economic growth. Putin may have to abandon his proclaimed goal of doubling Russia’s gross domestic product by 2012.[26]
It is also counterproductive to undermine the connection of voters and their elected representatives by abandoning the single-district system and shifting to elections by party lists.
Establishing an unelected and disempowered “public chamber” to supervise the security services will not solve Russia’s flagging anti-terrorism conundrum. There is no substitute for effective civilian control by the legislative and civilian executive branches. Nor are additional bureaucratic offices, such as the new Ministry for Regional Policy and Nationalities, likely to resolve the systemic problems of the Northern Caucasus.
What Should Be Done
In pursuing the global war on terrorism, the U.S. should attempt to accomplish a number of policy objectives with regard to Russia:
Keeping Russia as a friendly partner in the anti-terrorism coalition;
Cooperating with Moscow to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially preventing terrorists from acquiring such weapons;
Shoring up Russia as a reliable supplier of oil and gas to the world market, in addition to the Persian Gulf states, and keeping the Russian energy sector open to U.S. and Western investment;
Supporting the territorial integrity and independence of the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia; and
Developing the forces of democracy in Russia, especially supporting civil society and free media.
To advance these policy objectives, the Bush Administration should:
Emphasize to the Russian people, President Putin, and the Russian government that Russia and the U.S. are facing the same enemy, which threatens their national survival, their peoples, and their most cherished values. Presidents Bush and Putin should hold an anti-terrorism summit in the near future to hammer out a joint anti-terrorism action plan. In view of Beslan, President Bush should order a review of U.S. policies on asylum for Chechen leaders, Chechen fundraising in the U.S., and the U.S. intelligence community’s contacts with Chechen rebels.
Increase U.S. outreach in the battle for Russia’s hearts and minds, paying particular attention to the younger generations of Russian citizens. Cold War paranoia still permeates the Russian elites. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow is already busy reaching out to Russia’s media, think tanks, and government offices, but more needs to be done on the public diplomacy front.
Expand security cooperation in anti-terrorist force structure, command, control, and communications and on techniques for dealing with hostage situations. The Trubinkov–Armitage Group run by the U.S. Department of State and the Russian Foreign Ministry could coordinate cooperation. A joint project, such as neutralizing Shamil Basaev and his organization, could be undertaken cooperatively. On the U.S. side, participants might include the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security and the CIA. On the Russian side, participating offices might include the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service, Emergency Situations Ministry (Russian FEMA), and Alfa and Vityaz units.
Cooperate with Russia, if it so desires, in strengthening transparency and civilian control of the Russian security services. This can be accomplished through expanded contacts between the Duma, the Council of the Federation, and the U.S. Congress. Congress and the Pentagon, as well as think tanks, could conduct a series of seminars discussing the U.S. experience in this field in Moscow.
Develop a range of joint programs that reduce WMD and terrorist threats to both countries, going beyond the current Nunn–Lugar funding which focuses on storage, safety, and security. Such programs should actively prevent WMD proliferation to non-state actors. As both countries have an interest in strategic arms reduction and ballistic missile defense, such cooperation can help to transcend Cold War fears. The U.S. and Russia should intensify cooperation on joint ballistic missile defense and aggressive non-proliferation to help further reduce Cold War sentiments.[27]
Support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet states. Expand cooperation with these countries via NATO’s Partnership for Peace and bilateral military-to-military ties, exchanges, train-and-equip programs, and (where necessary) limited troop deployment. Maintain and expand dialogue with Moscow over contentious issues, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the U.S. presence in Central Asia.
Develop programs that support freedoms of the press and of political organizations, federalism and local self-governance, growth of the nonprofit/nongovernment sector, and the rule of law and promote transparent, participatory, and democratic governance in Russia. This can be accomplished through joint activities involving political parties, their institutions, and other nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy in the U.S. and the Moscow Helsinki Group, International Memorial Society, and Glasnost Defense Foundation in Russia. The U.S. should also expanding support of the independent media in Russia in all forms, including print, broadcasting, and Internet.
Conclusion
The U.S. faces a delicate and difficult policy challenge after Beslan. President Putin is taking Russia in the direction of greater centralization, which he believes will make Russia more secure and make it into a greater power. An authoritarian Russia, lacking democratic checks and balances, is likely to pursue a regional and even global foreign policy that increases friction with the United States, its vital interests, and its allies.
The U.S. should do its best to encourage democracy, political pluralism, and media freedoms and dissuade Moscow from becoming increasingly authoritarian or expansionist. It should support Russia’s weaker neighbors, their independence, and their territorial integrity. At the same time, the U.S. should avoid an unnecessary confrontation with Russia while shoring up and expanding U.S.–Russian cooperation in the global war on terrorism.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
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[1]Mark MacKinnon, “Beslan Hostage-Taking a Big Success, Warlord Boasts,” The Globe and Mail, September 18, 2004, at www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040917.wchech18/BNStory/Front (October 6, 2004).
[2]Olga Craig, “One Little Boy Was Shouting: ‘Mama.’ She Couldn’t Hear Him. She Was Dead,” telegraph.co.uk, May 9, 2004, at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/05/wosse105.xml (October 6, 2004).
[3]Author’s notes on NTV (a Russian television network), 2 p.m. live broadcast from Beslan, September 3, 2004.
[4]Author’s notes on NTV, live news coverage, September 3–4, 2004.
[5]Author’s notes of meeting of Western experts and journalists with President Vladimir Putin, Moscow, September 6, 2004.
[6]Meeting with President Putin.
[7]Author’s interviews with anti-terrorism officials, Washington, D.C., and London, 2003–2004.
[8]MacKinnon, “Beslan Hostage-Taking a Big Success, Warlord Boasts.”
[9]Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie prezidenta RF V. Putina na rashirennom zasedanii pravitel’stva RF” (speech of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin at the expanded meeting of the Cabinet of the Russian Federation), September 13, 2004, at www.sinfo.ru/ru/main/officially/interview/detail.shtml?id=43 (October 6, 2004).
[10]Meeting with President Putin.
[11]Jill Dougherty, “Putin Urges Voters to Support Bush,” CNN.com, October 18, 2004, at www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/ 10/18/putin.iraq/index.html (October 18, 2004).
[12]Ibid.
[13]However, he authorized a Russian nuclear technology deal to complete the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, Iran, despite Tehran’s support for international terrorism.
[14]Ibid.
[15]SunnahOnline.Com, “Chechnya Relief Fund,” at www.sunnahonline.com/news/important/asia_chechnya_index.htm (October 7, 2004). See also Thomas de Waal, “Europe’s Darkest Corner,” The Guardian, August 30, 2004, at www.guardian.co.uk/comment/ story/0,3604,1293502,00.html (October 7, 2004).
[16]ITAR–TASS, “Ministry for Regional, Nationalities Policy to Be Restored,” September 13, 2004, at www.itar-tass.com/eng/ level2.html?NewsID=1241323&PageNum=0 (October 6, 2004).
[17]“Kozak Appointed Putin’s Envoy to Terror-Hit South Russia,” MosNews.com, September 13, 2004, at www.mosnews.com/ news/2004/09/13/yakovlev.shtml (October 7, 2004).
[18]Meeting with President Putin.
[19]“Georgian Military Ship Pursues Motorboat with Russian Duma Deputies,” Pravda, August 11, 2004, at english.pravda.ru/ printed.html?news_id=13725 (October 7, 2004).
[20]Anton Krivenyuk, “Abkhazians Opt for Russian Citizenship,” The Moscow News, June 26, 2002, at english.mn.ru/english/ issue.php?2002-26-6 (October 7, 2004).
[21]Vladimir Sokor, “Moscow Breaches Sochi Agreement on Abkhazia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 04, 2004, at www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3036&article_id=2368350 (October 7, 2004).
[22]For a typical criticism, see Andrey Piontkovsky, “Putinskaya Shinel,” Fond Liberal’naya Missiya, September 17, 2004, at www.liberal.ru/article.asp?Num=213 (October 7, 2004).
[23]Dr. Yevgeny Volk, Coordinator of The Heritage Foundation’s Moscow Office, summarized these measures.
[24]“Gosduma reanimiruyet institut propiski,” Pravda, September 21, 2004, at news.pravda.ru/politics/2004/09/21/67505.html (October 7, 2004).
[25]Steven Lee Myers, “The World—Dark Age; Putin Gambles on Raw Power,” The New York Times, September 19, 2004, Section 4, p. 1.
[26]Russian News and Information Agency, “President’s Adviser on Doubling GDP,” August 12, 2004, at en.rian.ru/rian/ index.cfm?prd_id=159&msg_id=4704450&startrow=1&date=2004-08-12&do_alert=0 (October 7, 2004).
[27]Heritage Foundation analysts James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Jack Spencer contributed to this recommendation.
09-29-2004
Much has been reported about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 6 meeting with Western journalists and academics, just days after the tragedy at Beslan. What many of the reports have missed, however, was Putin’s overt questioning of post-Soviet borders.
Georgia, the Kremlin’s lead sparring partner of late, was clearly the main target of these statements. "No one asked Ossetians and the Abkhaz whether they want to stay in Georgia,” Putin declared.
This declaration is no mere policy posturing. Separatists have allegedly used Russian arms in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and reports have circulated of Cossack and Trans-Dniester volunteers heading off to fight in both regions. Russian ships also reportedly enter Georgia’s territorial waters without authorization. In addition, Russia has granted citizenship to large numbers of Abkhaz and Ossetians, while economic ties through investment or illicit trade have tacitly supported the leadership of these breakaway regions.
The Kremlin’s policy in Georgia could possibly establish a precedent that may be applied to other territorial/border/ethnic minority issues, such as northern Kazakhstan, a heavily Russian area, Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, and even Nagorno-Karabakh. In those potential instances, the possibility of border revision could be held above the heads of uncooperative neighbors like a sword of Damocles. For this reason, Moscow has supported various separatist causes throughout the former Soviet Union, ranging from the Trans-Dniester enclave in Moldova to Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
Security officials with whom our group of experts met in Moscow pointed out that, nearly 13 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has still not secured its borders with neighboring states. “We have not even decided whether we need to protect the borders of the Russian Federation, or [the frontier] of the former Soviet Union,” one senior official said. The Beslan tragedy – which took place inside the Russian Federation – has helped focus the Russian leadership’s attention on this issue.
At present, it appears that the Kremlin wants to pull South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Moscow’s orbit. However, Putin’s administration should tread carefully: exerting greater force over the two Georgian regions could inadvertently strengthen the case for Chechen separatism. Acknowledging the right of South Ossetians and Abkhaz to determine their own affairs, while seeking to deny the Chechens the same right, would expose the Kremlin as hypocritical.
Putin’s actions and rhetoric in the aftermath of the Beslan tragedy do little to generate hope that Russia will contain the twin scourges of separatism and terrorism in the near future. For one, the Russian president has been reluctant to admit any missteps by his administration, even while recognizing mistakes made during the Soviet era. Putin acknowledged, for instance, that Soviet ideology suppressed real ethnic conflicts, and that up to 2,000 such conflicts throughout the former Soviet Union are frozen or simmer on. But the president’s own decision to nominate rather than to elect regional governors will do little to correct this legacy within the Russian Federation. It will effectively do away with the concept of ethnic autonomy, which survived czarist imperialism, and was embraced by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 revolution.
The poor performance by Russian intelligence and security forces before and during the Beslan hostage tragedy begged a question about Russia’s cooperation with the West in fighting terrorism. In response, however, Putin launched a long tirade about the roles that the Soviet Union and the United States played over the past 25 years in turning Afghanistan into a terrorist haven.
Putin places much of the blame for Russia’s misadventures in Chechnya on the West. "I have been tracking the issue for several years and have made up my mind", he said. The Western powers are interested in keeping Russia down and "involved in its own problem" by supporting Chechen separatism, Putin believes. Both the United States and Great Britain have granted political asylum to Chechen separatist leaders, he said, and Western intelligence services maintain contacts with Chechen fighters.
Putin decried the horrible conditions under which Stalin exiled the Chechens 60 years ago, and termed the first Chechen war, launched by predecessor Boris Yeltsin in 1994, as “probably a mistake.” But what about the second war which he started in 1999? There was no discussion. Nor, he maintain, did the Chechen war have anything to do with the hostage-taking in Beslan.
Today, Russia is facing its demons in Beslan, in Chechnya, in the northern and southern Caucasus. These are trying times for Russia, its neighbors, its president, and its people. The question remains: can the Kremlin shrug off its nostalgia for the Soviet past? And with it, recognize the right of neighboring states to their borders? The security of Eurasia and Russia itself depends upon it.
09-24-2004
Two days after the Beslan tragedy ended in a fiery blood bath, a group of Western experts and journalists, including this author, met with Vladimir Putin for tea in his state residence in Novo-Ogarevo. It was a grim affair.
The historic significance of the location, where Mikhail Gorbachev and the leaders of nine Soviet republics made a last ditch attempt to save the USSR was obvious to most people present.
Before entering the room, the delegation watched the news on a huge plasma screen in the billiard room. Images of children buried in small coffins and harrowing scenes of screaming mothers were broadcast unfiltered, triggering difficult questions. What went wrong?
First, Russian intelligence networks in the North Caucasus failed to identify preparations for the attack or provide timely intelligence to intercept hostage takers before they entered the school.
The failure of the rescue operation was obvious for all to see. The top military commander said that "there was no planning to rescue hostages" and that the main spetsnaz [special forces] force was training 30 kilometers away – 48 hours after the hostage taking took place. Even if negotiations were underway, the rescue force had to be on location and ready to attack at any moment, especially at night.
The hostage takers dictated the operational tempo: they were able to impose the rescue timing by setting off the explosives and by putting up a resistance stiff enough to last 10 hours: from 1PM to 11PM, when most of the militants were killed.
As it was known that there were explosives in the building, the only chance to save the children if negotiations failed was to overwhelm the terrorists in a massive, targeted attack that would have eliminated most of the perpetrators of this crisis in the first five to 10 minutes. Such an operation would have made use of the advantages inherent to an attack force equipped with night vision goggles, stun grenades or knock-out gas.
Nothing of the kind happened.
Appallingly, hundreds of armed locals were not removed from the scene. They interfered with the rescue attempt, such as it was, and possibly hurt both hostages and rescuers with their gunfire. No civilian-free zone was established around the school house, allowing the terrorists to pick off civilians outside the building.
Nor was an effective secure perimeter enforced around the school. Escaping terrorists broke out of the building and engaged in sporadic fire fights until 4AM the next morning. The Russian anti-terrorist forces at the scene did not wear modern ballistics and flame-resistant Kevlar helmets or wear bullet-proof vests. The famed Alfa and Vympel units lost 10 men in the operation – the groups’ highest casualty rate since Soviet days. Local Northern Ossetian OMON [special assignment militia], who helped out with the rescue attempt, were barely trained for the demanding mission.
This was the fifth massive hostage taking in the past 10 years, yet the Russian security forces demonstrated that they had learned little from similar debacles at Budyonnovsk, Pervomaiskoye, Kizlyar, or Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater.
The question of why this latest operation had proven such a shambles overshadowed our September 6 meeting with Putin. Unfortunately, however, it was a question that went unanswered. Our host had other priorities on his mind, as we found out later.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, little attempt has been made to reform Russia’s security services. These are still a post-communist, quasi-totalitarian political control mechanism – aggravated by a pervasive corruption that was acknowledged by President Putin himself and other senior Russian officials with whom our group met. These units are not what Russia needs to confront modern local and global terrorism.
Jihadi terrorism may be a totally new and insufficiently understood challenge for Russia, different from the Cold War threats of "Western imperialism" or internal dissent. To address these threats, Russia’s anti-terror approach needs to be rethought and revamped. New security structures need to be put in place which will prove capable of dealing with terrorism, and adapting to the security challenges of the 21st century.
But more than this is needed. Ethnically driven insurgencies are hardly new in the Caucasus or anywhere in the former Russian and Soviet empire. Political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and "hearts-and-minds" issues are in desperate need of attention throughout the Northern Caucasus. It remains to be seen whether Vladimir Yakovlev, the newly-elected head of the Ministry for Regional Development that oversees policy on nationalities, and Dmitry Kozak, a Putin can-do confidante and former cabinet secretary, who was recently appointed President’s Plenipotentiary to the Southern Federal District, are up to this demanding task.
Instead of revamping, retraining and reorganizing Russia’s anti-terrorist and security services, Putin has opted for a massive re-centralization of power. In doing so, he is taking the country back to a future reminiscent of the Soviet and czarist eras.
In this time of crisis, the Russian president has chosen to empower himself and his inner circle, not the people of Russia. Appointing Russia’s 89 regional governors instead of submitting them to popular elections, and establishing a toothless "public chamber" to supervise the security services, instead of relying on civilian control by the legislative and executive branches of government, will not solve Russia’s terrorism problems.
As former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev warned in separate, September 16 commentaries in Moscow News, nostalgia for the Soviet past may beget new authoritarianism. And authoritarianism is an unlikely antidote for terror.
09-20-2004
Three days after the tragedy of Beslan ended, we sat for over three and a half hours with Vladimir Putin. Between picking up the pieces of the worst Russian terror attack to date and planning a massive power consolidation, the energetic Russian leader still found time to meet with leading Western scholars and journalists, answering our questions at length, totally unscripted.
Unfiltered, Putin was a strange mix of tough pragmatism and Soviet nostalgia. He was shaken by walkie-talkie intercepts of terrorists shooting children in Beslan "for fun" and by the horrible conditions in northern Russian camps to which Stalin exiled the Chechens sixty years ago. "The first Chechen war was probably a mistake," Putin said. But what about the second war which he started in 1999?
He repeatedly bemoaned the passing of the Soviet "great power" -- thirteen years after its demise. He recognized that Soviet ideology suppressed real ethnic conflicts, and that new secure borders have not been erected. Yet he also questioned the sovereignty of neighboring countries such as Georgia. Today, Russia is slowly absorbing its constituent parts, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while thwarting Chechen bid to secede.
Putin missed an opportunity to reach out to the U.S. after the horror of Beslan. In response to my question, he launched a long tirade about the Soviet Union and US releasing the genie of terror out of the bottle. He believes that the Western powers are interested in keeping Russia down by supporting Chechen separatism, pointing out that Great Britain and the U.S. granted political asylum to some Chechen leaders, and that Western intelligence services maintain contacts with Chechen fighters.
As an intelligence professional, Putin should appreciate the difference between information gathering and operational support. Instead, he overstated the alleged desire of the West to create an irritant for Russia. In an earlier speech to the nation, Putin went further, saying that foreign powers are interested in dismembering Russia and neutralizing it as a nuclear power. Nevertheless, he is open to anti-terrorism cooperation, and indicated that "professionals" on both sides are engaged in just that.
Putin left enough common ground to believe that cooperation with the West in the war on terror is possible. He called President Bush a "good, decent man", a reliable and predictable partner, someone he can "feel as a human being". From his remarks, it is clear that he genuinely likes George Bush and wants to see him re-elected, something the media present at the event studiously ignored. After all, isn’t it John Kerry that foreign leaders are supposed to support?
Putin mentioned three times that Russia, the U.S. and Western Europe belong to "Christian civilization and European culture," to which a prominent French writer for Le Monde commented that maybe Russia does, but not the U.S.
Putin has the global geopolitics right, especially when it comes to connections between the Chechen and other radical Islamist terrorists in the Northern Caucasus, and to global jihadi sources of funding, political-religious indoctrination, and volunteer recruitment and training.
He criticized the West for allowing fundraising for the Chechen cause from Michigan to London to Abu Dhabi, but seemed to be unaware that the U.S. Treasury recently busted Al Haramain, a Saudi global "charity" connected to Bin Laden, which was involved in supporting the Chechens.
Putin also correctly noted that the West shouldn’t want to see terrorists come to power anywhere on earth, should not demand that anyone negotiate with child killers, and that it is not in Western interests to see the Russian Federation dismembered.
It is the Russian president’s actions after Beslan, more than his rhetoric, which point to missed opportunities in the wake of Russia’s 9/11. Instead of revamping, retraining and reorganizing Russia’s anti-terrorist and security services, Putin has opted for a massive re-centralization of power. In doing so, he is taking the country back to a future reminiscent of the czarist era. Putin essentially is applying the 19th century Russian imperial model and the Soviet security state apparatus to a 21st century state rife with terror and corruption.
Nostalgia for the Soviet past may beget new authoritarianism, as Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev warned in their September 16, 2004 interviews. In this time of crisis, the Russian president has empowered himself and his inner circle, not the people of Russia. Presidential appointment of Russia’s 89 regional governors instead of popular elections, and the establishment of a disempowered and toothless "public chamber" to supervise the security services instead of effective civilian controls will not solve Russia’s terrorism problems.
The security services that failed to prevent or resolve the Beslan tragedy and that Putin has not reformed after five years in office are still a Soviet-style, quasi-totalitarian political control mechanism. They are not the hat Russia needs to confront modern local and global terrorism.
Islamist jihadi terrorism is a new enemy -- not the old enemy of the Cold War. In response, Russia’s anti-terror approach needs to be rethought and revamped, with new structures for the 21st century, capable of dealing with global terrorism, put in place. A new anti-terror doctrine and effective organizational structure to coordinate intelligence and operations must be created. The U.S., Great Britain and Israel can offer assistance. The time for cooperation in the face of a common enemy is now.
A real challenge for the Bush Administration, however, is Russia’s questioning the sovereignty of Georgia in the Caucasus, and playing fast and loose with her post-Soviet borders. In addition, by trying to pull South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Moscow’s orbit, the Kremlin may be strengthening the case of Chechen separatism. This policy opens the doors to revision of other borders, such as Northern Kazakhstan, Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine, and even Nagorno-Karabakh. Undermining the territorial integrity of neighbors is unacceptable to the U.S., and dangerous for Russia.
When in crisis, countries and leaders fall back on their time-tested political instincts and patterns. Putin’s re-centralization proves that Russia after its barbaric 9/11 is no exception.
03-30-2004
As the October 2004 parliamentary elections in Belarus are becoming a priority for democratic forces in the country and for Western friends of Belarussian democracy, it is the time to act.
It is time to consolidate opponents of the status quo, reach out to the people, and give them hope. This is the task, first and foremost, for the Belarussian opposition, but also for those who understand that at stake is more than just the future of Belarus, important as it is. At stake is how willing--or unwilling--the West is to fight for liberty.
If the West is ready to defend freedom, what is a better place to start than its own home base--Europe? At stake is our own future. At stake in Belarus is how we handle rogue regimes--and friends of rogue regimes. Alexander Lukashenka was elected president in 1994 and then engineered his own re-election in 2001 with major violations of the Belarussian constitution and international democratic norms. The opposition refused to recognize the legitimacy of those elections.
In 1996, Lukashenka dismissed the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court and imposed his own constitution, further alienating the Belarussian elite. He has supported every dictator from Kim Jong Il, to Yasir Arafat, to Saddam Hussein.
In the case of Belarus, it is important to recognize that hard-line elements of the Russian government were strongly supporting Mr. Lukashenka and his pro-Russian rhetoric and policy. However, many in the Russian leadership have grown exasperated with Lukashenka’s antics, and even those with lower democracy standards may finally recognize that the dictator is becoming a liability for Moscow.
The Struggle for Freedom
The struggle for freedom in Belarus is greater than Belarus itself. It is about Russia helping, tolerating, or opposing democracy next year. It is about setting a good example for Russia and Ukraine. And it is also about preventing the process of rebuilding the Soviet empire--regardless of how nostalgic some people get in Moscow.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus has remained a Jurassic Park of authoritarianism in the heart of a democratizing Europe. However, it is also a huge lab in which retrograde forces of the old Soviet regime are attempting to develop new models of repression, which they may apply in Russia, and possibly Ukraine. It is not accidental that the rumors of extending presidential terms in violation of existing constitutions are repeatedly floated and then vehemently denied--which makes them ever more credible--in Minsk, Moscow, and Kyiv.
It is true that Belarus was one of the most Soviet among all Soviet republics. It is true that the anti-communist and nationalist movement there was among the weakest. However, I do not want to blame the people of Belarus for what happened next.
There are other examples of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet camp, where the pre-reform conditions were appalling. Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine had all started from a point of severe disadvantage in comparison with the Czech Republic and Estonia. Nevertheless, their achievements are quite remarkable. Romania and Bulgaria are in NATO and on the way to EU membership, and in Ukraine, the democratic opposition leader Victor Yushchenko consistently remains the most popular presidential candidate.
If Russia’s main priority in Belarus--safe and secure gas transit--is assured, it certainly should be no problem for Moscow to cooperate with the West to ease Lukashenka out. Can Belarus become a test case of Russia’s policy of integration with the West based on shared democratic values? In a way, Belarus becomes a litmus test on Russia’s future relationship with the West.
Lukashenka’s Disastrous Performance
The performance of Belarus under Lukashenka, judged by objective international criteria, has been a disaster.
However, Lukashenka’s repression may be sowing the seeds of his own demise. The recent events in Georgia, some fatigue in Moscow with Lukashenka’s escapades, and--most important--his utter failure to provide Belarussians with a road to a decent future may indicate that 2004 will be the year in which he could return to the kolkhoz--or, even better, be investigated and tried for abuse of power, for the disappearances and possibly murder of his political opponents, and for other crimes. Another solution for Lukashenka would be political asylum in North Korea, Syria, or Cuba--albeit those regimes may not last very much longer either.
The historic experience of the Soviet Union shows that pro-independence forces, from Central Asia to Moldova, learned from the leadership of the Baltic States. Once the communist leadership failed to stop the surge to freedom in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallin, others followed in Kyiv and Baku.
As revolutions in Georgia and Serbia have demonstrated, political protests tied to elections--with appropriate preparation through political activities, public education, and international support--may be the magic mix that makes dictators disappear. The freedom bug is contagious indeed.
What Should Be Done?
To facilitate Lukashenka’s road from the presidency back to the farm, or from Minsk to Pyongyang, the opposition and supporters of Belarussian freedom should take several joint steps. These include:
Conclusion
The business of freedom in Eastern Europe is not over. Belarus, just like Ukraine and Moldova, has not fully completed its transition from the Soviet system to democratic capitalism. It is the duty of neighbors near and far to help complete the process and to reach the safe coast of democracy, security, and prosperity.
02-26-2004
On February 24, three weeks before the March 14 Presidential elections, Vladimir Putin dramatically fired his Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, as well as his entire cabinet. All the world knows who the next Russian President will be, but the real game in Moscow today is: who will Mr. Putin appoint to be the next Prime Minister? Under the law, the President will nominate the Prime Minister within two weeks after the elections.
A PR Ploy?
Firing the Kasyanov cabinet was an attempt to resuscitate public interest in an otherwise boring presidential election in which Putin is a shoo-in -- with 80 percent of popular support -- and other candidates are threatening to quit the race.
However, sacking an adequate cabinet prior to victory in the presidential election showed that Putin, a lawyer by training, may understand the letter of the Constitution, but not its spirit. Reports of Putin’s personal dislike of Kasyanov, the latter’s ties to the industrial tycoons, or the President’s desire to break ties with Yeltsin holdovers do not justify the rash move. The decorum of democracy -- the respect of the people’s will -- is as important as popularity in the polls. In a democracy, a candidate does not appoint a new cabinet before the people have returned their verdict.
Powerful position
According to the 1993 Constitution, Russia is a mixed presidential-parliamentary republic. While the President is elected, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President and approved by the Duma, the lower house of the legislature. Similar to the French Premier, this is the second most important job in the country, though, unlike in France, the Prime Minister is not the leader of the majority coalition.
Officially, the Prime Minister -- or Chairman of the Government, as it has been known since czarist times -- is the second most important job in the country. However, in reality, a strong presidential chief of staff may be politically more powerful.
The Prime Minister runs everything but the “power” ministries; those, including Defense, Foreign Affairs, and police and security services report directly to the President. The Prime Minister also has authority over economic and social policy, which includes the ability to make key decisions in the dominant energy and natural resource sectors. Prime Ministers Victor Chernomyrdin (1993-1998) and Mikhail Kasyanov (1999-2004) have left particularly strong imprints on how the Russian economy is administered.
Beyond economic management, there is another important function the Prime Minister provides. He is the second-in-command and stand-in for the president. Like the American Vice President, the Prime Minister also has a key role as a constitutional and temporary successor for the President, if the latter is incapacitated.
If the President does not return to office after a temporary absence, the Prime Minister would become acting president for up to three months, after which new elections would take place. This also means control of the “football” – a device capable of launching Russia’s mighty nuclear arsenal against her foes. The naming of the next Prime Minister will have internal, political, and economic repercussions, as well as consequences in national and global security.
So, you want to be the Prime Minister?
The key ingredient to getting the top job in Russia is gaining the trust of President Putin, who relies on former colleagues from his native St. Petersburg more than representatives of the so-called Old Moscow faction, or “Yeltsin family.” Whereas Yeltsin ran through seven Prime Ministers during his two tumultuous presidential terms, Putin has persevered with one: Kasyanov. Whoever Putin appoints will be a key player in efforts to modernize the Russian economy and double the GDP, as Putin promised to do in this 2003 State of Russia address.
The current leading candidates for Prime Minister of Russia include:
What Washington Should Do?
When the new Russian Prime Minister is announced, the Bush Administration should establish good working relations with him, as it did with his predecessor. Specifically it should:
In Moscow, the selection of a Prime Minister remains the best game in town. Putin’s choice will indicate Russia’s policy direction after the presidential elections.
02-25-2004
Vladimir Putin sent shivers down the spine of CIS leaders on February 12 when he declared the demise of the Soviet Union a "national tragedy on an enormous scale." The nostalgia for the collapse of the Soviet empire was genuine and not pre-election rhetoric: "The breakup of the Soviet Union is a national tragedy on an enormous scale," from which "only the elites and nationalists of the republics gained," Putin said in a nationally televised speech. Is Russia going to operationalize this nostalgia? Will a new robust policy in the CIS go beyond traditional diplomacy? What responses CIS states will pursue? And what options Washington has to counter this rhetoric?
BACKGROUND: When Secretary of State Colin Powell landed in Moscow on Monday, January 26, after attending Mikheil Saakashvili’s inauguration, he was facing an atmosphere decisively different than the Georgian celebrations. Over the last several months, Russian leaders have sent signals indicating a less cooperative stance in the CIS. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has called 2004 a year to reassert Russia’s position in the CIS. In a speech to the Munich Security Conference in February, Ivanov threatened to pull Russia out of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which will increase Russian military deployment in the Caucasus. Russia deployed elements of the air force in the new base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, and made bases in Tajikistan permanent. Russian energy monopolies such as GAZPROM and RAO UES and other Russian companies are on an acquisition spree from Lviv to Bishkek.
The brewing disagreements between Moscow and Washington over the future of the Russian military bases in Georgia and presence of U.S. military instructors there, which Powell attempted to resolve, signal what is coming. The fight for the future of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline and for U.S. military presence in Kyrgyzstan are other issues on the horizon.
The Russian Duma December 2003 election results clearly indicate that the mood of Russian elite is shifting. Great Power rhetoric is back in vogue. Last December, the big winners were the socialist/nationalist newcomer Rodina (Motherland) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democrats. Both have an aggressive agenda of “defending” Russian-speakers, “people who belong to Russian culture”, or “feel affinity to Russia” in the words of Rodina leader Dmitry Rogozin.
Russia’s neighbors no longer write off imperialist statements as an election ploy. Implications are ominous for Northern Kazakhstan, Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and even Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. “Putin’s speech was a clear and unambiguous signal to all of us,” a senior Kazakhstani leader told the author. In particular, Rogozin’s message of nationalization at home and nationalism abroad, high taxes, protection of co-ethnics, and Russian tanks rolling through Lithuania to ensure an extra-territorial corridor to Kaliningrad, caused consternation in many capitals in the region. Such foreign adventures would cost a fortune, and are a prescription for derailing Putin’s goal of doubling GDP by 2010.
Zhirinovsky doubled his vote to 11.6 percent with slogans such as “We are for (ethnic) Russians, we are for the poor”. Before the elections he declared that Chechnya should be a taboo in the media. Instead, he suggested leaving it to the secret police and using death squads to kill off entire Chechen villages. He called for establishing a monarchy but would settle for an elected czar – President Putin.
Three parties represented in the Duma, the communists, LDPR and Rodina, have positions which are more nationalist than the official line of the Putin administration. However, the two liberal parties: Yabloko and Union of Right Forces were wiped out in the elections, and will not provide a political balance to the hard-liners.
Russian observers such as Dmitry Oreshkin of the Merkator Group, Alexei Makarkin of the Centre for Political Technologies, and Vyacheslav Igrunov, former deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs have expressed a mixture of support and anxiety about this nationalist tide. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, they consider Russian policy expensive and inefficient. Moscow keeps ignoring the former republics’ orientation towards Europe and the United States and their greater involvement in NATO and the EU. “Russia today is pursuing an inflexible policy in the post-Soviet area and this is partially destroying the fruits of what has been done. If this continues in the future, Russia will lose its position,” Igrunov said.
IMPLICATIONS: Putin’s changing rhetoric, supported by a cackle of politicians and experts, is caused by the deep unease in the Russian politico-military elite with the growing U.S. presence in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, U.S. deployment in that part of the world is not directed against Russia, but is rather a result of a changing global footprint in the war on terrorism.
Access to Afghanistan and preemption of the rise of militant Islam in Ferghana Valley is more important today than a tank division in the Fulda Gap. This is something the Pentagon needs to make clear to Moscow. Sergey Ivanov said in Munich that he is willing to expand military-to-military contacts with NATO. U.S. should take him at his word. Putin does not need neo-imperialist rhetoric to consolidate his already firm grip on power or to placate the siloviki. This deeply felt sentiment may become particularly dangerous as the U.S. is preoccupied with the conflict in Iraq and November 2004 Presidential elections. The possibility of rush Russian moves in the Caucasus and Central Asia between now and January 2005 is growing.
Russia also enjoys a massive budgetary surplus of over $70 billion, with oil prices showing no signs of declining. Politicians everywhere, but especially in oil-producing countries with weak parliamentary and civil society controls, tend to use excess funds for their favorite geopolitical and military undertakings.
The Washington policy makers in the State Department, the Pentagon and National Security Council, however, are deeply apprehensive of the specter of Russian hegemony in its former imperial domain. They are likely to stand up to Russian neo-imperialist rhetoric while attempting to maintain reasonably good U.S.-Russian relations. Russia is likely to keep in mind that its relations with Europe have soured over the EU objections to the Russian membership in WTO. Putin is exasperated with many European positions, thus risking Russia’s isolation.
CONCLUSIONS: The swing away from democracy and towards authoritarian political controls also aggravates U.S.-Russian relations. Many among champions of exporting democracy in Washington believe that the Georgian revolution may be a model to dissolve dictatorships in other parts of the former Soviet empire, where the surge of freedom, started in 1989 with the collapse of the Berlin wall, has not been completed. NSC and the State Department, including Secretary Powell, however, grapple with the fact that democratization in the CIS is only a part of the equation. There are other important U.S. strategic priorities on the agenda, such as keeping Russia in the coalition against global terrorism, and assuring access to Central Asian military bases and to energy resources of Eurasia.
The Bush Administration is likely to face a more assertive Russian policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. An U.S.-Russian friction, such as the one over Georgia, may become a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, which have improved after 9/11. Putin’s good judgment and U.S. resolve will make the difference between progress and failure in the U.S.-Russian relations.
12-16-2003
MOSCOW, Russia -- Andrey Illarionov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s libertarian economic adviser, almost single-handedly engineered the Kremlin’s commitment to kill the Kyoto Protocol -- a climate control treaty heavily promoted by the European Union and environmentalist movement. UN Secretary General Koffi Annan called upon Putin last Thursday to ratify the treaty. Without the Russian and American signatures, the Protocol is dead in the water.
The Protocol is purported to limit global warming through curbing carbon dioxide emissions at a cost deemed unacceptable for Russia. Illarionov used Putin’s stated policy goal -- to double Russia’s GDP by the year 2010 -- and the staggering cost of Kyoto’s implementation to convince his boss that the Protocol is dead meat.
Russia would need to spend up to 4.5 percent of its GDP to comply with Kyoto, Illarionov told me in the Kremlin. "When Deputy Minister of Economy said recently that Russia is still negotiating, I corrected him saying that he reflected the Russian position in August. Things are different in December."
Putin even joked in October that the global warming will "cut fur coat costs and improve wheat yields." The joke made the green lobby… well, green. Jokes aside, Russia is responsible for 17 percent of the global CO2 against the U.S.’s 35 percent based on the baseline year 1990. Today, Russia is responsible only for 8-9 percent, as many smokestack industries collapsed, allowing Russia to trade in "hot air" quotas. However, the Russian economy is only 4 percent of America’s. Russian GDP after five years of robust growth is only $400 billion against U.S.’s $11 trillion.
Deft Bureaucratic Politics
Initially, when the Protocol was initiated, Russia believed it stood to benefit from carbon dioxide emissions trading because its current CO2 production is 30 percent lower than the baseline year 1990 due to the extinction of many Soviet-era industrial dinosaurs. There is plenty of room in Russia to improve environmental performance, reducing emissions even further -- and increasing an incentive for emission trade.
However, deft bureaucratic politics by treaty opponents have reversed the initial commitment to ratify the protocol. On October 1, Illarionov gathered in Moscow the World Climate Change Conference, at which leading Russian and Western Kyoto opponents voiced their concerns.
Professor Kirill Kondratyev of the Research Center for Ecological Studies in St. Petersburg claimed that the "science behind the Kyoto Protocol is still highly uncertain, and reducing greenhouse gases will have little or no impact on climate change."
Richard Lindzen, Sloan Professor of Management at MIT added that "Climate change is inevitable as a result of natural processes and regardless of human factors… Kyoto… will have an insignificant impact on climate. This is true even if the climate change in the past century has been significantly affected by humanity, or that the model projections (of global warming) are correct."
Margo Thorning, director of International Council for Capital Formation, (Brussels) stated that "promised emission reduction targets for the second period of the Protocol (past 2010) to the range of 60-70% lower than the current level will hit the Russian economy very hard, including job losses and lower living standards. Other experts pointed out that when Europe was considerably colder -- in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, it was infested with malaria. Economic and technological progress allowed eradication of mosquito-infested swamps, while better medicine took care of the sick.
Still, supporters of Kyoto point to the warming up of harsh Russian winters: some birds stopped migrating and the areas infected with viruses of West Nile fever and the Congo-Crimean fever -- another hemorrhagic disease -- have expanded 300-400 kilometers north.
Four Reasons
Russia has rejected Kyoto for four reasons which combine business and geo-economics.
First, it did so because U.S. refused to ratify, thus hitting hard the value of emission trading quotas. Russia stands to make much less from hot air trading than initially expected.
Second, Moscow is fuming at the treaty exemptions India and China have received. The two giant states are among the world’s biggest polluters and, increasingly, Russia’s industrial competitors.
Third, Russian smokestack industries -- such as ferrous and non-ferrous metals, autos, and oil -- are all standing to lose if the Kremlin signs Kyoto. However, RAO UES, the Russian state-controlled eleven time zone electric grid monopoly, and the state-owned powerful nuclear ministry MinAtom, which also supplies nuclear reactors to the Iranian mullahs, are eager to sign Kyoto.
Last, conspiracy-minded Russians are suspecting that Kyoto has become a tool for the EU bureaucracy to limit U.S. and Russian economic growth and reduce Russia to a raw materials "appendage" for Europe, especially as a giant natural gas tank.
Kirill Yankov, the young and dynamic Deputy Natural Resources Minister, also believes that Kyoto, if ratified, would breed yet another layer of bureaucracy tasked with issuing "greenhouse gas emission permits." This will be an additional burden on business which is already suffering from high over-regulation costs. As Russian bureaucrats are notoriously underpaid -- and corrupt -- one can see that Mr. Yankov’s concerns are not without merit.
Also, Kyoto does not provide a break given Russia’s notoriously cold climate. "Lots of carbon dioxide [emissions are] generated by central heating, which Russia needs seven month a year," Mr. Yankov notes.
Russia should pursue a national program to limit carbon dioxide emissions outside of the Kyoto framework, just as the U.S. and Australia do, says Kirill Yankov. It should study the American experience, without committing to the treaty. In the meantime, Kyoto looks dead. The Kremlin is the one who killed it.
Russian Duma Elections: How the U.S. Should Respond to "Controlled Democracy"
12-12-2003
The tectonic political shift that occurred in Sunday’s parliamentary elections will make Russia more difficult diplomatically and less hospitable to foreign investment. The biggest winner was President Vladimir Putin, whose United Russia party won 37 percent of the vote and, together with its allies, has close to the two-thirds majority necessary to change the constitution, including extending the president’s term in office beyond 2008.
United Russia capitalized on three major developments:
Putin’s popularity--up to 78 percent according to an International Republican Institute poll.
The crackdown on corruption undertaken by Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov--the party leader and rumored next speaker of the Duma or prime minister--and the jailing of billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which appealed to the vast majority of Russians who view oligarchs as corrupt and detached from the impoverished masses and the struggling middle class.
The use of "administrative resources," including government-controlled television and provincial governors’ guidance, to boost United Russia candidates.
Putin’s judgment in using his new parliamentary support and popularity will define both his relationship with the West and his place in history. His resistance to the virulent nationalism and populist socialism of his party’s hangers-on will make the difference between Russia’s progress and failure.
The Other Winners. The second and third winners were, respectively, the socialist/nationalist newcomer Rodina (Motherland) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democrats. Led by former Communist Party economic guru Sergey Glazyev and former Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dmi-try Rogozin, Motherland won 9 percent of the vote. Its message of nationalization at home and nationalism abroad, high taxes, and foreign adventures is a prescription for derailing Putin’s goal of doubling GDP by 2010.
Motherland was a creation of Kremlin consultants who were tasked with stealing votes from the ultra-nationalist communists. They succeeded--too well. Senior government officials recognize that they do not control Glazyev and that the younger, feistier Motherland Duma team will be more of a nuisance than the predictable communists, who have not learned the game of competitive politics.
Zhirinovsky, the third winner, doubled his vote to 11.6 percent. Before the elections, he got into yet another fistfight in a television studio and declared that Chechnya should not be discussed in the media. Instead, he suggested leaving it to the secret police and using death squads to kill off entire Chechen villages. He called for establishing a monarchy but would settle for an elected czar--President Putin. Today, when suicide bombers tear apart Moscow civilians almost weekly, the tough guys finish first.
The Losers. The big losers are the communists (whose 12.7 percent was half of the vote they received in 1999), democratic forces, and the business community. The center-right Union of Right Forces (URF) and liberal-left Yabloko (apple) failed to launch viable party structures in Russia’s 89 regions. Without new ideas to address the electorate’s needs, they lost votes to Putin’s United Russia, Motherland, and voter apathy. Turnout was 54 percent--8 percent lower than in 1999 Duma elections.
As Putin embraced United Russia and, to some degree, Motherland and the government-controlled television followed suit, the bottom dropped out from under the democrats. Yabloko and URF were painted as too pro-Western. Center-right politicians appeared rich, spoiled, and detached from the ordinary Russian’s everyday problems. The emergence of Anatoly Chubais, the highly unpopular former privatization czar, as a de facto leader of the center-right did not help; nor did the extensive support of the hated tycoons.
As the statist and pro-Putin forces became stronger, the business community weakened. According to a cabinet insider, big business should forget about dictating the legislative agenda in the Duma as it did throughout the 1990s. Two days after the elections, Putin signed a new law imposing additional energy export tariffs. Raising taxes on energy exports is being discussed even as cheap Russian oil and gas for domestic consumption provide a multibillion-dollar subsidy for the Russian economy, imperiling Russian membership in the World Trade Organization.
The Appropriate U.S. Response. The Bush Administration has a strategic interest in dialogue with Russia’s president, government, and people. However, the U.S. needs to strike a balance between fighting the war on terrorism and defending Russian democracy, supporting Russian integration with the West, developing Russian energy resources, and encouraging foreign investment in Russia. To achieve these goals, the Administration should:
Express support for Russia’s democratic forces. The White House has endorsed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s statement, which called the elections "unfair" and criticized the government’s control of the country’s television channels. More needs to be done, including expanding exchanges with Russia and providing support to democratic non-governmental organizations, independent media, and nascent forces of freedom through the National Endowment for Democracy, International Re-publican Institute, and National Democratic Institute.
Communicate directly to Putin that continued integration into Western frameworks such as the G-8 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development depends on Russia’s following Western political models and boosting the rule of law.
Warn that further executive branch abuse of Russia’s legal system, leading to the destruction of major economic players, could discourage foreign investment, thus jeopardizing Putin’s stated goal of doubling GDP by 2010.
Conclusion. Russia now has a Duma that is more nationalist and less democratic. While emerging democracy is often a two-steps-forward, one-step-back proposition, it is in everyone’s interest that Russia pursue civic society, free markets, and political liberty. The U.S. and the West should not hesitate to remind Moscow of this.
