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By Ariel Cohen & Owen Graham
On January 1, 2009, Russia’s state monopoly OAO Gazprom began reducing gas supplies to Ukraine. Moscow and Kiev had failed to negotiate the price for natural gas, and the initial reduction affected six additional countries: Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. As problematic as this was, the crisis has extended beyond these initial victims. Russia is losing its reputation as a reliable supplier of gas to Europe.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 (UPI) -- Russia held joint naval exercises withVenezuela late last year to demonstrate its growing strategic reach and political clout, particularly in Latin America, which many consider the traditional U.S. sphere of influence.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (UPI) -- As UPI reported, at the end of November Russia successfully test-launched its new-generation land- and sea-based ballistic missile designed to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems such as the one planned for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. The new Russian missile can be equipped with up to 10 warheads, including decoys, to overwhelm or mislead American sensors.
By Ariel Cohen
Despite the raging economic crisis and collapse of oil prices, Russiacontinues to push its global diplomatic offensive, which has overt anti-American overtones. At the end of November, President Dmitry Medvedev paid a week-long visit to Latin America The trip demonstratedRussia’s growing strategic reach and political clout in a region considered a U.S. sphere of influence.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- Russian generals have long felt they should be the ones to set military policy. They have trouble accepting civilian authority -- be it from President Dmitry Medvedev or Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. They derisively describe the minister as a former furniture salesman and tax man, yet Serdyukov knows where the brass keep their money.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI) -- The Arctic Ocean is quickly re-emerging as a strategic area where vital U.S. interests are at stake. The geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the arctic region is rising rapidly, and its mineral wealth will likely transform the region into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 (UPI) -- Implementing military reform is a challenging task for Russian generals. Understanding what’s going on is daunting for outside observers. Moscow’s military leaders seem to think that the best way to proceed is to keep their dirty laundry out of public view.
By Ariel Cohen
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 (UPI) -- The resumption of Cold War-style patrols and increased naval presence in the Arctic Ocean by the Russian navy and air force is in keeping with the Russian Federation’s more forward posture of recent years.
By Ariel Cohen
The day after Barack Obama won the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the first real test for the U.S. President-elect. In his State of the Federation speech, Medvedev threatened to station Iskander short-range nuclear-capable missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave if the U.S. proceeds with deploying anti-missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
By Ariel Cohen and Lajos Szaszdi
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 (UPI) -- The arctic is quickly re-emerging as a strategic area where vital U.S. interests are at stake. The geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the arctic region is rising rapidly, and its mineral wealth will likely transform the region into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century.
By Ariel Cohen
Until Russia can revitalize its naval forces to a much larger degree, its deployments to the Mediterranean contribute more to symbolic and diplomatic activity than being a viable military counterweight to NATO in the region. Yet the Black Sea Fleet in the Med is a significant show of force and a diplomatic irritant and a potential threat to shipping in the Suez Canal and to America’s ally Israel.
By Ariel Cohen
The fifth annual Valdai Club meeting took place against the backdrop of the conflict in the Caucasus and Russia’s recognition of the secessionist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Valdai Club, of which this author is a member, brings together policy experts and journalists fromRussia and the world for discussions with the Russian leadership.
Ariel Cohen
On Aug. 8, Russia decided to rewrite the rules of post-World War II European security. It repudiated the Helsinki Pact of 1975, which recognized the sanctity of borders in Europe, and violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of NATO aspirant Georgia, whose troops had attacked South Ossetia the day before. In the process, Russia also tore up its own peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
By Ariel Cohen
While all the facts of last week’s Russian-Georgian war are not clear, enough information--including eyewitness accounts--has been reported in the media to draw initial conclusions about the performance of Russian military forces and the implications of these operations for U.S. defense policies. Unquestionably, the war is a reminder that "conventional" military operations as an instrument of modern combat are far from obsolete.
By Ariel Cohen
Moscow remains deaf to pleas from Washington and European capitals to cease aggression against its neighbor, Georgia. Last week, as the Olympic Games opened, the tragic and ominous conflict between Georgia and Russia erupted. On Thursday, August 7, South Ossetian separatists, supported by Moscow, escalated their machine gun and mortar fire attacks against neighboring Georgian villages.
By Ariel Cohen
Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) was a titan of 20th century Russian literature and politics. He survived the Stalinist purges, World War II, eight years in the Gulag, Communist denunciation, and even a battle with cancer. After spending 18 years exiled in America, he made a triumphant return to his homeland.
By Ariel Cohen
July 2008 will mark a momentous month in the history of Russian business. This is when Sergey Chemezov, a close associate of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, consolidated control over 426 additional enterprises that are now a part of the Russian Technologies (Rostechnologii) empire. A global, state-owned Russian weapons-and-metals holding has been born.
By Ariel Cohen
In the last few days, Moscow has beefed up its "peacekeeping force" in the breakaway Abkhazia on the Black Sea, claiming it is protecting Russian citizens, who are the majority population of Abkhazia. Furthermore, Russian troops are amassing on the de-facto Abkhazia-Georgia border. The Caucasus may be on the brink of a war. At the same time, Russia has accused Georgia of planning to invade Abkhazia, accusations that sound distinctly hollow under the circumstances.
By Ariel Cohen
Russian President Vladimir Putin began a two-day visit to Libya on April 16, the first by a Russian president to the formerly shunned country. The event was hailed by Libya’s veteran leader Moammar Gadhafi as "historic, strategic and very important." Gadhafi further stated "…given that we are both producers of gas and oil, we will work together to defend our interests."
By Ariel Cohen
This coming weekend, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin will meet for their final summit, to be held in the Russian resort of Sochi on the Black Sea at Putin’s invitation. This will mark the end of an era in a complicated relationship. The question is: Will the two leaders leave the scene while U.S.-Russian relations are at their lowest point since the Cold War, or will they attempt to rescue them?
By Ariel Cohen
Central Asia is a major area of concern for US intelligence agencies, according to an annual threat assessment presented recently by Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell.
McConnell discussed the Annual Threat Assessment -- a document representing the consensus view of 16 US intelligence agencies that covers all global security threats facing Washington -- with US senators on February 5. While Iraq remains an enduring source of concern, the reviving Islamic radical/terrorist threat in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan topped the list of security worries.
"We have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006," McConnell told members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "We assess that al Qaeda’s homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population."
The Assessment warns that Islamic activism may grow in Central Asia as a result of mounting social and economic discontent. In Uzbekistan, a weaker economy and rising prices for commodities are a potential source of trouble for President Islam Karimov’s authoritarian-minded administration. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain stable, Turkmenistan is beginning to open up after years of self-imposed isolation, and it has made improvements in human rights. Yet, unfortunately the Assessment disregards both regime fragility and growing external meddling in the region.
On Russia, the Threat Assessment drops plentiful hints that US-Russian relations stand to become more confrontational in the coming year. It mentions the Kremlin’s aims to dominate the main oil and gas land distribution networks to Europe and East Asia. Energy has become an instrument of Russian power in terms of its foreign policy and international economic relations, the threat assessment states.
The Report mentions the gradual resurgence of Russia’s military forces in terms of better training, more units with higher rates of readiness, military exercises conducted more frequently, and a higher number of strategic bomber patrols over the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.
The Assessment does not dwell at length on Russia’s aspirations to alter the global economic architecture, and to do away with the Western-dominated post-Bretton Woods system. Russian leader Vladimir Putin called for just that in the 2007 St. Petersburg economic summit. Russia, Iran, Venezuela and other energy producers are moving away from the US dollar as the principal currency of settling energy accounts.
Meanwhile, the Threat Assessment views Iran with caution, in particular the country’s nuclear program. In a report released February 22, the International Atomic Energy Agency expressed concern about Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons. The Threat Assessment states that Iran is developing and deploying longer range ballistic missiles with the capability to carry a nuclear warhead. The report does not mention, however, the close links between Iran and Russia regarding the development of the Iranian ballistic missile program. According to the London Daily Telegraph, Russia since 2003 has been supplying ballistic missile technology, including missile production capabilities, and technical assistance by Russian engineers.
Iran is also continuing efforts to enhance its ability to enrich uranium, ostensibly for civilian purposes but with the potential for making nuclear weapons. McConnell has reported that Iran may achieve the technical capability to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon within a few years.
While the intelligence community is certain that Iran stopped in 2003 its secret work to design a nuclear weapon and to enrich uranium for military purposes, it can’t be certain if Iran has restarted these activities. But there is no doubt that Iran has the scientific know-how, the technical capacity, and the industrial capability to develop nuclear weapons at some future point, McConnell said. A lot of this know-how came from Russia.
Moscow, for example, is building for Iran a $1-billion nuclear reactor in Bushehr. The US State Department has accused Iran of using the Bushehr project as a cover for a weapons program. There are also media reports that Iran is either negotiating the purchase of, or has already acquired S-300 long-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. These SAM systems would be deployed to defend the Bushehr nuclear power plant and other key sites like the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility, analysts believe.
Iran also has a chemical weapons program, and it is engaged in research on biological weapons. Teheran’s development of a ballistic missile arsenal and its acquisition of anti-ship cruise missiles are intended to serve as a strategic deterrent in the Persian Gulf, especially at the Strait of Hormuz. Iran would be capable of closing the Strait, and thereby cause considerable disruption to oil exports, in the event of a conflict. In addition, US bases and naval forces in the region would face a serious tactical threat. Iran’s arsenal could also be used to intimidate its neighbors into "withholding support for US policy."
Tehran’s development of longer-range ballistic missiles with the capacity to reach Europe might also to deter NATO countries from permitting US military forces to use bases on their territory during a potential US-Iranian clash. A significant reason why Russia might be assisting Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs could be to support Tehran’s deterrence capability, thereby intimidating NATO countries that host US bases.
Russia and Iran also have similar views on using energy as a geopolitical tool, with both expressing interest in establishing a natural gas cartel, along the lines of OPEC. Such an entity would aim to challenge the established international economic system, dominated by Western industrialized countries.
While the Threat Assessment is sober-minded on many points, it avoids one obvious conclusion involving Russia’s strategic intentions; by re-emphasizing military and economic power, and challenging the West, Moscow, aided and abetted by Teheran, is seeking to change the post-Communist balance of power in Europe, the Middle East, and in the world at large, and is challenging American post-Cold War hegemony. Whether it will succeed or not is a different question. It’s also up in the air whether American policy makers sufficiently comprehend the Kremlin’s capabilities and intentions, and, if they do, whether they can muster the political will that can help frustrate Russian plans.
Lajos Szaszdi, Ph.D., has contributed to the production of this article.
By Ariel Cohen
Last December Russian President Vladimir Putin chose Dmitry Medvedev, a first deputy prime minister, to succeed him in the country’s presidency. March 2 presidential elections are anti-climactic, as they are going to ratify this choice, and as Mr. Medvedev is the only candidate likely to win.
By Ariel Cohen
As Yogi Berra once said, “This is déjà vu all over again.” On May 9, heavy military equipment will once again roll down Moscow’s Red Square for the Victory Day military parade. Tanks, missiles, and 6,000 troops will be joined overhead by Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft and military helicopters. The last time Moscow saw such a display of military hardware on Red Square was November 1990, before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The world should take notice of Russia’s increasing militarism. The parade is designed to generate nostalgia among the Russian people and to signal U.S., NATO, and Russia’s neighbors that Russia’s power is back. Most importantly, it illustrates President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on the military and security services at the expense of modern, democratic institutions.
Putin has justified Russia’s rebuilding of its military muscle in the recent speech to the State Council. Putin claimed that the new arms race has been triggered “by the world’s most developed countries” – a clear reference to the U.S. and the West. Russia’s forthcoming rearmament is not caused by Russia but brought upon it by its adversaries, Putin said. In response to this alleged challenge to Russia’s security, the Kremlin plans to produce and deploy in the next years new weapons claimed to be as good as or even better than its Western equivalents. Research and development in revolutionary biological, nano-, and information technologies with military applications will continue. Putin also wants a new defense strategy for the Russian Armed Forces, and the formation of an “innovative army” based on more professional and better trained servicemen.
What the Parade Means
President Vladimir Putin’s government is reaffirming the central role that the military and the security services play as pillars of the Russian state. This is yet another indication from the Kremlin that the so-called “power” ministries and agencies are the bedrocks of the Russian Federation—as opposed to democracy, an open society, a multiparty system, free media, fair elections, constitutional liberties, and the separation of powers.
The parade is a signal to the world and to the Russian people that the armed forces matter again, after a decade or so of decay following the collapse of the Soviet state. Strategically, the display of newly-built weapon systems—like the road-mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), S-300 mobile long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), bombers, and fighters—are intended to show that the Russian military is resurging with modern, or modernized, arms. This is a hallmark of Putin’s new Russia and a revival of the Soviet and czarist tradition of showing off the country’s military prowess.
To the Russian people, the parade will convey a sense of national pride and security in the face of external threats. First, it will mark the USSR’s heroic moment: victory in “The Great Patriotic War” (1941-1945), in which more than 25 million Soviet citizens were sacrificed—millions of them brutally murdered by the Nazis. Second, the Kremlin wants to resurrect the popular belief that Russia is a great power, which lost credence after the demise of the Soviet Union.
In essence, the parade is another sign that the Russian government is going “back to the future.” It wants to return the military—as well as other instruments of state power, from oil and gas exports to secret police and a subservient judiciary—to the forefront in 21st century Russian policy. While doing so, it is disregarding modern means of governance: popular participation, democratic politics, free press, and the rule of law by independent judiciary.
Putin’s Nostalgia
Almost three years ago, Putin said, “We should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.” Clearly, the USSR was Putin’s country. During his career as a KGB officer, he cultivated a sense of duty and loyalty to the state (and to the “guild” of espionage officers) that made the USSR’s collapse, in his words, “the greatest geo-political catastrophe of the 20th century.”.
Since becoming president, his nostalgia for the Soviet past has manifested in the re-adoption of symbols from the Communist period. When that period ended, President Boris Yeltsin resurrected national symbols from the czarist pre-revolutionary period, including the tricolor Russian national flag, the imperial double-headed eagle on the state coat of arms and the hats of military officers, the 19th century-style gala uniforms of the Kremlin guard, and the adoption by the armed forces and security services of patron saints.
Under President Putin, these symbols have been complemented by the communist Red Star, which appears on military hardware such as tanks and aircraft; the re-adoption of Stalin’s Soviet anthem tune as the music for the Russia’s national anthem in 2000; the use of “comrade” as a form of address within the military and security services; and the placement of a bronze bust of Felix Dzerzhinsky in the courtyard of the Internal Affairs Ministry in Moscow in 2005. Dzerzhinsky was the founder of Lenin’s dreaded secret police, the Cheka, and was responsible for arresting, exiling, torturing, and executing countless victims. Moreover, Putin appears to be particularly fond of commemorating every December 20 as Security Services Workers’ Day, or Chekist Day, recalling the day in 1917 when “Iron Felix” founded the Cheka, the predecessor of Stalin’s NKVD, the KGB, and today’s FSB.
Allegedly, the coexistence of czarist and Soviet symbols is a way to connect Russia’s present and past. According to a spokesman for the Moscow Patriarchate, the use of both symbols means that “the continuity of all Russian history is restored and demonstrated.” Of course, the actions of Putin’s government show that this continuity is not limited to symbols. Putin also demonstrates his intent to restore the state’s historically central role in managing the politics, media, and economy in Russia.
Russia’s Military Resurgence
The public display of Russia’s military might reaffirms the power of that centuries-old Eurasian Leviathan, the Russian state. Russia’s resurgence is not limited to military parades, but includes military deployments and maneuvers, as well as the procurement of weapon systems. Last year, Putin ordered a resumption of regular patrols of strategic bombers deep into the Atlantic and Pacific airspace, from which they can launch cruise missiles against the United States. The already frequent ballistic missile test launches are set to double in the years ahead. The Strategic Missile Forces are deploying silo-based, mobile, and ship-based Topol-M, Bulava, and RSM-54 Sineva ICBMs. The Russian Navy is scheduled to commission the first of a new class of ballistic missile submarines this year. Moreover, on January 21–23, for the first time in 15 years, the Russian Navy staged a large-scale exercise in the Bay of Biscay, which included its sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, a guided missile cruiser, and strategic bombers, together with air-refueling tankers and airborne early-warning aircraft.
Conclusion
The announced rearmament, the parade, global maneuvers, and new weapon systems are designed to make others respect Russia as well as deter NATO and the U.S., which is viewed by Putin as a hegemonic superpower seeking to harm Russia. Russia wants to send the signal that it again has the military means to counter both perceived strategic threats, such as the U.S. missile defense system, and conventional military challenges such as NATO expansion and the West’s superior air power. The fanfare communicates Russian intentions to change the global “correlation of forces” in Moscow’s favor and signals Russia’s neighbors to do its bidding and not to challenge its security or its interests.
Russia is back on the world stage with all the attributes of power, including wealth and military might, for all to see. The next Administration will have its hands full dealing with resurgent Moscow.
By Ariel Cohen
Russia lags behind the United States in aerospace research and development. It has yet to produce decent competitors to America’s two new, fifth-generation fighter jets, the Lockheed Martin (NYSE:LMT) F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter and the Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor.
The main Russian rivals to the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightnings are the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35 (NATO designation Fulcrum F) and the Sukhoi Su-35 (NATO designation Flanker). The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35 is an upgrade of the MiG-29M/M2 and the MiG-29OVT. Both are fourth-generation jets.
The Russian government has been eagerly selling the Sukhoi fighter jets to its friends, so these aircraft are likely to be found in areas where the potential for conflict is greatest, while financing development of the fifth-generation fighter from these export revenues.
Russian analysts like to note that the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning JSF, with a maximum speed of only 1,200 mph, is slower than both the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker -- maximum speed 1,680 mph -- and the MiG-35 Fulcrum -- maximum speed 1,587 mph. The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning’s range of 1,320 miles is below the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker’s range of 2,260 miles as well.
While these measures make the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter seem inferior, they are actually fully consistent with its projected mission: F-35s are designed to operate in tandem with Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptors, which would clear the way for F-35s in real combat.
Moreover, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning JSF’s reported service ceiling of around 57,000 feet is superior to the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35 Fulcrum’s 56,000 feet and the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker’s 55,000 feet. The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning JSF also claims a significant advantage in maneuverability because of its smaller size, advanced materials and lightweight construction.
On the record, Russian defense officials insist their Sukhoi and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG fighters can stand up to their American rivals. But a Russian Defense Ministry expert, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Pravda.ru that Russia "patches" its fourth-generation modifications to extend their lifespan, while most of its fifth-generation fighter program has largely remained on paper.
In fact, statistics are only the broadest indicators of an aircraft’s performance. Combat performance analysis includes maneuverability, stealth, tactics, training, avionics, situation awareness, weapons, countermeasures, interoperability and supportability as major factors.
Stealth is a major discriminator between a 5G fighter like the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter and "Gen 4 plus plus" competitors like the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35 Fulcrum and the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker that are essentially modernizations of their respective progenitors, the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29 and the Sukhoi Su-27. No operational Soviet or Russian stealth aircraft has ever been reported to have entered service.
A U.S. analyst who requested anonymity said that while the Russians have some good specific system technologies, their ability to effectively integrate them often lags behind that of the West, and the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter takes integration of off-board intelligence to a step well beyond proven Russian capabilities.
"From the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union until crude oil prices recently rose to $100 per barrel, the ability of Russian aircraft designers to transition their advanced scientific knowledge through RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation) into production-ready systems has been restricted, with funding available almost solely from sales of its legacy 4th Gen MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters to other countries," the analyst said.
With oil prices collapsing, the challenges of serial production of advanced aerospace weapons systems remains, while the Russian highly skilled military space and aviation industry labor force is pushing 60 -- beyond the life expectancy of an average Russian male.
Sukhoi Su-30 fighters bought by China and India were more advanced than those in Russian air force service, which were procured only in small quantities. Progress in completing the production development of the PAK-FA T-50, Russia’s first 5G fighter design, remains dependent on Indian funding.
While notable improvements have been made in the reliability and supportability of Russian aircraft systems, they still fall far short of Western standards. This is particularly true of aircraft engines.
Russia has a long way to go to catch up with the United States in the prestigious new generation fighter competition. Only domestic politics, such as in Europe; declining economic fortunes of potential partners; and high production costs of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter may slow down its triumphant march.
by Ariel Cohen
Dmitry Medvedev’s endorsement as a presidential candidate by four pro-Putin political parties and by Vladimir Putin himself ends months of rumors in Moscow. Medvedev’s appeal to Putin, asking him to serve as a prime minister after the March presidential elections, confirms not only that Putin will play a pivotal role in Russian politics after he steps down but that he will remain the number one politician of Russia for years to come.
Putin is most likely to be a "super prime minister," with responsibilities over foreign, security, and defense policy. It is possible that after the March elections, Medvedev will transfer control of all or some of these branches to Prime Minister Putin.
Medvedev, a Putin protégé, is perceived as a weak bureaucratic player and will require Prime Minister Putin’s support as he consolidates power in the brutal world of Russia’s politics and oligarchic struggles. In contrast to Putin and other KGB veterans, Medvedev is soft-spoken and bookish. Having been focused on domestic politics and policy, Medvedev lacks experience in foreign policy and national security and may depend on Putin’s advice and support in these areas.
Who Is Medvedev?
Dmitry Medvedev, 42, first deputy prime minister and Putin’s former chief of staff, is the son of a Leningrad (St. Petersburg) professor. He has been a corporate lawyer and a law professor. In 1989, he joined the team of the late St. Petersburg pro-democracy mayor (and law professor) Anatoly Sobchak, at the height of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika reforms. Sobchak was Putin’s mentor. When elected, Medvedev will be the youngest Soviet or Russian leader since the 28-year-old Nicholas II’s accession to the throne in 1896.
Putin has deliberately chosen as a successor a person he can rely on and trust, while he remains the number one Russian politician. He has worked with Medvedev for the last 17 years, starting in the St. Petersburg city hall, where Putin was the deputy mayor in charge of foreign relations and Medvedev a legal advisor. The two struck a fast friendship and partnership, and Medvedev served as Putin’s campaign manager in his Kremlin-orchestrated presidential bid in 2000.
Medvedev became the chairman of Russian energy giant Gazprom and presidential administration chief in 2003--but many insiders say that Putin was still calling the shots in Gazprom. In 2005, Medvedev moved from the Kremlin into Putin’s cabinet, where he supervised "national projects," including health, education, housing, food production, and demography.
The projects are funded from Russia’s energy windfall profits.
Medvedev is known for his classical liberal rhetoric in an era of increasingly harsh nationalist, anti-Western, and anti-democratic pronouncements. For example, he has openly admitted that Russia is facing the problems of excessive dependence on natural resource exports, corruption, and a declining population.
Despite being the chairman of the second-largest state-owned corporation in the world, he appears to criticize the Kremlin’s preferred economic model of state-held companies, preferring private ownership. He said in a recent interview that the state should get involved in economy "only where it was needed." He recently said that "Gazprom will not be able to ’digest’ all of Russia’s energy resources...and thank God for that. Otherwise Gazprom would become the ministry of energy, and we have been trying to pedal away from this...."
Medvedev also said that laws limiting foreigners’ access to Russia’s "strategic" economic sectors, such as energy and natural resources, should be "clear, [and] balanced, and answer practical issues." So far, however, draft legislation on strategic sectors has been murky, and the Duma has delayed the vote.
Medvedev has expressed rhetorical support for a multi-party system based on large, stable parties, while decrying the chaos of the 1990s in Russia. He rejected the usual Russian adjectives when speaking of democracy, such as "controlled" or "sovereign." Yet, he is a part of the administration that cracked down on Yukos Oil Company, kicked Royal Dutch Shell from a lucrative Sakhalin energy project, bought up and shut up almost all opposition media, and conducted the most unfair and unfree elections in Russia since 1991. Mr. Medvedev will have a hard time proving his democratic credentials by opposing the siloviki, divesting the state from media control, and allowing unhindered political activities--an almost impossible task.
Guarantees of Succession
Just as Putin secured the late President Boris Yeltsin’s retirement by granting him a pardon from prosecution and guaranteeing his and his family’s safety and security, Medvedev is doing the same to win Putin’s endorsement. But there is more: He also guarantees Putin’s future political role for years to come by giving him the prime ministership. After the March presidential elections, Putin will stay on the scene as prime minister and the hailed "National Leader," a new and undefined position. This means that Russia is moving further away from constitutional democracy and the rule of law.
The Medvedev appointment also means that Putin and Medvedev have cut a deal with the powerful siloviki ("men of power"), which includes the secret police generals who supervise the security services and the armed forces. These men wanted Putin to stay as president in order to keep their powerful posts at the top of the national bureaucracy and lucrative positions as the heads of state-owned energy and arms-trading companies. They also are the main power behind Russia’s anti-American and anti-Western policy. Their influence is not likely to vanish, as Putin remains prime minister and shares many of their anti-American positions and Medvedev will depend on their support.
Energy Geopolitics
Medvedev is the chairman of Gazprom, the state-owned energy giant with market capitalization of $345 billion, which supplies over 30 percent of Europe’s gas needs. Russia has announced that its strategic goal is to reach capitalization of $1 trillion in seven to ten years, making Gazprom the largest company on Earth. Russia will not be able to accomplish this by permanently alienating its energy customers in Europe and elsewhere, so Russia’s confrontational foreign policy will be somewhat limited by the nature of its energy exports. Yet Medvedev announced that Russia will not sell subsidized gas to its neighbors and presided over the cut-offs of gas supply to Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus.
The New Broom
The rule of thumb is that each regime in Russia is very different from its predecessor. There are discontinuities in each. Thus, Gorbachev’s reign was different than Brezhnev’s, Yeltsin’s was different than Gorbachev’s, and Putin’s rule is different than Yeltsin’s. Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin all "campaigned" as the antitheses of their predecessors. Medvedev, on the other hand, is Putin’s "official" heir and will find it impossible to shed his boss’s control and vision even if he wants to.
First, there are personal promises to keep, especially as far as Putin’s prime ministership and other personnel issues are concerned and especially in the first presidential term. Second, Medvedev, lacking a KGB, military, or other security service background, may have a hard time establishing his control over the levers of power and, therefore, need Putin’s continued support.
But even if Medvedev ever, for some reason, stands on his own two feet, he must remember that public opinion in Russia and the USSR has always been unenthusiastic--to say the least--toward weak leaders: Nicholas II, Georgii Malenkov, Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris Yeltsin all are viewed with disdain by the majority of Russians, while "strong leaders" such as Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander II and III, Putin, and even the monstrous Joseph Stalin and bumbling Brezhnev are viewed by many in a positive light. To succeed, Medvedev will need to show his mettle.
U.S.-Russian Agenda Cannot Be Delayed
The Medvedev-Putin transition should not slow down the work on the complex U.S.-Russian agenda. It requires that the two countries return to business after the dust of transition settles in the two countries in early 2009 or even before.
U.S.-Russian relations today are at an all-time low. The bilateral agenda includes the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. anti-ballistic missile deployment in Europe, restraining Iran’s nuclear program, energy security, building democratic institutions in Russia, and many other issues.
The Bush Administration should give the Putin-Medvedev administration at least a 100-day grace period after Medvedev’s inauguration--until September 2008--to sort out the transition. In the meantime, the U.S. should lay the groundwork for engaging Russia on important issues, for the benefit of the next U.S. President. Specifically, the U.S. should press forward with the next round of sanctions on Iran in the U.N. Security Council, where the Russian vote is crucial, and continue discussions over the Kosovo independence and negotiations on deployment of the missile defense interceptors in Europe.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation
