By Ariel Cohen
Moscow continues to pursue a Sukhoi-based fifth-generation fighter. After five years of effort, Russia finally found an international partner for the development project. In 2007 India entered an agreement to jointly develop a fifth-generation fighter based on the Sukhoi.
By Ariel Cohen
Moscow continues to pursue a Sukhoi-based fifth-generation fighter. After five years of effort, Russia finally found an international partner for the development project. In 2007 India entered an agreement to jointly develop a fifth-generation fighter based on the Sukhoi.
By Ariel Cohen & Owen Graham
On January 1, 2009, Russia’s state monopoly OAO Gazprom began reducing gas supplies to Ukraine. Moscow and Kiev had failed to negotiate the price for natural gas, and the initial reduction affected six additional countries: Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. As problematic as this was, the crisis has extended beyond these initial victims. Russia is losing its reputation as a reliable supplier of gas to Europe.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 (UPI) -- Russia held joint naval exercises withVenezuela late last year to demonstrate its growing strategic reach and political clout, particularly in Latin America, which many consider the traditional U.S. sphere of influence.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (UPI) -- As UPI reported, at the end of November Russia successfully test-launched its new-generation land- and sea-based ballistic missile designed to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems such as the one planned for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. The new Russian missile can be equipped with up to 10 warheads, including decoys, to overwhelm or mislead American sensors.
By Ariel Cohen
Despite the raging economic crisis and collapse of oil prices, Russiacontinues to push its global diplomatic offensive, which has overt anti-American overtones. At the end of November, President Dmitry Medvedev paid a week-long visit to Latin America The trip demonstratedRussia’s growing strategic reach and political clout in a region considered a U.S. sphere of influence.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- Russian generals have long felt they should be the ones to set military policy. They have trouble accepting civilian authority -- be it from President Dmitry Medvedev or Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. They derisively describe the minister as a former furniture salesman and tax man, yet Serdyukov knows where the brass keep their money.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI) -- The Arctic Ocean is quickly re-emerging as a strategic area where vital U.S. interests are at stake. The geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the arctic region is rising rapidly, and its mineral wealth will likely transform the region into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 (UPI) -- Implementing military reform is a challenging task for Russian generals. Understanding what’s going on is daunting for outside observers. Moscow’s military leaders seem to think that the best way to proceed is to keep their dirty laundry out of public view.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 (UPI) -- The resumption of Cold War-style patrols and increased naval presence in the Arctic Ocean by the Russian navy and air force is in keeping with the Russian Federation’s more forward posture of recent years.
By Ariel Cohen
The day after Barack Obama won the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the first real test for the U.S. President-elect. In his State of the Federation speech, Medvedev threatened to station Iskander short-range nuclear-capable missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave if the U.S. proceeds with deploying anti-missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
By Ariel Cohen and Lajos Szaszdi
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 (UPI) -- The arctic is quickly re-emerging as a strategic area where vital U.S. interests are at stake. The geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the arctic region is rising rapidly, and its mineral wealth will likely transform the region into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century.
By Ariel Cohen
Until Russia can revitalize its naval forces to a much larger degree, its deployments to the Mediterranean contribute more to symbolic and diplomatic activity than being a viable military counterweight to NATO in the region. Yet the Black Sea Fleet in the Med is a significant show of force and a diplomatic irritant and a potential threat to shipping in the Suez Canal and to America’s ally Israel.
By Ariel Cohen
The fifth annual Valdai Club meeting took place against the backdrop of the conflict in the Caucasus and Russia’s recognition of the secessionist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Valdai Club, of which this author is a member, brings together policy experts and journalists fromRussia and the world for discussions with the Russian leadership.
Ariel Cohen
On Aug. 8, Russia decided to rewrite the rules of post-World War II European security. It repudiated the Helsinki Pact of 1975, which recognized the sanctity of borders in Europe, and violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of NATO aspirant Georgia, whose troops had attacked South Ossetia the day before. In the process, Russia also tore up its own peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
By Ariel Cohen
While all the facts of last week’s Russian-Georgian war are not clear, enough information--including eyewitness accounts--has been reported in the media to draw initial conclusions about the performance of Russian military forces and the implications of these operations for U.S. defense policies. Unquestionably, the war is a reminder that "conventional" military operations as an instrument of modern combat are far from obsolete.
By Ariel Cohen
Moscow remains deaf to pleas from Washington and European capitals to cease aggression against its neighbor, Georgia. Last week, as the Olympic Games opened, the tragic and ominous conflict between Georgia and Russia erupted. On Thursday, August 7, South Ossetian separatists, supported by Moscow, escalated their machine gun and mortar fire attacks against neighboring Georgian villages.
By Ariel Cohen
Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) was a titan of 20th century Russian literature and politics. He survived the Stalinist purges, World War II, eight years in the Gulag, Communist denunciation, and even a battle with cancer. After spending 18 years exiled in America, he made a triumphant return to his homeland.
By Ariel Cohen
July 2008 will mark a momentous month in the history of Russian business. This is when Sergey Chemezov, a close associate of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, consolidated control over 426 additional enterprises that are now a part of the Russian Technologies (Rostechnologii) empire. A global, state-owned Russian weapons-and-metals holding has been born.
By Ariel Cohen
In the last few days, Moscow has beefed up its "peacekeeping force" in the breakaway Abkhazia on the Black Sea, claiming it is protecting Russian citizens, who are the majority population of Abkhazia. Furthermore, Russian troops are amassing on the de-facto Abkhazia-Georgia border. The Caucasus may be on the brink of a war. At the same time, Russia has accused Georgia of planning to invade Abkhazia, accusations that sound distinctly hollow under the circumstances.
By Ariel Cohen
Russian President Vladimir Putin began a two-day visit to Libya on April 16, the first by a Russian president to the formerly shunned country. The event was hailed by Libya’s veteran leader Moammar Gadhafi as "historic, strategic and very important." Gadhafi further stated "…given that we are both producers of gas and oil, we will work together to defend our interests."
By Ariel Cohen
This coming weekend, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin will meet for their final summit, to be held in the Russian resort of Sochi on the Black Sea at Putin’s invitation. This will mark the end of an era in a complicated relationship. The question is: Will the two leaders leave the scene while U.S.-Russian relations are at their lowest point since the Cold War, or will they attempt to rescue them?
By Ariel Cohen
Central Asia is a major area of concern for US intelligence agencies, according to an annual threat assessment presented recently by Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell.
McConnell discussed the Annual Threat Assessment -- a document representing the consensus view of 16 US intelligence agencies that covers all global security threats facing Washington -- with US senators on February 5. While Iraq remains an enduring source of concern, the reviving Islamic radical/terrorist threat in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan topped the list of security worries.
"We have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006," McConnell told members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "We assess that al Qaeda’s homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population."
The Assessment warns that Islamic activism may grow in Central Asia as a result of mounting social and economic discontent. In Uzbekistan, a weaker economy and rising prices for commodities are a potential source of trouble for President Islam Karimov’s authoritarian-minded administration. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain stable, Turkmenistan is beginning to open up after years of self-imposed isolation, and it has made improvements in human rights. Yet, unfortunately the Assessment disregards both regime fragility and growing external meddling in the region.
On Russia, the Threat Assessment drops plentiful hints that US-Russian relations stand to become more confrontational in the coming year. It mentions the Kremlin’s aims to dominate the main oil and gas land distribution networks to Europe and East Asia. Energy has become an instrument of Russian power in terms of its foreign policy and international economic relations, the threat assessment states.
The Report mentions the gradual resurgence of Russia’s military forces in terms of better training, more units with higher rates of readiness, military exercises conducted more frequently, and a higher number of strategic bomber patrols over the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.
The Assessment does not dwell at length on Russia’s aspirations to alter the global economic architecture, and to do away with the Western-dominated post-Bretton Woods system. Russian leader Vladimir Putin called for just that in the 2007 St. Petersburg economic summit. Russia, Iran, Venezuela and other energy producers are moving away from the US dollar as the principal currency of settling energy accounts.
Meanwhile, the Threat Assessment views Iran with caution, in particular the country’s nuclear program. In a report released February 22, the International Atomic Energy Agency expressed concern about Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons. The Threat Assessment states that Iran is developing and deploying longer range ballistic missiles with the capability to carry a nuclear warhead. The report does not mention, however, the close links between Iran and Russia regarding the development of the Iranian ballistic missile program. According to the London Daily Telegraph, Russia since 2003 has been supplying ballistic missile technology, including missile production capabilities, and technical assistance by Russian engineers.
Iran is also continuing efforts to enhance its ability to enrich uranium, ostensibly for civilian purposes but with the potential for making nuclear weapons. McConnell has reported that Iran may achieve the technical capability to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon within a few years.
While the intelligence community is certain that Iran stopped in 2003 its secret work to design a nuclear weapon and to enrich uranium for military purposes, it can’t be certain if Iran has restarted these activities. But there is no doubt that Iran has the scientific know-how, the technical capacity, and the industrial capability to develop nuclear weapons at some future point, McConnell said. A lot of this know-how came from Russia.
Moscow, for example, is building for Iran a $1-billion nuclear reactor in Bushehr. The US State Department has accused Iran of using the Bushehr project as a cover for a weapons program. There are also media reports that Iran is either negotiating the purchase of, or has already acquired S-300 long-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. These SAM systems would be deployed to defend the Bushehr nuclear power plant and other key sites like the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility, analysts believe.
Iran also has a chemical weapons program, and it is engaged in research on biological weapons. Teheran’s development of a ballistic missile arsenal and its acquisition of anti-ship cruise missiles are intended to serve as a strategic deterrent in the Persian Gulf, especially at the Strait of Hormuz. Iran would be capable of closing the Strait, and thereby cause considerable disruption to oil exports, in the event of a conflict. In addition, US bases and naval forces in the region would face a serious tactical threat. Iran’s arsenal could also be used to intimidate its neighbors into "withholding support for US policy."
Tehran’s development of longer-range ballistic missiles with the capacity to reach Europe might also to deter NATO countries from permitting US military forces to use bases on their territory during a potential US-Iranian clash. A significant reason why Russia might be assisting Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs could be to support Tehran’s deterrence capability, thereby intimidating NATO countries that host US bases.
Russia and Iran also have similar views on using energy as a geopolitical tool, with both expressing interest in establishing a natural gas cartel, along the lines of OPEC. Such an entity would aim to challenge the established international economic system, dominated by Western industrialized countries.
While the Threat Assessment is sober-minded on many points, it avoids one obvious conclusion involving Russia’s strategic intentions; by re-emphasizing military and economic power, and challenging the West, Moscow, aided and abetted by Teheran, is seeking to change the post-Communist balance of power in Europe, the Middle East, and in the world at large, and is challenging American post-Cold War hegemony. Whether it will succeed or not is a different question. It’s also up in the air whether American policy makers sufficiently comprehend the Kremlin’s capabilities and intentions, and, if they do, whether they can muster the political will that can help frustrate Russian plans.
Lajos Szaszdi, Ph.D., has contributed to the production of this article.
By Ariel Cohen
Last December Russian President Vladimir Putin chose Dmitry Medvedev, a first deputy prime minister, to succeed him in the country’s presidency. March 2 presidential elections are anti-climactic, as they are going to ratify this choice, and as Mr. Medvedev is the only candidate likely to win.
By Ariel Cohen
As Yogi Berra once said, “This is déjà vu all over again.” On May 9, heavy military equipment will once again roll down Moscow’s Red Square for the Victory Day military parade. Tanks, missiles, and 6,000 troops will be joined overhead by Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft and military helicopters. The last time Moscow saw such a display of military hardware on Red Square was November 1990, before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The world should take notice of Russia’s increasing militarism. The parade is designed to generate nostalgia among the Russian people and to signal U.S., NATO, and Russia’s neighbors that Russia’s power is back. Most importantly, it illustrates President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on the military and security services at the expense of modern, democratic institutions.
Putin has justified Russia’s rebuilding of its military muscle in the recent speech to the State Council. Putin claimed that the new arms race has been triggered “by the world’s most developed countries” – a clear reference to the U.S. and the West. Russia’s forthcoming rearmament is not caused by Russia but brought upon it by its adversaries, Putin said. In response to this alleged challenge to Russia’s security, the Kremlin plans to produce and deploy in the next years new weapons claimed to be as good as or even better than its Western equivalents. Research and development in revolutionary biological, nano-, and information technologies with military applications will continue. Putin also wants a new defense strategy for the Russian Armed Forces, and the formation of an “innovative army” based on more professional and better trained servicemen.
What the Parade Means
President Vladimir Putin’s government is reaffirming the central role that the military and the security services play as pillars of the Russian state. This is yet another indication from the Kremlin that the so-called “power” ministries and agencies are the bedrocks of the Russian Federation—as opposed to democracy, an open society, a multiparty system, free media, fair elections, constitutional liberties, and the separation of powers.
The parade is a signal to the world and to the Russian people that the armed forces matter again, after a decade or so of decay following the collapse of the Soviet state. Strategically, the display of newly-built weapon systems—like the road-mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), S-300 mobile long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), bombers, and fighters—are intended to show that the Russian military is resurging with modern, or modernized, arms. This is a hallmark of Putin’s new Russia and a revival of the Soviet and czarist tradition of showing off the country’s military prowess.
To the Russian people, the parade will convey a sense of national pride and security in the face of external threats. First, it will mark the USSR’s heroic moment: victory in “The Great Patriotic War” (1941-1945), in which more than 25 million Soviet citizens were sacrificed—millions of them brutally murdered by the Nazis. Second, the Kremlin wants to resurrect the popular belief that Russia is a great power, which lost credence after the demise of the Soviet Union.
In essence, the parade is another sign that the Russian government is going “back to the future.” It wants to return the military—as well as other instruments of state power, from oil and gas exports to secret police and a subservient judiciary—to the forefront in 21st century Russian policy. While doing so, it is disregarding modern means of governance: popular participation, democratic politics, free press, and the rule of law by independent judiciary.
Putin’s Nostalgia
Almost three years ago, Putin said, “We should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.” Clearly, the USSR was Putin’s country. During his career as a KGB officer, he cultivated a sense of duty and loyalty to the state (and to the “guild” of espionage officers) that made the USSR’s collapse, in his words, “the greatest geo-political catastrophe of the 20th century.”.
Since becoming president, his nostalgia for the Soviet past has manifested in the re-adoption of symbols from the Communist period. When that period ended, President Boris Yeltsin resurrected national symbols from the czarist pre-revolutionary period, including the tricolor Russian national flag, the imperial double-headed eagle on the state coat of arms and the hats of military officers, the 19th century-style gala uniforms of the Kremlin guard, and the adoption by the armed forces and security services of patron saints.
Under President Putin, these symbols have been complemented by the communist Red Star, which appears on military hardware such as tanks and aircraft; the re-adoption of Stalin’s Soviet anthem tune as the music for the Russia’s national anthem in 2000; the use of “comrade” as a form of address within the military and security services; and the placement of a bronze bust of Felix Dzerzhinsky in the courtyard of the Internal Affairs Ministry in Moscow in 2005. Dzerzhinsky was the founder of Lenin’s dreaded secret police, the Cheka, and was responsible for arresting, exiling, torturing, and executing countless victims. Moreover, Putin appears to be particularly fond of commemorating every December 20 as Security Services Workers’ Day, or Chekist Day, recalling the day in 1917 when “Iron Felix” founded the Cheka, the predecessor of Stalin’s NKVD, the KGB, and today’s FSB.
Allegedly, the coexistence of czarist and Soviet symbols is a way to connect Russia’s present and past. According to a spokesman for the Moscow Patriarchate, the use of both symbols means that “the continuity of all Russian history is restored and demonstrated.” Of course, the actions of Putin’s government show that this continuity is not limited to symbols. Putin also demonstrates his intent to restore the state’s historically central role in managing the politics, media, and economy in Russia.
Russia’s Military Resurgence
The public display of Russia’s military might reaffirms the power of that centuries-old Eurasian Leviathan, the Russian state. Russia’s resurgence is not limited to military parades, but includes military deployments and maneuvers, as well as the procurement of weapon systems. Last year, Putin ordered a resumption of regular patrols of strategic bombers deep into the Atlantic and Pacific airspace, from which they can launch cruise missiles against the United States. The already frequent ballistic missile test launches are set to double in the years ahead. The Strategic Missile Forces are deploying silo-based, mobile, and ship-based Topol-M, Bulava, and RSM-54 Sineva ICBMs. The Russian Navy is scheduled to commission the first of a new class of ballistic missile submarines this year. Moreover, on January 21–23, for the first time in 15 years, the Russian Navy staged a large-scale exercise in the Bay of Biscay, which included its sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, a guided missile cruiser, and strategic bombers, together with air-refueling tankers and airborne early-warning aircraft.
Conclusion
The announced rearmament, the parade, global maneuvers, and new weapon systems are designed to make others respect Russia as well as deter NATO and the U.S., which is viewed by Putin as a hegemonic superpower seeking to harm Russia. Russia wants to send the signal that it again has the military means to counter both perceived strategic threats, such as the U.S. missile defense system, and conventional military challenges such as NATO expansion and the West’s superior air power. The fanfare communicates Russian intentions to change the global “correlation of forces” in Moscow’s favor and signals Russia’s neighbors to do its bidding and not to challenge its security or its interests.
Russia is back on the world stage with all the attributes of power, including wealth and military might, for all to see. The next Administration will have its hands full dealing with resurgent Moscow.